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# HISTORY OF THE YANKEE DIVISION



Major-General Clarence R. Edwards

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## **HISTORY**

OF THE

### YANKEE DIVISION

bu

HARRY A. BENWELL

with appreciations by

GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING

MAJOR-GENERAL CLARENCE R. EDWARDS

and

SECRETARY OF WAR NEWTON D. BAKER



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### **PREFACE**

In preparing the "History of the Yankee Division," the author is indebted to Major-General Clarence R. Edwards, General John J. Pershing, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and Brigadier-General Harry C. Hale for tributes to the Twenty-sixth Division, which appear as forewords.

Thanks are also due for personal assistance rendered in the compilation of the work by Major-General Edwards, Brigadier-General Charles H. Cole, Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew L. Pendleton, Brigadier-General George H. Shelton, Major John W. Hyatt, Lieutenant-Colonel James L. Howard, Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton R. Horsey, and other members of the Division, both officers and enlisted men, together with Bert Ford, Boston's own war correspondent; and also to The New England Publishing Company for the permission to reprint the work which appeared serially in the Boston Sunday Advertiser and American and the Boston American.

It is hoped that readers of this book, especially those associated with the famous Yankee Division, will accept it in the spirit in which it is offered, — as a tribute to the men of the Division and to its great leader, Clarence Ransome Edwards.

# GENERAL PERSHING'S TRIBUTE TO THE YANKEE DIVISION

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, March 21, 1919.

Major-General Harry C. Hale, Commanding Twenty-sixth Division, American Expeditionary Forces, Écommoy.

My Dear General Hale: — It gives me a great deal of pleasure to congratulate you, and through you all the officers and men of the Twenty-sixth Division, on their splendid appearance at the inspection and review which was held near Écommoy on February 19. The spirit and soldierly bearing of all ranks pleased me very much, and was what one would have expected of a division with such a long and excellent record in France.

Arriving in the autumn of 1917, the division went through the prescribed course of instruction until early in 1918, when, brigaded with the French, it entered the line for a month and a half's further training north of Soissons, in the Chemin des Dames sector. It was withdrawn for rest when the German offensive of March 21 necessitated its immediate return to the line in the La Reine and Boucq sectors, north of Toul. Here it had two important engagements, — one in the Apremont Forest, where it repulsed with loss a heavy German raid, and at Seicheprey, where casualties on both sides amounted to approximately 2,000 men.

On July 18 the division was thrown into the battle between the Aisne and the Marne, advancing in seven days more than 17 kilometers against determined enemy

opposition, and capturing the towns of Epieds, Trugny, Torcey, Belleau and Givry.

It next took part in the American offensive of September at St. Mihiel. Operating under the Fifth Corps in the Rupt and Troyon sectors, north of St. Mihiel, it captured Bois-des-Eparges, Hattonchatel and Vigneulles.

Later, during the Meuse-Argonne offensive, it attacked northeast of Verdun, and aided in the storming of Etrayes Ridge, capturing Bois-de-Belleu and the Bois d'Ormont, one of the most formidable heights in that region. The division was in this sector when the armistice called a halt to active operations.

Each soldier should be proud of the share which the Twenty-sixth Division has had in adding glory to the fighting record of our armies, and I want every man to know of my own appreciation, and that of his fellows throughout the American Expeditionary Forces, for the splendid work which has been done.

Very sincerely yours,

John Herseine

# GENERAL EDWARDS' TRIBUTE TO THE YANKEE DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS NORTHEASTERN DEPARTMENT, 99 CHAUNCY STREET, BOSTON, MASS.

In answer to your gracious request that I give to you some words of mine that you may use in your paper as a tribute to the Yankee (Twenty-sixth) Division, that it was my good fortune to command until the twenty-fifth day of October, 1918, I hasten to say to you that the Yankee Division proved itself to be a stout-hearted lot of lads, whose acts, determination, dash and enduring carrying-on ability under the greatest handicaps and desperate tests in critical times of this great war definitely proved that the blood of New England had not attenuated.

Advance notice of the authority to organize this division was received by telegram from Washington, August 13, 1917; the birth of the division dates from August 22, very nearly simultaneously with the formal authority to organize it. On that date it was fully organized throughout and its ranks full.

It was never concentrated as a division until after it reached France. It was the first division to be fully organized under the American flag. The whole division went into the firing line on the Chemin des Dames on the 6th of February, 1918, after three months' training under difficulties which were as great as ever fell to the lot of a division. It was forty-six days in the first-line trenches, without one case of absence without leave, on the Chemin des Dames, where it was first concentrated as a division.

With the exception of a ten days' training period after Château-Thierry, at Chatillon-sur-Seine, where it absorbed 6,000 replacements, this division, without one day's furlough, was fighting and functioning as a division with every element complete and in co-ordination tested out by the most desperate battles of the war. No division had harder service, no division was longer in the line or gained more distance or fought off more attacks than did this division.

It was not a Regular Army division, it was not a National Guard division, nor was it a National Army division; it was a division of the army of the United States in accordance with the President's orders, and no better division ever fought under the American flag or any other flag.

This division had an "esprit," a soul, which well took the place of the lack of time heretofore deemed necessary to fit a division to fight as this division did. The record of the Twenty-sixth Division, — its discipline, its accomplishments, what it did to the enemy compared to its own losses, — is a valuable lesson to the United States to indicate what can be accomplished in the shortest time, and its best argument in support of universal training of the youth of America, which I hope and pray will not be ignored. It tells how citizens can be mobilized, and anybody who approaches the defence of the United States from the standpoint other than the mobilization of all its citizenry fails to solve the problem of defence.

Loyalty is the priceless jewel of chivalry, and that jewel was in the hearts of the men of the Twenty-sixth Division.

C. P. Euras 3.

# SECRETARY BAKER'S TRIBUTE TO THE YANKEE DIVISION

The Twenty-sixth Division, under the command of Major-General Clarence R. Edwards, embarked for France in September, 1917. It trained actively after its arrival in France, and in March, 1918, was associated with the Eleventh French Army Corps. It was with this corps until it moved to the district of Toul to take over the sector occupied by the First Regular Division of the United States Army. In July it engaged in active offensive operations as a part of the Sixth French Army. It participated in the attack north of the Marne, and later played a decisive part in the battle of the St. Mihiel salient and in the battle of the Argonne.

Throughout its career it won the high praise of its French associates for its gallantry and soldierly qualities. It is one of America's veteran divisions, and it has left a record in France which is its full share of the glory achieved by our great army there. The people of the New England States who contributed these soldiers to the American Expeditionary Forces can welcome their heroes back, for they are heroes - men who have had a perilous and difficult duty and who have done it to the admiration of all beholders. They have had losses, and many of the men returned with wound chevrons to show the fierceness of the contests in which they participated, but they have exalted the traditions of the country from which they came, they have played the part of men on the greatest stage in the world, and they bring back glory for their own achievements and victory for the national cause.

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Secretary of War.

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# History of THE YANKEE DIVISION

"The Yankee Division!"

A name to conjure with wherever fighting ability is respected.

A division that will go down into immortality as having gloriously upheld the martial traditions of New England, and established new standards of fighting efficiency in the great war for democracy.

A division that carried out the most brilliant attacks in the face of all obstacles, and whose sheer, indomitable spirit caused these heroes to go on, superior to exhaustion and disease.

Time and again the Twenty-sixth achieved what the veteran French believed to be impossibilities, and as a result the Yankee Division came to be known as "Shock Troops."

The first full division to be organized and transported to France, and the first to occupy a sector as a full division, the Twenty-sixth had nearly ten months of continuous service, and took part in the bloodiest battles of the war.

Chemin des Dames, the Toul sector, Château-Thierry, Seicheprey, Belleau Wood, the St. Mihiel salient, Argonne Forest and many others testify to the high emprise and daredevil courage of the fighting New Englanders.

Carrying out their operations with skill, endurance, bulldog tenacity and cold nerve that has never been surpassed, the division was time and again selected to hold the hardest positions, and as a result thousands of the men were cited for bravery or won the Croix de Guerre.

The Twenty-sixth Division led all other National Guard divisions in the number of decorations received, and stood fourth in the list of American divisions in the matter of citations.

The colors of the 104th Infantry, formerly the 2d, 6th and 8th Massachusetts, were decorated with the Croix de Guerre, and for a long time this was the only regiment in the United States Army to be so honored by a foreign government.


As a further testimonial, and owing to the fact that it had seen the most service, the Twenty-sixth Division was host to President Wilson at a Christmas dinner while he was in France attending the Peace Conference. In addition, a battalion of the division acted as guard of honor to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the United States.

From February 6, 1918, until the signing of the armistice, the Yankee Division was almost continually in action, with the result that the men were too exhausted to make up a part of the Army of Occupation, and thereby carry out their cherished desire of marching into Germany.

Shunted from one part of France to another wherever there was a difficult task to be done, the Twenty-sixth Division scarcely ever knew where it would be next day. At one time the Yankees were the only troops between the German and the beautiful French capital which he had sworn to occupy. They threw him back, and for that act were hailed as the "Saviors of Paris."

Undaunted by cold, fatigue, insufficient food and clothing, and an almost paralyzing lack of sleep, they pressed on, with only ten days' rest in nearly ten months.

When the end came, and they were selected to make up part of the Army of Triumph of General Foch, it was found that they were done. Casualties had reduced the



Major-General Harry C. Hale

companies to half strength. Human beings could stand no more. Their shoes were worn out, their clothing was in rags, they had but a handful of emaciated horses, and their equipment was in terrible condition. Therefore they were compelled to move to a training area for the rest and recuperation, refilling and refitting, to which they were so justly entitled.

From beginning to end the record of the Twenty-sixth Division was one that should make every New Englander's heart swell with pride. Not only in battle did the New England boys conduct themselves like heroes, but while on leave their conduct was so exemplary that the general in command of the leave area was forced to comment on it.

They added another chapter to New England history, and their deeds will take rank with those of the heroes of Bunker Hill and the Green Mountain boys at Ticonderoga.

Many failed to come back, but they gave up their lives for one of the most worthy causes the world has ever known. They sleep in hallowed graves, which are carefully tended by grateful French women, who breathe a prayer with every flower they lay on the last resting places of the chivalrous Americans.

The division sailed from the United States with nearly 28,000 New Englanders, but when the armistice was signed less than 30 per cent. of the original members remained. The casualties numbered 11,955, and the New Englanders were further reduced by transfers.

The Yankee Division spent an aggregate of two hundred and ten days on the firing line, and while in the La Reine and Boucq sector, north of Toul, was engaged in the first two battles in which the Americans fought without the support of French infantry.

It was never concentrated as a division until it went

into the line for the first time, on the Chemin des Dames sector, north of Soissons, when it was placed in support of the French on February 6, 1918. For nine months following this time the division spent only ten days in a rest area, yet it captured thousands of prisoners and material, and advanced a total depth of 37 kilometers.

The impression made by the division on the enemy was shown by an extract from a confidential document, captured from the Nineteenth German Army, and made public by British general headquarters, which read:—

The Twenty-sixth American Division is a fighting division which has proven its qualities in battles on various parts of the front.

The division was cited in General Orders No. 7, Headquarters Eleventh Army Corps (French), March 15, 1918.

Cited (104th Infantry) in General Orders No. 737A., Headquarters Thirty-second Army Corps (French), April 26, 1918.

Commended (101st Infantry) in service memorandum, Headquarters Eighth Army (French), June 8, 1918.

Commended in memorandum, Headquarters Seventh Army (French), June 17, 1918.

Congratulated in memorandum, Headquarters Thirty-second Army Corps (French), June 18, 1918.

Cited in General Orders No. 131, Headquarters Thirty-second Army Corps (French), June 18, 1918.

Commended (103d Infantry) in letter from General Headquarters, A. E. F., June 20, 1918.

Cited in General Orders No. 133, Headquarters Thirty-second Army Corps (French), June 27, 1918.

Congratulated in letter, Headquarters Sixth Army (French), July 29, 1918.

Cited in General Orders, Sixth Army (French), August 9, 1918.

Cited in General Orders, General Headquarters, A. E. F., August 28, 1918.

Cited (102d Infantry) in General Orders No. 19, Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, A. E. F., September 18, 1918.

Commended in letter from Headquarters Second Colonial Corps (French), October 7, 1918.

Commended in letter from Headquarters Second Colonial Corps (French), October 24, 1918.

Commended in letter from Headquarters Seventeenth Army Corps (French), October 24, 1918.

Commended (104th Infantry) in letter from Headquarters Eighteenth Division (French), October 17, 1918.

Commended in letter from Headquarters Second Colonial Corps (French), November 14, 1918.

As has been stated, there were many individual citations for bravery in the division, — in fact, one of the largest lists in the American army, but there were also many other acts of heroism which were overlooked in the excitement of battle. Practically every man in the organization bore himself like a hero, and it is related how, during attacks, general prisoners working near the front lines seized rifles from wounded or dead comrades and fought on like demons.

An incident typical of many heroic acts was that which resulted in the citation of the first man awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, the highest award in the gift of the United States. The citation read:—

Private First Class George Dilboy (deceased), Company H, 103d Infantry.

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action with the enemy on July 18, 1918, near Belleau, France.

After his platoon had gained its objective along a railroad embankment, Private Dilboy, accompanying his platoon leader to reconnoiter the ground beyond, was suddenly fired upon by an enemy machine gun from 100 yards. From a standing position on the railroad track, fully exposed to view, he opened fire at once, but, failing to silence the gun, rushed forward with his bayonet fixed, through a wheat field towards the gun emplacement, falling within 25 yards of the gun, with his right leg nearly severed above the knee, and with several bullet holes in his body. With undaunted courage he continued to fire into the emplacement from a prone position, killing two of the enemy and dispersing the rest of the crew.

Too much cannot be said in regard to the work done by the divisional chaplains. Not only did these men of God hold services whenever the opportunity presented itself, but their very presence and cheerful attitude did much to uphold the wonderful spirit of the men. Furthermore, a number went "over the top" with their boys, and all were decorated for their splendid work in tending the wounded under fire and serving hot coffee and food to the men in the front line.

They took part in the men's joys and shared in their sorrows, administered both physical and spiritual aid, and wherever they might be were loved and revered as true servants of Christianity.

One of them, Chaplain Danker of Worcester, made "the great sacrifice," being killed by shell fire, and a number of others were wounded while ministering to the wounded.

The division first went into line on February 6, 1918, on the Chemin des Dames sector, and was withdrawn on March 21. In this connection it may be said that dates of entry and dates of withdrawal are the dates on which the command passed to or from the Twenty-sixth Divi-

sion. These dates, as a matter of fact, do not in reality show the exact time which all units served in line. There were several instances where regiments and brigades entered the line several days in advance of the passing of command to the division.

On April 3 the division moved into La Reine and Boucq sector, north of Toul, and stayed there until June 28. On July 10 the Pas Fini sector at Château-Thierry was entered, and the division was withdrawn on July 25. September 8 marked the entrance of the organization into the St. Mihiel salient, where it fought until October 8, and on October 18 it moved into the line north of Verdun, being withdrawn November 14, three days after the signing of the armistice.

During these nine months' service the division spent only ten days in a rest area, just prior to the battle of St. Mihiel, the rest of the time being occupied in moving from one sector to another, or in support position awaiting entry into line.

Important features of the line in the several sectors held by the division were in the —

Chemin des Dames: A, the Chemin des Dames; B, Fort de Malmaison; C, Chavignon Valley; D, Laffaux Valley; E, Pinon Woods; F, Cheval Mort Hill; G, Aisne River; H, Rouge Maison; I, Rochefort.

La Reine and Boucq: A, Mont Sec; B, Bois Brule (Apremont Woods); C, Seicheprey (Remiere Woods and Jury Woods); D, Xivray-Marvoisin; E, Dead Man's Curve.

Château-Thierry: A, Bois Belleau; B, Hill 190; C, Bouresches railway station; D, Trugny Woods; E, Epieds; F, Vesle River (Artillery Brigade); G, Vaux.

St. Mihiel: A, Les Eparges; B, Vigneulles; C, Hatton Chatel; D, Demmartin; E, Bois de St. Remy.

Argonne-Meuse: A, Bois Bellieu; B, Hill 360; C, Bois d'Ormont; D, Bois d'Haumont; E, Bois d'Etrayes; F, Les Houppy Bois; G, La Wavrille; H, Bois de Ville devant Chaumont; I, Côte de Talou.

Despite the fact that this division was composed of National Guard troops, with practically no previous experience, and lacking the lengthy training deemed so necessary by regular army officers, the Twenty-sixth went through the terrific struggle with no lowering of its magnificent morale. Though suffering the most terrible punishment in the various engagements, the Twenty-sixth came through with flying colors, and at the end it might well have been said, as it was of Napoleon's famous Old Guard, "The division dies, but never retreats."

### CHAPTER I

### Organization

The history of the Twenty-sixth Division is practically the history of the accomplishments of one man, Clarence R. Edwards, Major-General, U. S. A.

He organized the division, took it to France, and there by personal contact built up the wonderful morale which he had no time to secure by prolonged training.

A clear-visioned fighter of the old school, with a healthy contempt for theory and army red tape, he did not know the meaning of the word "can't." General Edwards led his division from one brilliant success to another, constantly endearing himself more and more to his men. The "Old Man," as he was called, was regarded with almost fanatical affection and veneration.

When General Edwards was relieved from command on October 25 and returned to the United States, the men of the Twenty-sixth were stunned, and tears came to the eves of many war-worn veterans. Although succeeded by Brigadier-General Frank E. Bamford, who in turn on November 19 was relieved by Major-General Harry C. Hale, General Edwards continued to be "Our General" to the men of the Twenty-sixth Division. They wrote letters to their parents, urging them to go and hear the speeches being made by General Edwards, who had assumed, for the second time, command of the Department of the Northeast, with headquarters in Boston. And those of the men who were already at home, having been discharged after recovering from wounds, never failed to turn out to listen once more to the voice of their beloved commander.

General Edwards acquired his first experience as a fighter in the Philippines, and later was placed in command of the Panama Canal Zone. There he acquired much experience in administration, and expended large sums of money in the betterment of conditions.

When the Department of the Northeast was organized, General Edwards was placed in command. He came to Boston gladly, as both he and Mrs. Edwards had relatives in this city, as well as many friends.

With other far-sighted men General Edwards believed that the United States would be drawn into the war. As a result of this belief he began a study of the New England National Guard as soon as his new command was smoothly under way.

He found the National Guard, on the whole, to be in good shape, having been well equipped by the various States. The Guard obtained valuable experience on the Mexican Border in 1916, although there were some incidents connected with that affair which were not of much credit to any one.

When the time came for this country to take part in the mammoth struggle overseas, General Edwards was thoroughly familiar with the material of which the heroic Yankee Division was to be composed.

On August 14, 1917, he received a letter from the Adjutant-General's office, dated the previous day, containing authority to organize a full division from National Guard troops, under the new tables of organization which had just been adopted by the War Department. It was decided that this division was to be known as the Twenty-sixth Division of the National Army, and "National Guard" was to be forgotten.

This letter was delivered to General Edwards by the then Major George H. Shelton, General Staff, who later



Brigadier-General Charles H. Cole

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became a brigadier-general. Shelton also brought advance copies of the new tables of organization, which showed radical changes in the make-up and personnel of military units. These copies were secured nine days in advance of their issue by the War Department, and as a result of this fact the general was enabled to speed up the organization of the division and get the jump on other organizations.

The War Department instructions allowed considerable leeway in working out the reorganization of the guard outfits, and General Edwards took advantage of this fact. It was apparent, from his study of the local conditions, that the War Department plan did not meet them fully, so he went ahead and worked out a different combination.

Establishing his headquarters at No. 25 Huntington Avenue, General Edwards sent for all organization commanders affected, who could be conveniently brought to Boston. He explained the situation to them in confidence, and then outlined the plans he proposed to follow to meet it, together with the military emergency which rendered reorganization necessary. Among these officers were Colonels George S. Simonds, J. W. Beacham, H. P. Hobbs, L. W. Cass and C. M. Dowell, all regulars, who had been assigned from Washington.

In a similar way, either in person, by a staff officer or by letter, General Edwards informed all of the Governors of the New England States in confidence of the situation and the plans evolved to meet it. Full co-operation was promised and given, and it proved to be complete, intelligent and helpful.

As was expected, some opposition arose to the breaking up of established National Guard organizations, and to the transfers from one organization to another as required

to meet the conditions of the problem. Some of this opposition was direct, some of it was indirect, through members of Congress and State officers, and through appeals to the War Department. Much of it was based on ignorance, and some of it upon misunderstanding of the facts of the case. Wherever it was possible to explain the matter in detail to those interested opposition was rapidly dissipated.

During the time of organization General Edwards, Major (then Captain) John W. Hyatt, his aide, Major Shelton and others sat up seventy-two hours at a stretch, at times, working out details. There were many obstacles, some of them apparently insurmountable, but the optimism and initiative of General Edwards, which, through his remarkable personality, he was able to transmit to his staff, overcame them.

As has been stated, the National Guard was fortunately well equipped with motor transport, animal transport, combat wagons and other material. What was needed in the way of clothing and other supplies was on hand, owing to the aforementioned foresight of the general.

When he was commander of the Northeastern Department, Colonel Williamson, the depot quartermaster, had presented a requisition for supplies. These called for enough for about 50,000 men only. General Edwards immediately told him to make it a million, but Williamson demurred, claiming that he had no authority, whereupon General Edwards ordered him to do it, and the matter was settled.

And so the work of reorganization went on. General Edwards brought a keen, trained mind to the task, and displayed none of the usual attitude of the Regular Army officer toward National Guard organizations. His spirit of frank, manly good fellowship and consideration for

others in a short time made him the idol of all his officers, and aided him greatly in securing results.

Within a very few days a plan of organization was worked out and the division formed. Major Shelton was promoted to lieutenant-colonel and made chief of staff. The General's aides included Captain Hyatt, Captain A. L. Pendleton and Captain "Nat" Simpkins of Boston, who later died in France, and who was mourned by the commanding officer as he would have mourned a son. Colonel Simonds was made divisional adjutant and Colonel Cass assistant adjutant.

Division headquarters was made up of officers assigned by the War Department and officers and enlisted men transferred from the division at large and by enlistment. Troop B of the old Massachusetts Squadron of Cavalry became the Headquarters Troop, commanded by Captain Oliver Wolcott.

The next unit to be organized was the 101st Machine Gun Battalion, which was composed of the 1st Connecticut Squadron of Cavalry, with additional strength from the 1st Vermont Infantry. This outfit was commanded by Major James L. Howard of Hartford, Ct., an old National Guard officer. The battalion was encamped at Niantic, Ct.

There were two infantry brigades, the Fifty-first and Fifty-second, and the Fifty-first Artillery Brigade.

Brigadier-General Peter E. Traub was given command of the Fifty-first Infantry Brigade, and Brigadier-General Charles H. Cole, former Boston fire commissioner, of the Fifty-second. General Cole, having previous experience as a National Guard officer, had enlisted as a private when the United States entered the war, and his promotion was rapid.

The artillery brigade was commanded by Brigadier-

General William L. Lassiter, a Regular Army officer, as was General Traub.

The Fifty-first Infantry Brigade was largely made up of Boston and other eastern Massachusetts troops, and for that reason was most popular locally. It consisted of the 101st and 102d Infantry and the 102d Machine Gun Battalion.

Men from the famous "Fighting 9th" Massachusetts, with the 5th and a part of the 6th, made up the 101st, and Colonel Edward L. Logan, who had led the 9th on the Mexican Border, was placed in command. Colonel Logan was judge of the South Boston Police Court, and had been an officer of the 9th for years. His lieutenant-colonel was John H. Dunn, Boston street commissioner, who enlisted in the 9th in 1888, and saw service in the Spanish-American war.

Another Boston city official in the regiment was Major William J. Casey, commanding the 2d Battalion and former superintendent of the city printing plant, who, like Dunn, first enlisted in the 9th in 1888, and was a veteran of the Spanish war. Lieutenant William L. Drohan was clerk of Colonel Logan's court in South Boston.

Owing to an intense spirit of pride in their respective organizations, which had been manifested by the men of both regiments time and again on the Border, there was some confusion at first when the reorganization went into effect.

This was straightened out within a short time, however, unlike similar incidents in certain other divisions.

The 102d Infantry was a combination of the 2d Connecticut, with additional strength from the 1st Connecticut, 1st Vermont and 6th Massachusetts. Colonel Ernest S. Isbell was made regimental commander.

The 102d Machine Gun Battalion was the old Massachusetts Squadron of Cavalry, less Troop B, with additional strength from the 1st Vermont Infantry. Major John Perrins, Jr., was given command of the battalion.

The Fifty-second Infantry Brigade was made up of the 103d and 104th Infantry and the 103d Machine Gun Battalion. The 2d Maine Infantry, with additional strength from the 1st New Hampshire, made up the 103d. The 104th Infantry was composed of the 2d Massachusetts, with additional strength from the 6th and 8th Massachusetts.

Colonel Frank H. Hume was made commander of the 103d Infantry, and Colonel William C. Hayes of Spring-field assumed command of the 104th.

The Rhode Island Squadron of Cavalry, less Troops B and M, and the New Hampshire Machine Gun Troop, with additional strength from the 1st Vermont Infantry, went to make up the 103d Machine Gun Battalion of which Major Walter G. Gatchell was made commanding officer.

With these units organized, the next task was the formation of the Fifty-first Field Artillery Brigade. It was decided to make it up with the 101st, 102d and 103d Field Artillery, the latter a regiment of "heavies," and the 101st Trench Mortar Battery.

The 1st Massachusetts Field Artillery, with additional strength from the New England Coast Artillery, composed the 101st Field Artillery, and Colonel John H. Sherburne became regimental commander.

The 2d Massachusetts Field Artillery, helped out by the New England Coast Artillery, made up the 102d, Colonel M. E. Locke, commanding, with Lieutenant-Colonel Thorndike D. Howe second in command.

For the heavy regiment were taken Batteries A of New

Hampshire, E and F of Connecticut, and 1st Battalion Rhode Island Field Artillery, with additional strength from headquarters and supply companies, composite cavalry regiment, Troop M, Rhode Island Squadron of Cavalry and part of the New England Coast Artillery. The regimental commander was Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Hale.

The trench mortar battery was made up of the 1st Maine Heavy Field Artillery. This battery was commanded by Captain Roger A. Greene.

It then became necessary to secure an engineer regiment, and for this purpose the 1st Massachusetts Engineers were at hand. Originally the old First Corps of Cadets, Boston's crack National Guard organization, the outfit had changed to an engineer regiment when it was learned that there would be no chance for it to get into action in any other way. With additional strength from the 1st Maine Heavy Field Artillery and the New England Coast Artillery, the organization became the 101st Engineers, commanded by Colonel George W. Bunnell. The Massachusetts Field Signal Battalion was taken over complete as the 101st Field Signal Battalion under Major Harry G. Chase.

Then came the 101st Train Headquarters and Military Police, commanded by Colonel Warren E. Sweetser, formerly of the 2d Massachusetts; the 101st Ammunition Train, composed of the 1st Vermont Infantry and local coast artillery, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel William J. Keville of the old 8th Massachusetts; the 101st Supply Train, from Troop B, Rhode Island Squadron of Cavalry, with additional strength from the 8th Massachusetts, and commanded by Captain Davis G. Arnold; the 101st Engineer Train, from the 6th Massachusetts, First Lieutenant S. R. Waller, commanding, and the 101st

Sanitary Train, Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Bevans, commanding. This sanitary train was composed of Ambulance Companies Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, and Field Hospitals Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. The 1st and 2d Massachusetts Ambulance Companies made up Ambulance Companies Nos. 1 and 2; the First Connecticut Ambulance Company became Ambulance Company No. 3, and the First Rhode Island Ambulance Company became Ambulance Company No. 4.

In the same way the 1st and 2d Massachusetts Field Hospitals became Field Hospitals Nos. 1 and 2; the First Connecticut became No. 3, and the First New Hampshire became Field Hospital No. 4. A mobile ordnance repair shop was formed by transfers from the division at large.

All the remaining troops under General Edwards' jurisdiction were assigned to the Fifty-first Depot Brigade, consisting of 35 officers and 596 enlisted men from the 1st New Hampshire Infantry; 29 officers and 284 enlisted men from the 1st Vermont Infantry: 37 officers and 503 enlisted men from the 5th Massachusetts Infantry: 18 officers and 360 enlisted men from the 6th Massachusetts Infantry; 28 officers and 406 enlisted men from the 8th Massachusetts Infantry; 20 officers and 365 enlisted men from the 1st Connecticut Infantry: 40 officers and 776 enlisted men from the 1st Maine Field Artillery; 3 officers and 62 enlisted men from Company B. New Hampshire Signal Troops; 3 officers and 64 enlisted men from Company A, Connecticut Signal Troops; 1 officer and 109 enlisted men from the first separate company, Connecticut infantry; and 3 officers and 149 enlisted men from the first separate company of Massachusetts infantry. This was a total of 217 officers and 3,674 enlisted men.

Following are copies of the General Orders issued by

General Edwards officially organizing the division on August 22, 1917:—

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION, BOSTON, MASS., August 22, 1917.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 2.

1. In compliance with telegraphic authority of the War Department dated August 13, 1917, and in accordance with confidential tables of organization published by the War Department, the Twenty-sixth Division is hereby organized from the units of the New England National Guard, as follows:—

Divisional Headquarters Troop, Captain Oliver Wolcott, commanding.

101st Machine Gun Battalion, Major James L. Howard, commanding.

Fifty-first Brigade, Brigadier-General Peter E. Traub, commanding; 101st Infantry, Colonel E. L. Logan, commanding; 102d Infantry, Colonel E. S. Isbell, commanding; 102d Machine Gun Battalion, Major John Perrins, Jr., commanding.

Fifty-second Brigade, Brigadier-General Charles H. Cole, commanding; 103d Infantry, Colonel F. H. Hume, commanding; 104th Infantry, Colonel William C. Hayes, commanding; 103d Machine Gun Battalion, Major W. G. Gatchell, commanding.

Fifty-first Field Artillery Brigade, Brigadier-General W. Lassier, commanding; 101st Field Artillery, Colonel J. H. Sherburne, commanding; 102d Field Artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel T. D. Howe, commanding; 103d Field Artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Hale, commanding; trench mortar battery, Captain Roger A. Greene, commanding.

Engineer Regiment, Twenty-sixth Division, Colonel George W. Bunnell, commanding.

Field Signal Battalion, Twenty-sixth Division, Major Harry G. Chase, commanding.

Headquarters Train and Military Police, Colonel W. E. Sweetser, commanding.

Ammunition Train (to be designated), commanding.
Supply Train, Captain Davis G. Arnold, commanding.

Engineer Train, First Lieutenant S. R. Waller, commanding.



Major-General Peter E. Traub

Bachrach



Company D, 104th, Yankee Division, Getting into Shape for the Hardships of Overseas' Service



Troops leaving for Debarkation Overseas

Sanitary Train, Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Bevans, commanding; Ambulance Company No. 1, Ambulance Company No. 2, Ambulance Company No. 3, Ambulance Company No. 4, Field Hospital No. 1, Field Hospital No. 2, Field Hospital No. 3, Field Hospital No. 4.

2. The transfers and assignment of commissioned and enlisted personnel to accomplish the organization of the new units in accordance with the War Department tables of organization will be as set forth in detail in letters of instruction from the chief of staff to organization commanders concerned.

By command of Major-General Edwards,

GEORGE H. SHELTON,
Lieutenant-Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

#### Official:

GEORGE S. SIMONDS,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,

Adjutant.

Headquarters Twenty-sixth Division, Boston, Mass., August 30, 1917.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 3.

- 1. In accordance with instructions from the War Department dated August 13, 1917, Brigadier-General E. Leroy Sweetser, National Army, is assigned to the command of the depot brigade of the Twenty-sixth Division.
- 2. The following troops are assigned to the depot brigade of the Twenty-sixth Division:—

1st Regiment, New Hampshire Infantry, National Guard.

1st Regiment, Vermont Infantry, National Guard.

5th Regiment, Massachusetts Infantry, National Guard.

6th Regiment, Massachusetts Infantry, National Guard.

8th Regiment, Massachusetts Infantry, National Guard.

1st Regiment, Connecticut Infantry, National Guard.

1st Regiment, Maine Field Artillery (Heavy), National Guard.

Company B, New Hampshire Signal Corps, National Guard.

Company A, Connecticut Signal Corps, National Guard.

And all other officers and enlisted men of the National Guard of the New England States in active service, exclusive of those belonging to or on duty with the coast artillery or assigned to duty with the active organizations of the Twenty-sixth Division.

By command of Major-General Edwards,

GEORGE H. SHELTON,

Lieutenant-Colonel, General Staff,

Chief of Staff.

#### Official:

HORACE P. HOBBS,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,

Acting Adjutant.

#### CHAPTER II

# **Expands All United States Units**

In ordering the organization of the division, the War Department had asked General Edwards if he could ship part of it the 1st of September and part the 15th. He replied that he could ship all by the 1st of September. They again wired asking, "Are you reasonably sure?" to which the general replied, "I am not reasonably sure; I am certain."

Prior to this war the largest regiment in American service contained 2,000 men, which was 600 larger than anything we had had in actual practice. The new organization required 1,000 men in every battalion, and very nearly 1,000 men in the headquarters, machine gun and supply companies, making little less than 4,000 men in a regiment. Those 4,000 men per regiment meant a bigger regiment, of greater strength, than the largest brigade United States Army officers had ever thought of. The brigade was some 7,800 men, and the division about 32,000, greater than an army corps in the civil war.

The command was virtually organized in forty-eight hours, day and night work, and this accomplishment was largely due to the co-operation furnished by the press of Boston and New England. In the words of General Edwards, "everybody played the game." After taking 100 integral numbers for what the regular army might expand in, it took 25 numbers of the Regular Army, and, therefore, the division became the Twenty-sixth.

General Edwards found it necessary to take a large number of coast artillerymen, and for this he was criti-

cised by the War Department. He said he was very sorry, but they had sailed, whereupon the War Department replied: "In the next war don't you dare do it again." He also took some draft men from Camp Devens.

The division was not concentrated at any one point, and as a matter of fact never came together as a whole unit until it entered the front line in France. Division headquarters, with the Headquarters Troop and 101st Field Signal Battalion, as well as the 101st Engineers, were at Boston. Framingham was headquarters of the Fifty-first Infantry Brigade, the 101st Infantry and the 102d Machine Gun Battalion. The 102d Infantry was at New Haven, Ct., the 103d Machine Gun Battalion was at Quonset Point, R. I., the 101st Machine Gun Battalion at Niantic, Ct., while the whole of the Fifty-second Infantry Brigade was at Westfield, Mass., and the field artillery at Boxford.

General Edwards made almost daily inspections of the camps, and on every occasion exhorted the men to pull together. He inspired the officers with his spirit, and they made frequent speeches to the men, dwelling on the value of team work and discipline.

As soon as the division was formed, General Edwards notified the War Department, and Camp Greene, N. C., was specified as a concentration point. A sergeant and ten men were sent down to Camp Greene to locate divisional headquarters.

In the meantime the General, who overlooked nothing, had sent an officer to Hoboken to see what could be done in the way of securing transports. This officer reported that there were no boats available, and there would be none in the near future, as it was the intention of the War Department to send over first the Forty-second

(Rainbow) Division, it being made up of men from a large number of States, and being considered representative.

General Edwards refused to be discouraged by this report, and called into conference one of his aides, Captain A. L. Pendleton, a young Regular Army officer with the reputation of doing things, and who later became a lieutenant-colonel. Here follows one of the most interesting stories in the history of the division. As a result of the initiative and enterprise of General Edwards and Captain Pendleton, the division was enabled to get away before the Forty-second, and was, therefore, the first full American division to reach France. Part of the First Division had gone over with General Pershing, but several units were absent.

Captain Pendleton arrived at Hoboken with personal letters of introduction to General Shanks, commanding the port, and Colonel Carson, in charge of assignments of troops to ships. Captain Pendleton was assured by the two officers that no boats would be available in the near future, due to the fact that all coming in were to be reserved for the use of the Regular Army and special units of the Forty-second Division.

Captain Pendleton patiently explained that the Twentysixth was fully organized and ready to move, which, he said, he did not think was true of others. He was again assured that the War Department had established these priorities and they would have to stand.

Undismayed by these statements, the young aide went forth to see what might be done. He made the acquaintance of Major Hambleton, adjutant to General Shanks, and the two soon became great friends. Each found much to admire in the other.

Pendleton spent much time with the major and impressed on him the fact that the Twenty-sixth Division

was ready to move and that transports must be secured at all costs.

Major Hambleton confidentially kept the captain posted on what boats would be available in the near future, and as there were no representatives from other units on the ground, the Twenty-sixth benefited.

One day Captain Pendleton was suddenly notified that four boats would be available in three days, the "Tenadores," "Pastores," "Mallory" and "Lenape." He was further advised that the units for which they were intended were not ready to take them, and was asked if he could use them for the Twenty-sixth.

He replied that he could use all he could get even on short notice. He said that the division was ready to go to France and the men wanted to get away.

Captain Pendleton called General Edwards on the telephone and told him that he could secure four boats. He asked the General to please have the chief of staff advise what units were to go first. In half an hour the chief of staff called up and gave him the assignments, which he handed to Colonel Carson. Colonel Carson was surprised as well as gratified at the quick action.

The unit which had the honor of being the first to go was the 101st Infantry, "Boston's Own," regiment.

Major George C. Cole of the Division Quartermaster Staff, who was with Captain Pendleton, got in touch with representatives of the American Railway Association at Hoboken, and in conference arranged for the reception of the troops at the 135th Street station. He also arranged for the ferrying of troops and baggage around to the Hoboken docks. Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph W. Beacham, Jr., divisional quartermaster, did excellent work at the Boston end, arranging the movement of troops here.

It had been announced through the press that the previous Sunday would be "visitors' day." On that occasion thousands of relatives and friends of the soldiers flocked to the different camps, many of them feeling that this would be the last opportunity they would have to see their loved ones.

At Framingham there was an address by Governor McCall in the name of Massachusetts, and Cardinal O'Connell gave the men his blessing. At Westfield there was a parade, and it was estimated that 100,000 civilians were present, and like conditions prevailed at Boxford and other camps.

At noon of September 6 Colonel Logan of the 101st issued the order turning the men out in full marching equipment, ready to entrain.

Starting at midnight troop trains in various sections began rolling into New York. The men got off the trains at the 135th Street station and took the freight out of the baggage cars. They loaded it on lighters and then got aboard ferries, which moved them around to the Hoboken docks.

Here, with only a few devoted friends present, including Boston officials, they were assigned to space aboard the transports, and in a short time were underway with no one in New York aware of what was happening.

The farewell to the 101st was brief, but the men carried the remembrance of it with them for many a day. Among those who saw the troops off were the late Postmaster William F. Murray, Surveyor of the Port of Boston Joseph A. Maynard, Colonel Logan's brother Malcolm, Congressman James A. Gallivan, Congressman John F. Fitzgerald, Willard R. Gallagher and a number of others.

This devoted little party embarked in a tug, and as the ships pulled out into the bay, steamed down the

harbor with Fitzgerald singing "Sweet Adeline." The tug stayed with the transports until the Statue of Liberty was passed, and the troops said farewell to home and friends.

The 101st Infantry got away first, while other transports carried Major William N. Tenney's Field Hospital No. 1, Major Charles F. Mains' Ambulance Company No. 1, and Colonel John H. Sherburne's 101st Field Artillery.

Outside the boats joined other transports, and the whole were later picked up by a convoy and escorted across the submarine-infested ocean.

Colonel Carson was so pleased at the manner in which the situation was handled that he was disposed to give the Twenty-sixth Division all the transports coming in. He hesitated, however, because of priorities of other units.

After the departure of the first ships, Captain Pendleton returned to Boston for a conference with General Edwards and the chief of staff. He said he could get the boats as soon as they were available, and only wanted a list of divisional units showing the sequence in which it was desired they depart. He also asked for the approximate strength in officers and men, as well as freight tonnage. This was quickly furnished.

He then went back to Hoboken and found out from Major Hambleton the tentative schedules of transports for the future, which were given confidentially. Major Hambleton also furnished the capacities of the boats for officers, men and cargo.


For his own amusement, and in order to be prepared for the call for troops on short notice by Colonel Carson, Captain Pendleton made up a schedule assigning certain units to certain ships in accordance with the dates of arrival and departure, reconciled, of course, with General Edwards' sequence list.



Brigadier-General George H. Shelton



Bishop William Lawrence and Chaplains at Westfield, Mass.



Officers of the 1st Trench Mortar Battery with Governor Milliken of Maine

As soon as this was finished Captain Pendleton conferred with Colonel Carson and showed him what he had done. He demonstrated how the colonel had been saved much thought and work, and this was appreciated.

When the next boats were available all the troops of the Forty-second Division had not yet arrived at their concentration camp, and the Twenty-sixth units were the only ones ready to move.

Again the Twenty-sixth got the transports, and they were loaded with the same success as before. The embarkation officials were highly delighted.

It was then that Captain Pendleton learned that English ships were available at Montreal. He prevailed on one of the embarkation officials to go there with him and look over the situation. They found one ship with large capacity ready to pull out. A conference was then held with the officials of the White Star and other lines, who offered prospects of immediate sailings of big ships.

Back again in Hoboken, Colonel Carson was informed of what had taken place, and it was arranged for Captain Pendleton to use ships out of Montreal. Colonel Carson and General Shanks arranged it through the War Department with our State Department and the Canadian government. By this move a number of ships were secured upon which no one had figured.

The Canadian movements were cleverly arranged and executed. Canadian railroad and steamship officials had had so much experience that they handled American troop movements with excellent skill.

The 2d Battalion of the 102d Infantry, under Major Alcorn, was assigned to the "Lenape," which had just returned from abroad after delivering some of the divisional troops. The "Lenape" was out three days from New York with this battalion when it had engine trouble.

The boat wallowed in the trough of high seas until every one was seasick, and then put back to port. The battalion was put ashore and the Fort Slocum authorities furnished tentage and took care of the men. They were later sent over on the "Tunisian," sailing from Montreal on October 14.

With the exception of this battalion, the last divisional unit to leave was the 101st Machine Gun Battalion, under command of Major James L. Howard of Hartford, Ct. The battalion left on the "Megantic," which sailed from Montreal on October 10. Captain Pendleton accompanied this battalion.

The entire division thus left New England without any one except those directly interested knowing anything about it.

While all this was going on, the New York papers were daily publishing stories, stating that the Forty-second Division was fully organized and equipped, and ready immediately to go abroad and be the first National Guard troops to arrive in France.

The New England papers had loyally refrained from publishing anything about the Twenty-sixth Division, which all this time was quickly moving overseas.

It was generally believed by those few who saw the Twenty-sixth movements that the troops were on the way to Camp Greene, N. C., for training. For months afterward members of the division received mail which had been forwarded to them in France from Camp Greene. Although the division was in France in its training area, a great many people still believed that it was in North Carolina. In fact, the division moved out so rapidly that the sergeant and ten men sent to Camp Greene were nearly left behind.

General Edwards and his staff sailed on September 25,

on the commercial liner "New York," which was not convoyed. They enjoyed an extremely pleasant trip. Later, the Navy Department took over this boat, making it a transport, and General Edwards and Major Hyatt returned to the United States on it in November of the following year.

When the division was organized it had practically full equipment of animals, animal-drawn transport, motor transport and all other ordnance, signal corps and engineer equipment it was supposed to have. The War Department, however, refused to permit this to be taken along with the organization, but promised that it would be in France before the troops. In charge of a supply company it was sent to Newport News for shipment, and the division arrived at its training area with one Ford touring car, no animals, no wagons and two motor cycles.

#### CHAPTER III

# Training in France

Some of the troops landed at Liverpool and some at St. Nazaire, France, but all were quickly forwarded to a training area in the vicinity of Neufchateau, where the entire division, less the artillery brigade, with ammunition train and trench mortar battery, was concentrated. These latter were sent to Coequidon for artillery training.

The troops were quartered in billets within a radius of 15 miles from Neufchateau, in which place divisional headquarters was located. General Edwards, Colonel Shelton and Captain Hyatt went to the British front for observation, and General Traub took command of the division. Divisional headquarters was opened at Neufchateau on October 31.

The division was confronted by many problems, especially those of transportation and supply. Due to the lack of animals and transport in general, it was extremely difficult to feed and equip the troops.

The weather was cold and it was sleeting most of the time. The roads were in bad shape, covered with mud, and it was necessary for the men to go to distributing points and bring back flour, bacon, coffee and other articles of subsistence on their backs. To get firewood it was necessary for them to go into the forests, fell a tree, cut it up and bring it to camp.

Colonel Beacham, who was then quartermaster, did everything he could to relieve the situation, and his personality and advice to make the best of the situation and

"play the game" went a long way in keeping up the spirit of the division.

The 101st Engineers had been detached from the division shortly after its arrival, and was engaged in putting up barracks for the Forty-second Division, which was then on the seas. A supply company had also been loaned to the First Division, Regulars, who had gone over with General Pershing, but were not fully organized. The Twenty-sixth was especially handicapped by a lack of rifle ranges, the men being forced to shoot at tin cans and bottles. Later, they built their own ranges.

The situation is best described in the picturesque language of General Edwards:—

They kept me away from the division for one month [he said], and I had the great privilege of serving with the famous Fifty-first Highlanders up near the Cambrai front. Then I went to the Irish Division, then to the Ulster Division, and saw their "shows," as they called them. One was a two-brigade raid. It was the most marvellous thing, where they went over the top, and where they used gas, large calibers and barrage, and made their raid and came back at night. Then every night they would give them what they called "a bit of chemical barrage," and that amounted to the Englishmen throwing over a double dose of gas, to discount anything the Boche ever did.

Then I went to Chemin des Dames. On the 10th of November I joined my division. All but one battalion of the 102d Infantry, the Connecticut regiment, had arrived. They were in England. For ten days those 25,000 men had three trucks to feed themselves. After that the French loaned us eleven and we got twenty-two Packard trucks. The men used to march 2 and sometimes 3 miles for their fuel. They would cut in the snow the saplings, and each man would take one in his hands, and they had no gloves. Then they would march back and cut up those saplings so they could smoke and put out their eyes in the cow stables they occupied.

The men went into billets; they went into garrets, but there was no fire. They went in pigsties and in cow stables. Their feet were wet. And then came the necessity of unloading big lots of trains, of digging sewers and building hospitals.

At that time the labor troops had not arrived. It was necessary for the fighting troops to do the work. About 70 per cent of the men had bronchitis or pneumonia. You could not get one of them to go to a doctor. I had about as bad a cough as the rest, and I would run around among them myself. I told the doctors to put them on sick report, and that public opinion in the companies would take care of the malingering.

There were many articles of equipment which they could not get. Frequently there would be a deficiency in the rations. I never saw so much mud and rain in my life. Their feet were generally wet and we were experimenting with the shoes. We turned the leather wrong side out and fixed the pores so that they would act like syphons — and fill our shoes with water. I never saw men put up with so many discomforts in my life.

They had French methods to absorb. The French were keen and earnest to teach them what they knew. They had four years of trench warfare, and they came to the conclusion that the special methods and special instruments and arms which they were using were essential to their winning out. And as I recall it, they worked on this sewer problem, they worked on the sewer warfare, because they had to live in the sewer.

I am just sketching some of the difficulties, but the word I want to give you is that I never heard a complaint from these 25,000 men. The one thing they demanded was, "General, let us get at those Boches!"

During General Edwards' absence, Captain Malick of the French Army, a thorough gentleman and experienced officer of most pleasing personality and professional accomplishments, had been assigned to the division as senior officer of the French Mission attached to the Twenty-sixth. He saw the situation that existed, and

telegraphed to his chief that the Twenty-sixth Division needed trucks; had to have trucks. As a result a French company with thirty trucks came to their assistance, and stayed with the division until it went into an active sector. The trucks saved the situation.

About this time Captain Pendleton, who had succeeded in securing transports from under the noses of other units at Hoboken, was sent on a scouting expedition to locate lost freight and baggage. He went to Folkestone, London, Liverpool, Southampton, Havre, Brest and St. Nazaire, and was able to find a great deal, but much of it was lost and never showed up, thus adding to the hardships of the division.

Upon his return Captain Pendleton conferred with Colonel Beacham, the divisional quartermaster, about the transportation problem. The French trucks were not sufficient in capacity or number to take care of the division's needs.

Colonel Beacham then suggested that the captain go to Paris and to the Reception Park at St. Nazaire to see what he could beg, buy or steal. This was done, and on his arrival in Paris, Captain Pendleton met General Edwards, who had just returned from the British front. When informed of his aide's mission, the General said; "Go to it and don't come back without trucks!"

At the Motor Reception Park at St. Nazaire were found any amount of 3-ton trucks, Ford ambulances, motor cars and motor cycles. Captain Pendleton wired to that effect, and suggested that it be taken up with general headquarters and an immediate assignment be secured. In the meantime he arranged with the American military authorities at St. Nazaire for truck equipment for two truck companies of twenty-eight trucks each. The personnel of the 101st Supply Train, under

command of Lieutenant Henderson, arrived and manned the fifty-six trucks. Captain Pendleton then took all the trucks to the big quartermaster depot at St. Nazaire, and loaded them with flour, coffee, sugar, canned goods, rubber boots, ponchos, horseshoes, shovels, with some lumber, and sent them on their way over the roads to Neufchateau.


The arrival of these trucks with their supplies happily remedied the situation. Things were going along in good style, despite the handicaps. The 101st Engineers had not returned to the division, but were engaged in building cantonments and hospitals.

Battalions of infantry were digging sewers and drains when they should have been training. The weather was bitterly cold, and the men needed gloves, knitted helmets, heavy underwear and new shoes, which were not possible of procurement from a government source.

About this time orders were received to send the new trucks with their personnel to the First and Forty-second Divisions. General Edwards immediately telephoned to General Pershing and explained the situation, with the result that permission was given to retain the trucks.

A few days later the quartermaster of the Forty-second Division came down and told his story. They were even worse off than the Twenty-sixth, and so the Yankee Division turned over twenty-eight trucks to them. The personnel came back, but soon after orders were received to transfer the entire personnel of one truck company to the First Division. They never returned.

Then wagons and animals began to arrive. The bakery company was turning out excellent bread in sufficient quantity to supply the division and the advanced section line of communication. This company was taken away from the division and with other companies put to



Harris & Ewing Brigadier-General William Lassiter



General Edwards and Some of Original Staff of Yankee Division



Chaplains Edwards, De Valles, O'Connor, Evans and Imbrie, France

baking bread for the lines of communication, which became the source of the division's bread supply.

Colonel Beacham was shortly relieved as divisional quartermaster. Captain Pendleton was recalled from the General Staff College by General Edwards, promoted to major, and detailed as divisional quartermaster.

The new quartermaster sent out scouts, the greatest of whom was Captain "Al" Ford, a former Boston newspaperman, to go to Paris, Nancy, Tours and other places to buy gloves, knitted helmets, underwear, shoes, etc. General Rogers, at Chaumont, approved of what was being done and gave blanket authority to purchase what the division needed. Captain Scorer, the disbursing officer, had about \$6,000,000 to his official credit, so that it was possible to spend as much money as was necessary. There was always plenty of food during that period, but there was a serious shortage of hay and oats. Captain Henry H. Wheelock, assistant quartermaster, was instrumental in purchasing all the hav and oats for miles around. In that way the divisional animals got full rations. It is a fact that at this time two of the other divisions lost great numbers of animals from starvation. The Twentysixth lost none.

Then it grew so cold that the fuel problem became serious. No wood could be secured from the lines of communication, and the lack of fires was working an additional hardship on the men; also at this time the French peasants had become extremely despondent, and openly told the soldiers that their entrance into the war would merely prolong it four or five years. They declared they were ready to make peace even at the German's terms. This attitude was not evidenced by the more intelligent French people, however, and it had absolutely no effect on the New Englanders. Lieutenant, later

Major, Theodore Baker and Lieutenant Dickson were sent out to buy up all the wood they could find. They made contracts for immediate and future deliveries which took care of the entire division.

During this time the training of the men went on as steadily as possible, considering the number of working details necessary each day. The men were billeted in various small villages within a radius of 15 miles from Neufchateau, where, on the Rue St. Anne, divisional headquarters was located. Each morning they marched about 6 kilometers to their training fields, where they were put through an intensive course under the guidance of the French. The latter, after their three years of experience, were wedded to trench warfare, and attempted to concentrate on it.

General Edwards, however, differed with them on this subject, and insisted that the men be given thorough training on the range and with the bayonet. He declared that the rifle had always been the reliance of the American soldier, and that grenades and bombs were to be used only when the enemy failed to leave his dugouts. Subsequent operations of the division in battle proved the wisdom of his attitude. The French were also continually dinning into the ears of the Yankees the danger of overconfidence.

They attempted to instill a spirit of cautiousness, but it is not on record that the New Englanders were ever afflicted with it. Time and time again in the various battles in which they took part they went forward through barrages that were considered impassable.

#### CHAPTER IV

# **Enjoy Old-fashioned Christmas**

The men had celebrated Christmas in the training area, an old-fashioned "white" Christmas, and, for many, the first one away from home. A week before hundreds of freight cars had arrived, laden with packages from home, and these were distributed to all by Christmas Eve. Men who had been unfortunate in receiving no gifts shared those sent to their comrades, so that every one was made as happy as possible considering the distance from home and loved ones, and the realization that all were shortly to go into action.

On Christmas Day only the necessary military duties were performed, and the men were given the time to themselves. The majority took occasion on that day to attend services in some of the tiny chapels in the neighborhood and to pray for the folks at home.

This attitude of devotion to Christian ideals on the part of the men of the Yankee Division was noticeable throughout their stay in France. It led to many commendations. Prior to leaving home the majority had been carefree, typical boys, who, though they realized the necessity of religion in daily life, more often than not gave little time to it.

When they arrived in France, however, and began to come into contact with war's grim realities, they became more sincere.

"God bless them," said Brigadier Mary Sheppard of the Salvation Army, who spent months with the division, "they were the best boys in the world. No words that I can use would be too good for them."

The days dragged on into January with General Edwards going about daily and establishing personal contact with his men. Practically every one, including the General, suffered from colds and bronchitis, but he continued his work of building up morale, which the lack of training time had prevented.

I am an awfully ingrained Yankee, [remarked General Edwards], and I know one American could lick four or five of those Dutchmen. If there is one thing in which we excel it is initiative.

Now my job was to aid, pat on the back and capitalize those qualities which are not so prominent in other nations, — dignify the non-commissioned officer, tell the private he has a baton in his hand, pat the young commissioned officer on the back and say, "Go out and get killed if you cannot lick the Dutchman."

I had to go along with the whole business and supply the lack of training and the lack of opportunity by capitalizing the traditions of our blood and individuality.

So I took these battalions and said, "Bring them up around me." I had a bad cold which afterward resulted in pneumonia. We all had it. I would say to the men, "I am going to tell you what I have seen up in the British front, and I am going to tell you all that is going to take the place of training, and I want to say to each one of you, play the game with your whole heart, make good every effort. Just think of your home and mother every day of your life."

"How about the salute?" I'd ask. That is the thing that the American soldier has less sympathy with than anything else. If there is any way he can beat that salute he is going to do it. I have passed a big crowd and I know what they said: "Hell, here comes the old man," and then spend time trying to tie a shoe or looking the other way, or jumping into a billet.

"You show me a crackerjack saluting command and I will show you a disciplined command. The British Army salutes and the Russian Army doesn't. Remember that a salute is

nothing on earth in this game but the manifestation of a man's self-respect. Salute a man that you loathe, salute an empty automobile if you think there is some martinet inside of it, and always put yourself right with the command.

"I believe that a salute is nothing in the world but an inheritance from savages, who said, 'I have no arms. I am a friend, come on.'

"When you salute, give me the salute with your eyes. Keep your eyes off the mud of France. When a man walks along like that, his stomach will not function. He has a bad tongue. His feet are wet. Keep your eyes up in the clouds and smile. When you salute, look at the man you are saluting; give him the tribute of your eyes and smile. Don't any one of you dare to salute me unless he smiles. Let me know the officer that does not smile back, and salute in acknowledgment of the tribute that you gave him."

For the military police I had selected 325 men. Their colonel and their crackerjack Major Dolan were told to go and pick them, to be the rock of the Twenty-sixth Division. "Pick them for character," I said; "pick them for size, pick them for bowels, and I will show you the greatest military police in the world."

They certainly picked them. I do not believe I ever had to court-martial one of those men. They had me afraid.

One of them jumped on my automobile one day when that fine soldier, Captain Simpkins, was with me. The policeman said to my sergeant chauffeur: "The orders are 8 miles an hour up this narrow street. You are going 12; stop it." The sergeant looked at me. I said: "Obey him." I got to my house and told Captain Simpkins to go back and compliment that lad.

Later I saw an officer in a magnificent trench coat pass one of those big policemen. The policeman saluted, but the officer gave him what Major Scorer used to call an S. O. S. salute. I called the captain back, and told him that he was not going the right way to pay a tribute to his flag. I said: "There is a man," pointing to the policeman, "who is playing the game, but you

are not playing it. Salute him with the same care you salute me. I salute a military policeman with as much care as I would salute General Pershing."

Two days later Captain Simpkins and I were coming back. The same big policeman stood there. There was a number of soldiers standing around. I called the men around me and said: "You see that street. Get down there double time, turn around, come back and see if you can salute that soldier as he should be saluted. I will watch it." They did as they were told. I said: "Sentinel, I don't think that is very good, do you?" "I don't think it is, General," said he. Then I told the men to go right back and try it over again, or they would trade places with the policeman. The next time the policeman admitted that the salutes were correct.

That is merely an example of how I went after them every day. However, when they did anything right I would tell them so, and that was the soul of the Twenty-sixth Division.

All through November the artillery, trench mortar battery and ammunition train had been getting into shape at Coetquidon, the artillery training camp. Then on December 18, 500 officers and men were sent to the division area at Neufchateau to prepare billets for the artillery brigade at Rimacourt. They were never occupied, however.

The ammunition train, in command of Lieutenant-Colonel William J. Keville, was in particularly bad condition, owing to lack of equipment.

Arriving in France with practically no mobile equipment, it was some time before the men of the train got even a single truck on which the drivers could be instructed. A detail of twenty trucks was at length secure from St. Nazaire, and these were at once put into shauling supplies to Coetquidon. The drivers were nated, so that the inexperienced were enabled

practice. The men also got some experience handling ammunition, carrying it up each day from Rennes for artillery practice.

Like all other parts of the division, although it was one of the most vitally important, the train suffered from lack of necessary supplies. The men were also forced to take part in road building and the construction of artillery positions.

There was no motor equipment, no trucks to speak of, and no machine shop in which to repair the trucks they had. Another train turned over twenty-two trucks to the 101st of which only three were mobile. However, Yankee ingenuity can accomplish most anything, and in a few days the men had fourteen of the trucks going.

The expected equipment never came except in part, and for many months the ammunition train got along with an outfit that was badly handicapped. On January 6 a divisional ordnance repair shop, mounted on a truck, was attached to the ammunition train, but immediately went to work repairing artillery material.

The artillery also lacked equipment, but to no such extent, being helped out considerably by the French and British.

The artillery had left its American 3-inch guns at home, and on arriving in France started in to learn to use the French "75s" and the heavier "155s," corresponding to our 6-inch gun.

The 75 was one of the most efficient weapons of the war, about the same caliber as a 3-inch, but with improved recoil mechanism and periscopic sight. With this gun the French had done tremendous execution on the enemy, and had attained an accuracy which it was impossible to better. However, the Yankees took the gun, and perceiving the advantages of the recoil mechanism, became

so proficient in loading that the Germans afterward frequently declared they were using a 3-inch machine gun. The Yankee trick of loading on the recoil was difficult and dangerous, but was much more rapid than the regulation fashion.

The "Y. D." artillery also became extremely accurate, and learned to lay barrages with such deadly precision that the "doughboys" later on took to "leaning on" them. This expression means that the infantry kept so close to their own barrage that unless it were as accurate as possible in the nature of things, many of our own men would have been killed.

Under the expert instruction of the French, who are declared to be the best artillerymen in the world, the Yankees became so proficient that they were frequently called on to go into a sector in advance of the infantry, and remain there to help out other outfits when their own division had pulled out.

On the last Sunday in January the members of the division, together with French troops and peasants, were treated to an impressive spectacle. The 101st Infantry was lined up, the men all wearing new trench caps which had been secured for them by Colonel Logan, and General Edwards presented a stand of colors. The colors were sent by Governor Samuel W. McCall of Massachusetts in behalf of the people of the State, and were accepted for the regiment by Colonel Logan.

It became necessary to reorganize divisional headquarters along new general staff lines developed by general headquarters of the A. E. F.

This plan called for a chief of staff, — to which position Colonel Shelton was appointed, — assistant chief of staff G-1 for supply, administration and co-ordination, assistant chief of staff G-2 for intelligence, and assistant chief



Colonel E. L. Logan

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Colonel E. L. Logan and Staff



General Hale and Staff

of staff G-3 for operation. Major Pendleton had done so well as quartermaster that General Edwards appointed him G-1 of the division, in which position he was in charge of all matters of transportation, supply of subsistence, equipment, ammunition, construction, evacuation of sick and wounded, replacements, material and personnel, animals, etc. The other two appointees were Major Hyatt, aide to the General, as G-2, and Major Mack as G-3.

In the meantime it had been decided that Major Howard, commanding the 101st Machine Gun Battalion, should be made acting divisional machine gun officer, and in December he had been sent to a British machine gun school at Camiers. Then he joined the Canadians in front of Lens, observing the machine gun work, and did not return to the division until it had gone into an active sector.

Soon after the organization along the new lines, General Edwards was ordered to go to general headquarters at Chinan. Taking with him his chief of staff and Major Pendleton, he presented himself and was informed that General Petain and the French government had persuaded General Pershing to allow some of the Twenty-sixth troops to go up to the Chemin des Dames and learn the German tactics. The plan was to send two battalions.

General Castelnau, the "grand old man" in command of that sector, said: "We are anxious to tell you everything we know. We have lost thousands of lives that might have been saved, but I am an old man and I have got to admit that there is only one instructor in this war, and that is the Boche."

Edwards was asked if he would allow these two battalions to go up. Straightening himself to his full height, he announced: "I want every man of the Twenty-sixth

Division, and I will take them all up to the Chemin des Dames."

He was told that all of his troops had not had sufficient training, but he replied: "Let them go up."

He was taken at his word, and the artillery brigade, ammunition train, trench mortar battery and engineer regiment were directed to proceed to the new area and join the rest of the division. General Traub, who had commanded the division in the absence of General Edwards, with Major Pendleton and Captain Malick of the French Mission, went up to Soissons as the advance party of the division to make all arrangements.

The division was assigned to the Eleventh French Corps under General de Mau d'Huy, part of General Duchesne's army. The movement was very successfully executed, and was witnessed by a number of American officers from general headquarters.

The division entered the line on February 5 and remained in the sector about one and a half months. The artillery went in first, and then the infantry, in companies and battalions, entered the sector and relieved the front line troops.

For the first time the division was concentrated with every unit. The organization was split up and parts of it were assigned to the Fourth French Division as a matter of training.

It was necessary to have eleven distributing points by motor beyond the end of the railroad, where all the supplies arrived. In other words, General Edwards had administrative control of the nearly 30,000 men, but did not have the tactical control.

## CHAPTER V

#### First United States Divisional Shot in War

The guns of Battery A of the 101st Field Artillery went into action on the afternoon of February 5. At 3.45 o'clock one of the 75s fired the first shot of a full American division, much to the delight of the peppery Colonel Sherburne, commanding the regiment. The shell case was later sent home, and placed in the Massachusetts State capitol. The 101st Infantry went through to front line positions that night, and was the first National Guard outfit, representing a full division, to get into action.

It was a new and somewhat nerve-wracking experience for these New England boys. Filing one by one into the line in the darkness of night, with French soldiers guiding them, they took their places. It was a strange feeling to realize that but a short distance away were men who would gladly murder them at the first opportunity. All that night the sentinels peered anxiously into the blackness of No Man's Land. Many times an overwrought lad believed that he saw large bodies of the enemy advancing toward the American lines.

The division was under the French in all matters except supply, evacuation and ammunition. The troops were scattered over 40 kilometers of front, and the daily supply of various units with subsistence and forage, keeping them properly equipped and uniformed, was a problem which no other division had ever gone through or will have to in the future. The roads were in frightful condition and it was a tremendous task to get supplies over them.

The various regiments went into different sectors [said General Edwards], and when the green battalions went in it became the duty of the German to identify them. In other words, you get an order for identification. That means you have to send out a raiding party, and you have to get some of the enemy and make them talk, telling what outfit they belong to and identifying the division, the battalion and the regiment.

This was called a quiet sector at the time. The French, by a brilliant operation, had taken the Chemin des Dames in October of the previous year. They did not have many troops and they sat down and occupied it. The system of defence was a series of coups de combats, with trenches about to the knee and with tangent machine guns defending. The German immediately felt out every one of my regiments. The 104th went into this difficult place and the Germans put down a heavy barrage in the rear of these groups of twenty or forty men with machine guns. The idea was to prevent reserves from coming up, and in the meantime rush in, gobble up the men, take them home and say, "Here are some of these queer Americans we have heard about."

The barrage was put down on those "green" men, and they did not even lie down. They crouched in their holes, with high explosives rattling on their helmets and killing several, and when the barrage was lifted, jumped up and made a lot of prisoners of the Germans.

The Chemin des Dames sector was considered quiet by the French, but immediately after the arrival of the New Englanders the German gave them a baptism of fire. It was here that the first member of the division to become a victim of the enemy met his death from shell fire. He was Corporal John J. Crowley of the signal platoon of the 101st Infantry.

During their six weeks' stay in the Chemin des Dames sector, where previously some of the most sanguinary actions of the war had taken place, the New Englanders

participated in and repulsed a number of raids, but there were no really large engagements. They also received a trying out under fire which proved them to be of the best soldier material, and won warm words of praise from their French comrades.

General Edwards made a custom of always preceding his troops into a new sector and making a personal reconnaissance of the front to be taken over. As a result of the knowledge thus acquired, he three times countermanded written orders when emergencies arose, and by means of verbal directions saved his troops from unnecessary casualties.

Despite the fact that his action was opposed by the higher command, the sturdy old fighter persisted, and the results always justified him. In this way he saved the lives of many of his men, and demonstrated the fact that practical experience is superior to theory.

In this sector the New England troops were sandwiched in between French outfits, — a battalion of French, then a battalion of Americans, and so on. Raiding parties were made up of men from both armies, with usually a French officer or non-commissioned officer acting as mentor and guide.

On St. Valentine's day, after the Yankees had been in action for a week, they got their really first opportunity to take part in a night patrol. An order came through calling for a patrol made up of 20 Americans and 20 French, the whole party to be under the command of a French officer. The 104th Infantry, which was holding this particular spot with a French regiment, was asked for volunteers, and the whole outfit volunteered to a man. However, only 20 could be taken, and Lieutenant James W. Brown was selected to lead them.

At the word of command from the French officer, the

party wriggled out of their "fox-holes" and started across No Man's Land. They had orders to go as far as the German wire, and if possible to secure prisoners.

The German entanglements were reached without incident, and the men turned back after looking over work which had recently been completed by the enemy. Part way back moving figures were discovered between the party and their own lines. Lieutenant Brown at once ordered his men to lie down flat and open fire. The Germans, for so they turned out to be, replied. The Americans were armed with automatic pistols and rifles, and their French comrades with rifles.

After about half an hour the German fire died down, and the Americans and French started slowly forward. They found a wounded German and took him to their own lines, where he died a short time later.

In the meantime Sergeant John L. Latzig, who was out on the flank of his patrol, in company with a French poilu, saw a German crawling away into the darkness. Latzig jumped on the German, and a rough and tumble battle took place, in which the American was the victor.

When the reconnoitring patrol reached its own lines the roll was called, and eight men, together with Sergeant Latzig, were missing. Although it was almost daylight, Lieutenant Brown went out again to search for the missing men. German machine guns opened up on him, but by diving from one shell hole to another he managed to avoid being hit. After some time he descried a moving party which turned out to be the men he was seeking.

It transpired that Latzig had started his prisoner for what he believed to be the American lines. A flare showed that he was heading in the wrong direction. It also showed a number of Americans crouching in a near-by

shell hole. The sergeant took command, and was on his way in when the lieutenant met him.

For this act both the lieutenant and sergeant were awarded the coveted Croix de Guerre.

A few nights later the Germans came over in a raid directed against a company of this same regiment which had come in for the first of its six days in the front line. Prior to the raid the German artillery bombarded the American lines, the fire waxing hotter until at 10 o'clock it was intense. In a short time it ceased, and a barrage was laid down which the German raiders followed. By the bright light of the moon the Germans were seen by the Americans passing through a wood.

When they reached open ground, however, the enemy faltered and then broke. The "green" Americans, following a terrific bombardment, were waiting, and poured in a fire which demoralized the Germans.

These two incidents, which were typical of the Yankee Division, caused French commanders to shower General Edwards with compliments.

The General's headquarters at this time were at Court-trelles, some distance behind the lines, but he refused to stay in them. Accompanied usually by his aide, Captain "Nat" Simpkins, or by Major Hyatt, he visited the front daily, again and again subjecting himself to the enemy fire. At all times he kept his finger on the divisional pulse, dropping into regimental "P. C.s.," or posts of command, visiting dressing stations, and stopping now and then for a few words of praise and encouragement for the men. On two occasions horses were shot by enemy aviators in front of him. In describing this later, General Edwards said:—

We were being bombed every night, and nothing on earth gets on your nerves like bombing. The enemy had airplane superiority, and when I went riding on my horse, as I did with my staff officer, we always agreed whenever an airplane came around — and we were a little doubtful whether it had a German cross or a French circle on the fuselage — that we would take cover. He'd ride one way and I another, and then we would tumble from our mounts and roll into the woods. We had to do that three times. The aviators would come over, see some one on a good-looking horse, and turn loose with their machine guns. I had two horses killed right in front of me.

They also attacked our balloons, and it was a common sight to see French observers jumping with parachutes and come floating down, depending upon the wind to take them over the line.

An interesting story is told exemplifying the attitude of the men in regard to General Edwards' custom of visiting the trenches. One day at Chemin des Dames the General made an inspection of the line. After he had gone, Major Hammond of the 104th Infantry decided he would go through and see what had happened.


In the trenches he came upon a spectacle which astounded him. A "buck" private was standing, first on one foot and then on the other, vigorously wiping the mud from his shoes on his breeches and coat.

An irate sergeant, who had also witnessed the performance, suddenly rushed up and profanely demanded to know what the private was doing. "Are you crazy?" he asked. "No," replied the "doughboy" solemnly, "but I'm damned if I'll let any General come through here with more mud on him than I've got on me."

In this sector the 104th was holding the line at Bois Quincy, about February 9 or 10, when on the third night the Germans attempted to put over a big raid. There



Brigadier-General John A. Sherburne



Officers of 101st Regiment Infantry, Beaumont, France, May 6, 1918



Billets of Company C, 101st Ammunition Train, France

were no trenches at this place, nothing but fox-holes and heaps of mud at the outer edges of the woods. The kitchens in the woods were on top of the ground instead of underneath it, while officers and men lived in shacks. The Germans put down an intense barrage and then the raiding troops came over. They were repulsed with losses, while the Yankees had only one wounded. The following day Captain Hyatt went through the woods and found that the ground was literally peppered with holes, and the whole place torn up. He never could understand how the New Englanders had escaped without more casualties.

Late in February a big raid was started by picked German troops, who were brought to the front in covered camions, or trucks. Following a violent barrage, which began at 9 o'clock of an extremely dark night, and which lasted half an hour, the Germans crossed the canal which divided the lines at this part of the front. The enemy split into three parties.

One made a feint attack to draw the fire of the Americans and French; a second crept noiselessly straight across No Man's Land; while the third swung to the right and attempted a flanking movement on the outposts. The watchful Yankees soon discovered what was taking place, and with a withering machine-gun fire broke up the attack. The picked German troops were unable to stand the intense fire and retreated.

Prior to the beginning of this attack an American wiring party, consisting of 32 men, under the command of Lieutenant Ralph Bishop of the 101st Infantry, with a French sergeant as guide, had gone out into No Man's Land. Loaded with rolls of barbed wire and stakes they were busily engaged when the barrage began to drop around them. Lieutenant Bishop ran along the line,

getting his men into small groups and ordering them into shell holes. Then he made his way through both German and American barrages to his own lines, and reported to the French officer who was in charge of the wire laying. Again the young officer passed through the rain of shells, and ordered back all the men he could find. The central party of German raiders had in the meantime passed the Americans without seeing them.

Lieutenant Bishop did not find all his men, and was himself forced to join the last group who shot their way back. On the way Bishop saw a badly wounded man. Taking two of his party he went out, found a stretcher, got the wounded man, and carried him to a dressing station.

When the lieutenant left his own lines to go back through the barrage the third time Sergeant Eric S. Olsen and Corporal Earl H. Sanderson went back after him. All three were recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross.

By the time the Yankees left this sector a large number had been recommended for Distinguished Service Crosses and Medals, and a respectable-sized group had been awarded the French War Cross.

During this time the division had suffered very few casualties, and but twelve men had been sent to the hospital with gas poisoning. This was a remarkable testimonial to the efficiency and morale of the men,—a morale which had been built up by General Edwards without the long months of training considered so necessary by the majority of Regular Army officers.

There had already been many changes in the divisional personnel. Officers had been relieved and transferred, and other officers had been made from the ranks. Captain Hyatt was succeeded as G-2 by Major Mackall, a

stranger to the division, who had been sent over from the States and who had had no experience. In January Colonel Shelton had been relieved as chief of staff, and succeeded by Colonel Dowell, while Major Maback, the G-3 of the division, was later succeeded by Colonel Krueger.

These changes were made by general headquarters at Chaumont, and the policy was continued to the end. They constituted a great annoyance to General Edwards, who would no sooner get a man on whom he relied in a position, when an inexperienced Regular Army officer would be sent to relieve him. In some cases such an officer might have attended the Staff College for a time, and having absorbed a quantity of theories, was considered to be perfectly capable of taking over the work.

One other incident at Chemin des Dames is worthy of being recorded, as it exemplified the spirit of self-sacrifice and desire to "play the game" of every member of the division.

During a German attack grenades were being handed to a squad of bombers by Corporal Homer J. Wheaton of the 101st Infantry, a former Worcester newspaperman. These bombs were prepared by hitting the detonators, after which the bomber heaved it with a stiff-arm motion at the enemy. After the detonator is set off it is but five seconds until the bomb explodes. Wheaton had an armful of bombs, which he was handing out, when one of them dropped to the ground and struck on the detonator. The corporal saw it fall, and in a flash realized that an explosion would kill a large number of his own Without the slightest hesitancy he gently deposited the bombs he held in his arms, and, leaping forward, smothered the grenade on the ground with his body. The explosion took place, but Wheaton was the only man killed.

## CHAPTER VI

# Yankee Spirit Amazes the French

While the infantry and artillery were getting their training under fire, the other units of the division were also learning rapidly. They also were under fire, but were unable to fight back. Supply and ammunition trains were continually coming up to the front over roads which were plotted out on German artillery maps, and which were swept by shell fire.

The engineers were engaged in laying narrow-gauge railroad tracks, machine-gun emplacements, barbed-wire systems, dugouts, excavations and trenches, frequently under direct fire from the enemy.

The engineer regiment was split up, even companies being divided, so that it was extremely difficult for Colonel Bunnell to keep in touch with all units. However, he not only succeeded in doing this, but with the assistance of French instructors brought his outfit up to a high state of efficiency.

The men displayed the same fighting spirit that animated the other members of the division, and were always glad to lay down their picks and shovels in favor of the rifle.

Later on, when casualties were heavy, volunteers would be called for to bury the dead. On these occasions the regiment volunteered to a man, although as it frequently happened, they had been working tirelessly for days.

The same thing was true of the signal troops, hospital corps and ambulance men. In fact, every member of the

division was always ready to volunteer for extra duty, and incidents occurred when men of the S. O. S. walked miles for an opportunity of begging some officer to allow them to get into the fight.

The French had attempted to impress on the Americans the folly of volunteering for patrol duty, declaring "it is not good." There never was a time when volunteers were called for to go out on patrol but that every man in the Yankee Division who knew about it insisted that he be one of those picked.

This spirit amazed the French, who had been through three years of the most terrible warfare, and realized the value of conserving lives.

Lieutenant Edward Hutchins of the 102d Field Artillery is the son of Mrs. Susan Hutchins of Beacon Street, Back Bay, a cousin of General Edwards. Before the division left for France Mrs. Hutchins charged the General with the welfare of her boy, and told him to be sure and see that "Ed" did not run into any unnecessary danger. The General agreed, and then, owing to the multiplicity of his duties, promptly forgot the entire matter.

It was recalled to his mind forcibly on the Chemin des Dames, when he and Captain Hyatt rode over to the aviation camp one day. There they met Lieutenant Hutchins. "What are you doing, Ed?" asked the General, after the usual amenities. "Oh," replied the youth, carelessly, "I'm doing observation work in airplanes." "My God," groaned General Edwards, "what will I tell Susie?" For be it known that artillery observation from aircraft is probably one of the most dangerous jobs in the service.

While in this sector the men of the division saw their first German airship brought down. It was reached by the anti-aircraft guns of the French at a height of 2,000

feet. The machine broke in two, the pilot and observer fell out, and the wrecked craft dropped to the ground behind the allied lines. The Germans were almost buried in the ground, so tremendous was the force of their fall. They were the first German dead the Americans had seen, and as a result the New Englanders were somewhat awed. The French, on the other hand, were unaffected, except that they were pleased that two more of the enemy had ended their ability to make trouble. Captain Hyatt, who was one of the first on the spot, secured a map and pieces of the wrecked plane.

The Chemin des Dames, or "Road of the Ladies," is a famous highway that runs along the top of a ridge. When the Americans went into this sector the highway had not been used since the beginning of the war, owing to the fact that it was in full sight of the guns of both parties.

Shortly after arrival, General Edwards wished to go to the headquarters of Colonel Hume, which was located at Vaudesson. Captain "Nat" Simpkins, the General's aide, declared confidently that he could find the place with the aid of a map. The two climbed into the General's big limousine, driven by Sergeant Shea, and started.

Apparently Captain Simpkins' knowledge of map reading was somewhat faulty, for the party drove out boldly on the Chemin des Dames, and proceeded jauntily down that highway under the eyes of the German gunners. At first the enemy was so astounded by this spectacle that he did nothing. In a short time, however, he recovered, and began sending over shells which landed in close proximity to the car. General Edwards leaned forward to tell the driver to go away from there, but it was not necessary. Later Captain Hyatt asked Sergeant Shea if the shells were falling close to the car. "I don't really know," replied Shea, "I was too busy feeding her gas."

Vaudesson, Colonel Hume's headquarters, had been a town, but at this time there was no semblance of a building and no cellars. "It was the worst shot-up town I ever saw," said Captain Hyatt. "There was not even a little pile of rock left. In a year or so, when the grass has grown up, it will be impossible to tell that the town ever existed."

The French were accustomed to going on raids and patrols without rifles. They used knives, grenades and bombs. General Edwards insisted that the Americans carry rifles and pistols at all times.

In the latter part of February the 101st Infantry sent over 40 men and the French contributed 40 men, all commanded by a French officer. The Yankees used rifles, and the party invaded the German trenches, capturing 23 prisoners, including 2 officers. The American forces had not a single casualty. The French had six. Fifteen New Englanders received the Croix de Guerre for their share in this raid. It was noticed that all the prisoners were displaying black eyes, which apparently had been acquired during the struggle in their trenches.

The use of the rifle on this raid brought a comment from General de Maud 'Huy, which was extremely complimentary. He said that the French soldiers had forgotten how to use the rifle, and must learn again to use it like the Americans, who had given a lesson to the French.

During this raid the 101st Machine Gun Battalion helped put across a box barrage by indirect fire. This also brought a letter from General de Maud 'Huy, as it was the first time that machine guns had been used in co-operation with the artillery in putting down a box barrage.

In this sector the German had almost entire superi-

ority in the air. German airplanes used machine guns on the roads, and flew low over the trenches, spraying them with bullets. One day General Edwards was riding with Captain Hyatt when a wagon train appeared on the road ahead of them. Suddenly a German plane dropped out of the clouds, and, flying only about a hundred yards above the road, opened up with a machine gun, killing several horses. Not a shot was fired in return.

During the big raid on Paris a German bombing plane was brought down in the sector occupied by the 104th Infantry. Captain Hartwell, the supply officer, and several of the men saw the descending light and followed it. The machine had hardly struck the ground when the captain pulled his pistol and called on the occupants to surrender. There were four men in the Gotha, all officers and all uninjured. They refused to talk to the American intelligence officers and were turned over to the French.

Captain Hyatt, being curious, the next day strolled over to French headquarters where he learned that the Germans' whole story had been secured. One of the Germans was commander of the squadron which attacked Paris. He told where they came from and furnished the order under which they were acting. They still had two bombs of 300 kilos which they had intended to drop on the American and French lines. They told their captors that the French barrage around Paris was so intense that they were unable to penetrate it. The Americans never had any further trouble in securing information from prisoners.

When the Yankees had entered the sector they found that a sort of truce was maintained during the day. French and German soldiers had washed clothes in the canal at the same time, and it had been customary for



Colonel Frank M. Hume



Colonel Frank M. Hume and Staff



International Film Service, Inc.

Engineers of Twenty-sixth Division supplying Field Artillery with Munitions, France

the men of both sides to move about freely outside the trenches.

The New Englanders could not understand this state of affairs, and they called down the wrath of both sides by opening fire on the first Germans they saw. During this time one sniper of the 103d Regiment averaged one German each day.

About the middle of March General Edwards received orders to move the division to the Bar-sur-Aube area, where it was scheduled for a big advance problem. The division had completed its front line training much more quickly than had been expected, and the French were enthusiastic.

As an evidence of the brotherly spirit existing between the two armies, General de Maud 'Huy, commanding the Eleventh French Army Corps, issued the following order:—

> ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS, STAFF, HEADQUARTERS, March 15, 1918.

No. 9114 B-1, S. C. No. 4817. GENERAL ORDERS, No. 7.

We regret that our comrades of the Twenty-sixth Division should leave us in order to fulfill their task elsewhere.

We have been able to appreciate their bravery, their sense of duty and discipline, also their frank comradeship; they carry away our unanimous regrets.

General Edwards has been pleased to consider the Eleventh Corps as godfather to the Twenty-sixth Division; the Eleventh Corps feels proud of the awarded honor, being sure that, wherever he may be sent, the godson shall do credit to the godfather.

> LE GENERAL DE MAUD 'HUY, Commandant le 11me Corps d'Armée.

### CHAPTER VII

# Move to Start a Big Drive

The division started out on March 20. On the 21st the big Boche offensive began. A few days before the Germans had put over a gas bombardment which lasted thirty-six hours. This was concentrated mostly on the 102d Infantry. The men wore their masks five or six hours, and the gas discipline was so good that the division had only 250 casualties.

The German long-range guns shelled the railroads and bombed the towns through which the Yankees passed on their way south. It was difficult to move during the day. It was at this time that Major H. B. Estes of the 101st Engineers and Lieutenant Ralph Hopkins of the 101st Supply Company won decorations for sticking to the job of entraining and loading supplies under the most intense fire.

The infantry entrained at Soissons and Brisnes, and proceeded down to the area around Bar-sur-Aube. The artillery, ammunition train and other mobile units went over the road. The division was concentrated in the area about the 23d or 24th.

Before he left the Chemin des Dames the General had received orders to hold maneuvers at Bar-sur-Aube for the solving of practical problems. They were to advance against the Forty-second Division, and plans were completed and about to be put into operation when they were called off on account of the Boche offensive. The

division was then marched overland to the training area around Ruynel, where division headquarters were located for two days.

This territory had not felt the hand of the great ravager, War. The houses were whole and inhabited by warm-hearted French peasants, who fed the men to repletion with fresh vegetables, milk and eggs. There were also streams of fresh water in which the men might bathe, and the two days spent there were reminiscent of home to the Yankees after their six weeks in the Chemin des Dames sector. The inevitable rain was also absent, and the sun shone brightly.

During this time the men of the division were visited by Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. The secretary made but a brief stay, and did not interfere with routine by having the men turned out for inspection.

A short time later the Massachusetts Commission, composed of Lieutenant-Governor Louis Frothingham, Charles W. Baxter and Dr. John Coughlin of Fall River, arrived. They visited the Massachusetts boys, and took messages for their friends and relatives at home.

Two days after the division was concentrated in this area order was received to proceed to the Toul sector and relieve the First Division, part of which was in that line, and a French division. On the day of the move the orders were changed nine different times. Everybody was up in the air. The order indicated an emergency which necessitated the movement of many of the infantry units by motor bus, while the animals, supply company wagons, and equipment were marched over the road with the artillery and other divisional units.

The big German drive of March 21 had started, and was sweeping along as though nothing in the world could stop it. It was vitally necessary that the troops be placed

in the Toul sector to relieve the French who had been holding it with a part of the First Division.

Though the men had been able to secure but two days' rest, they set off on their long journey with the customary, "C'est la guerre." Rain and snow fell alternately, and the weather was cold, while at times it was impossible to bring up supplies to every organization. The mix-up in orders had prevented any real plan for supply being made, and the result was that sometimes both men and animals missed a meal.

The men stood the discomforts of the journey remarkably well, and the division reached the Toul sector on the last day of March, immediately starting the relief of the First Division and the French troops.

There had been so many changes in orders, and the various movements had to be executed so quickly, that all orders regarding supply were given verbally. As a result there was some confusion in the sector. Some of the infantry units of the Twenty-sixth, due to their movement over the road by bus, were separated from their transport, for several days. Advance preparations had been made for their supply in the new sector. It became necessary to send up truck companies immediately to establish a quartermaster depot at the First Division railhead, from which supplies were drawn daily.

The relief of the First Division by the Twenty-sixth has been the subject of comment. There were two inexperienced officers, perhaps prejudiced, who made a report of this relief, much to the disadvantage of the Twenty-sixth. This report was read at the General Staff School at Langres, and while the designations of the two divisions were not mentioned, being referred to as "X" and "Y" divisions, the nature of the report clearly indicated that the First and Twenty-sixth were meant.

According to authorities, the report the two officers made was unfair in every detail and showed prejudice. It was also said to have been proved by the report that the two officers lacked the experience which would have justified them in any criticism.

After the relief was completed the Twenty-sixth occupied a front extending about 18 kilometers, which had previously been held by one infantry brigade of the First Division and a full French division. Therefore the Twenty-sixth was the first American division to occupy a sector as a division.

On April 3 the First Division was entirely relieved, and General Edwards was given command of the sector. It was the first time that the division was in line by itself and under the control of its own officers.

It was fairly quiet here, with a little artillery strafing at meal times. At breakfast, dinner and supper the Boche would send over a few gas and high explosive shells in an endeavor to put the kitchens out of business.

The 104th Infantry was occupying a salient between Apremont, inclusive, and Bois Brule to Bussons, at the foot of Mont Sec. This sector was on a level plain of flat, marshy land from Apremont up to Flirey. The only elevation occupied by the Twenty-sixth was Beaumont Ridge. There was a bend in the road leading to Beaumont which was called Dead Man's Curve. The Germans held Mont Sec and the heights of the Meuse River. They were able to overlook the Yankee sector and could see directly into the lines. Every one hated Mont Sec and the men would gladly have rushed it, but were not permitted to do so. The German salient protruded into the allied lines like a sore thumb.

When the Boche captured Mont Sec the French lost 10,000 men. The hill was honeycombed with concrete

dugouts, machine-gun emplacements and observation posts.

When the French occupied the sector the Germans made strong attacks when their morale was low and captured numbers of prisoners. The next day the German communique would call it a victory.

To the left of this wide sector was a salient in the Bois Brule, or Apremont Woods, where the French had lost a great many men, and where the Germans frequently took prisoners. General Marchand of Fashoda fame, who was in command of the division on the left, afterwards told General Edwards that three times the Germans had attacked the salient and taken the garrison. As General Edwards described it:—

The Toul sector we were in was a marsh. On the left were the heights of the Meuse, with Apremont on our right, the salient extending down to the Bois Brule, in front of Luneville, a wood in a marsh, and all under the smashing fire of the Boche artillery. At Bois Brule there was an entering curve on a high mountain, and the place opposite where I had to put a battalion had sixteen minnenwerfer. They have a normal range of 600 yards, and they could smash down on the advance trenches and do terrible damage. General Marchand of the famous Fashoda incident was there, and he quietly told me that he had been there about three years. He said that every time the Boche morale was low all the enemy had to do was to put a barrage beyond his front trenches, come over and take some prisoners. That was the prospect.

I put Colonel Shelton, who had been placed in command of the 104th Infantry, in that awful hole. I put the 102d in the Bois Remiry, and I put the 101st in Rombacour, right between the two of them. The sector had never been organized; it had never been wired; it was two and a half times the size of an ordinary sector.

And this green division went in and took over that sector as

the first independent thing they ever did. Everybody told me it was the worst place on the western front; that more Frenchmen had been killed there than was necessary. Behind that, a little way, was the famous fort of Luneville, about which there was a good deal of sentiment, like the Toul fort.

Dominating the entire sector was Mont Sec, held by the Germans, which will never be forgotten by those who took part in these battles. Whatever was attempted by the Americans and French came directly under the view of the Boche observers at Mont Sec.

As was customary, General Edwards went down and made a personal examination of the sector. When he saw the position held by Colonel Shelton he ordered him to pull his troops back from the front line. The French corps commander demurred to this proceeding, but General Edwards insisted that his order be carried out. He declared that he was responsible to his own conscience which would not permit him to sacrifice his men unnecessarily. He asserted that the Germans could cut off the entire salient and capture the biggest part of the men of the 104th.

The French commander said that the Germans would come over and occupy that trench if the Americans gave it up. Edwards replied: "That's just what we want them to do. If they come over we'll lick hell out of them."

That is exactly what happened. The Germans came over, and the New Englanders withdrew and allowed them to occupy the front line at Chauveau, as this particular spot was known. Then, with wild cheers, the Yankees fell on the Boche with their bayonets; killed a large number, took about forty prisoners, and drove the enemy back to his own lines.

### General Edwards described it in these words:—

The second night we were there the Boche attacked after putting down a barrage. My men did as they were told and ran back. The Boche advanced, as the French thought they would. They filled up the Chauveau front, and when they lifted the barrage, without any order, the platoons of the 104th Infantry got up, and, singing "Hail, Hail, the Gang's All Here," went after them.

At the same time Colonel Sherburne dropped a smashing American barrage on the Chauveau front with his 75s. He lifted it and allowed the Yankees to go ahead. They went ahead, driving the Boche before them. They charged up the hill into the front line German trenches, overrunning their objectives, and had to be called back.

The plan of defence of the French on the left warranted a fall back. The liaison between the Second Division was not complete, and the Tenth Colonial Division fell right back and exposed the flanks of the 104th Infantry. The enemy curled round and got in behind it. The second day they brought up 700 shock troops, because the first time we had licked them and had taken the first prisoners that had been taken in Apremont for six months. Each lad got 1,000 francs reward for taking those prisoners, which belonged to the Fifth German Landwehr.

I am getting a little ahead of my story. Two days after they brought up 700 shock troops, together with two other battalions, and they said: "We will show these Americans." They came down again and got in behind our flanks. Our men did the same thing again. And as soon as they had chucked the Boche out of one place they would whack him in another. The lieutenants did not have to do anything. The sergeants would get up and indicate: "Follow me." They didn't say it, because they could not have been heard above the shells.

And those men fought there for five days around Hill 320 in front of Apremont. They wiped out the 700 Germans, made 40 prisoners and buried 200 Boches. The French Army commander cited 117 men of the 104th and they got the Croix de Guerre in a very impressive ceremony when they were with-



Harris & E. Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew L. Pendleton



Number of 155 m.m. French Guns at Valdahon, France



American Soldiers being rushed to the Front in France

drawn. They also pinned the Croix de Guerre on the colors of the regiment, and I don't know that that ever occurred before.

During the engagement General Marchand was down in the post of the Italian command. The French corps commander was at my headquarters, and the French Army commander visited me three times that day. He told me an old observer who had been at Laonville for four years said that we were whipped; that we had lost Hill 222; and that he could understand why. I laughed at him and smoked a cigarette. It was very natural.

A new French division came to us about which we knew nothing, and at the end of the thing the officer said that it was about as game an action as he ever saw. It was the first time that troops had ever won in that sector, and from that time on we absolutely owned No Man's Land.

This general of the Thirty-seventh Division was General Sabatier. He was relieved by the Tenth Colonial. When relieved he said: "Those Americans are the queerest things I have ever seen." He said that a Boche prisoner had told him the Yankees were crazy. The Boche said: "They sing when they use the bayonet, and they follow you right into your own wire."

This general was a very generous man in his tribute. He said: "I have lost a garrison generally whenever the Boche wanted to come over and take it. I didn't know how to stop it. A great American division comes in here and suggests a new method to us people who have been fighting for three or four years. The Boche had got our goats. Now that is all changed. Now the Americans have got their goats. They don't need anybody on the flank of their liaison. They have destroyed the Fifth Landwehr division. They own No Man's Land. I take off my hat to the Twenty-sixth Division."

In that warfare written orders were issued covering the most minute details, but in this case the General stepped in, and through his knowledge of the situation gave verbal orders which were a decisive factor in our success.

#### **CHAPTER VIII**

# **Battle of Apremont**

On the morning of April 10 the Boche attacked in force the lines of the 104th Infantry. There were 800 men in the raid, and they penetrated for a short distance into the front lines. The 104th then counter attacked. They fought through the night of the 10th and all day of the 11th, drove the Boche out of their lines, captured 48 prisoners and killed a large number. The American casualties were very light.

After that fight General Edwards had a conference with General Passaga, the French corps commander, and it was decided to build a trench, wiping out a salient. The 101st Engineers did this, working nights between bombardments, and finished it in a few days.

During this battle of Apremont Forest there were incidents of personal bravery too numerous to mention. The men proved themselves to be absolutely fearless, while their reckless bravery and ability with the bayonet daunted the Hun. One incident, however, will bear repetition at this time.

On the morning of April 12 orders had been received for an advance by the 104th Infantry. Sergeant John A. Dickerman of the Headquarters Company was in charge of two Stokes mortars, the small trench artillery which did so much damage. These two mortars were placed in a screen just behind the second line trench. With Dickerman were Privates Alson, Knutson, Cole and Howland, and Corporal Henry Mack. Dickerman had orders to

lay down a barrage of three minutes, after which the artillery was to take it up and drop a barrage behind which two companies were to go over the top in the first wave. There was a heavy fog that morning.

Dickerman laid down his barrage as ordered, but there was no sign from the artillery. In the fog the signal had not been seen. Then the Boches came over in an attack against the American lines, and Dickerman opened up with his mortars. They were the only protection between the Boche and the 104th first line.

The men worked madly, dropping round after round into the mortars, which took deadly toll in the attacking force. Then the Germans started a creeping barrage. The shells from the enemy guns exploded nearer and nearer to the little party working the mortars. Sergeant Dickerman and the men knew that it was only a question of time, as it was easy to locate them. Still, they held out. Suddenly a shell landed in the midst of the party. Alson, Knutson and Cole were killed, and Howland was wounded. Corporal Mack escaped. Dickerman lost his right eye and right foot, his left leg was torn and he had many other wounds. For this all of the party, living and dead, were given the Croix de Guerre.

The enemy was comparatively quiet after this until the attack on Seicheprey on April 20 to the 22d. The German "Sturntruppen," or Hindenburg's Traveling Circus, as it was called, led the attack. These were a body of picked shock troops, who traveled from place to place, along the German line and delivered raids at regular intervals. After a heavy bombardment they came over, about 400 in number, with about 2,500 more Germans following to consolidate the positions the raiders were expected to take. They came over with full packs and with orders to take the lines and hold them until they

could be consolidated. Evidently the attack was designed to break down the Yankee morale.

The Boches were favored by a heavy fog, and were upon the New Englanders before they realized what had happened. Company C of the 102d Infantry was surprised, and practically the whole unit was captured. Many desperate combats took place in the mist.

It was at this time that Colonel Bertrand, commanding a French regiment, led his troops in a counter attack on Fleury, mounted on a horse.

The fighting became general. Like their forefathers at Lexington, the Americans fought from behind walls in the little towns behind the front, and any other cover they could find. Armed with machine guns and rifles, some of these detachments held on for two days. At the end of the fight Lieutenant Lockhart, unshaven, drawn and haggard, reported to his commanding officer and apologized for his appearance. He said that he had been in a trench with his platoon and not a man had left. Asked how many remained alive, he replied: "Nine sir."

Word came that at the convergence of two lines of trench there were a party of Boches in a strong point. Lieutenant Wilcox, with an automatic rifle and four men, went up one trench. His platoon had been relieved, but he could not take it out because of the barrage. At the same time Lieutenant Horton Edmands, former Boston newspaperman, took five men and went up the trench at the left, headed for the same point. Lieutenant Wilcox left two of his men to bomb a dugout on the way up, and therefore had but two men with him when he came on nineteen of the enemy in a communicating trench. He immediately commanded them to throw up their hands, and the whole party were taken prisoners.

In the meantime Lieutenant Edmands arrived at the

strong point and found eleven Boches waiting for him. Edmands ran up, pistol in hand, and his appearance so terrified the Germans that one of them threw his arms around the young officer's neck and begged for mercy. The man had been wounded in the arm, and his blood flowed all over the American. Edmands gathered up his prisoners, the wounded being placed in makeshift litters and went back down the trench. For these acts both lieutenants received the Croix de Guerre.

General Edwards told of the battle in these words: —

Then came an incident that is very important to me, and I think I analyze it properly. That is the battle of Seicheprey, where the 102d was stationed. It was the first battle where any number of prisoners were taken. We had all become a little cocky. The 104th stayed there, although they were pretty badly cut up, because we had only a few divisions then and the Boche divisions were in superior numbers on the western front. We knew they were going to try to break through, and the master minds had to keep divisions in reserve to reinforce any line that might be threatened.

On the morning of the 20th of April we had a little bit of evidence of larger concentration of Boche guns, and they were a little bit more active. Early in the morning, 4 o'clock, the most violent bombardment on all the rear areas, on Seicheprey, Rombacaur and on the connecting trenches, took place. The 101st were at Ramschelle, and Colonel Logan's headquarters were smothered. He was in the cellar of a church, and he and Father O'Connor wore their masks for five or six hours. We could not tell at first where the smash was coming. There was a tremendously heavy mist, and the Boche was favored. Thirteen hundred shock troops came down between Seicheprey and Ramschelle, and another 1,500 came around from Remier, starting for Seicheprey, and the artillery just smothered us. It was as much as a man's life was worth to try to get out of Seicheprey by Beaumont, but they did it. There Lieutenant

H. Comfort, a doctor, ran back and forth through the barrage. The ambulances ran on the main road to Seicheprey. A gallant sergeant timed the shots and would shoot through. Most of them were hit right into Seicheprey.

The Germans swept down into the middle of the town. They overran our machine guns, and they had big clubs; they carried 5-kilogram nitroglycerine boxes, and they all had trench knives. This man, Captain Stanchfield, stood there. The first thing he saw was two automatic guns playing on him, not more than 10 feet away. They got into the middle of Seicheprey. And there was a gallant fellow by the name of Major Rau, since killed, who stood there. There was also Lieutenant Thompson, who gathered his men together and fought them. And Captain Griswell, who came home suffering from shell shock, was surrounded.

Three of our machine-gun crews were found sitting on their machines with their heads down. Only one man got away alive. In front of each machine gun were 10 to 15 Boches lying around; there were over 400 Boche helmets on the ground.

They outgunned us by 4 or 5 to 1, and they kept up this artillery concentration for over thirty-six hours. It was as much as your life was worth to go anywhere. I would not let them go to pick up our dead. We buried 164. The Boches worked thirty-six hours with twenty-six pairs of litter bearers taking away their wounded. We carefully examined prisoners, and everybody else after that, and there is no doubt that their casualties amounted to 1,200. We lost very nearly 150 prisoners. We had gassed or slightly wounded about 600, and the permanent losses were about 200.

We found the Boche coming down the Laiville trench, and we put all the Twenty-sixth artillery on that trench, as well as the 69th, and we massacred them.

That night the Yankees counter attacked under Major Rau, drove the enemy from the American trenches, captured a few prisoners, and buried more dead Huns than

the Twenty-sixth had suffered in killed, wounded or missing.

The 102d Infantry bore the brunt of this engagement, and acquitted themselves in a way that brought more compliments from the French. About thirty or forty general American prisoners, with the 102d Infantry at this time, were working in this vicinity. When the fight began the prisoners grabbed rifles from wounded and dead comrades, jumped into the midst of the fray, and each and every one proved himself to be a hero.

The bombardment which began on Saturday morning was the most terrific the Americans had yet experienced. High explosives mixed with gas were sprayed all up and down the line. The Boche was following the barrage closely at right angles, and a great many Germans got through the loosely held front line, which was nothing but an irregular string of strong points.

The Germans intended to hold this line with their storm troops until reinforcements could come up and organize it. The Germans shelled the roads leading to the front line in an attempt to prevent the Yankee reserves from coming up, but they came up.

In the midst of a deadly storm of shells they fought with the rifle, bayonets, grenades, pistols and even their fists. Although heavily outnumbered, the New Englanders fought on and on. Hand-to-hand combats took place in the streets of a little town just behind the lines.

Then the Boche retreated, carrying his own wounded and also taking some prisoners. In retreating the Boche came upon isolated platoons of Yankees, and swept some of them along with them. Captain Griswold was with one of these, but he managed to escape when a shell dropped near his captors.

In the meantime the American artillery was pouring a

devastating fire on the first line trench, now held by the enemy.

During the engagement the engineers in this sector fought abreast of the infantry. The 2d Battalion of Infantry, which had just been relieved before the fight began, returned to the front and "stood to." Many small units which were not relieved stayed in their positions until the end.

The moral effect of Seicheprey on the allies was very great, in that it showed the Yankees had, in their first serious engagement, been able to stand up, take punishment, and hold ground against especially trained shock troops.

On April 28 the 104th Infantry was decorated with the Croix de Guerre for its work in the battle of Apremont. There were also 116 individual decorations given out that day to officers and men of the regiment.

The ceremony took place in a large field, the battalion marching from the billets, where it was being held in reserve, having left the front line for rest. General Edwards and his chief of staff were present, as was Brigadier-General Cole, commanding the brigade.

General Passaga, in his gray-blue uniform, arrived in a big automobile and was greeted by the American officers. With his aide, General Passaga advanced to the colors of the 104th, followed by General Edwards, and pinned the Croix de Guerre to them. He said: "I am proud to decorate the flag of a regiment which has shown such fortitude and courage. I am proud to decorate the flag of a nation which has come to aid in the fight for liberty."

He then decorated Colonel Shelton and the remainder of the officers and men who had been cited. Among these were Father Des Saulles, the Knights of Columbus



Captain Nathaniel S. Simpkins (deceased), Second Aide-de-Camp to Major-General Clarence E. Edwards



Members of Twenty-sixth Division leaving for the Front, France



Captain H. M. Howe inspecting Members of Company C, 101st Ammunition Train, in France

chaplain, and the Rev. Walter Danker of Worcester, the Protestant chaplain, who was later killed.

The order which resulted in these decorations was issued by General Passaga, and read as follows:—

THIRTY-SECOND ARMY CORPS, HEADQUARTERS, April 26, 1918.

STAFF G-1. GENERAL ORDERS, No. 787-A.

General Passaga, in command of the Thirty-second Army Corps, mentions in the army corps dispatches:—

One Hundred and Fourth Infantry Regiment, U. S. A., under command of Colonel G. H. Shelton:—

For greatest fighting spirit and self-sacrifice during action of April 10, 12 and 13, 1918. Suffering from very heavy bombardments and attacked by very strong German forces succeeded in preventing their dangerous advance, and with greatest energy reconquered at the point of the bayonet the few ruined trenches which had to be abandoned at the first onset, at the same time making prisoners.

GENERAL PASSAGA,
Commanding Thirty-second Army Corps.

A few days previously the following was issued: —

HEADQUARTERS TWEMTY-SIXTH DIVISION,
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,
FRANCE, April 15, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 29.

1. The following General Order, issued by the general commanding the Thirty-second Army Corps, French, is published for the information of this command:—

EIGHTH ARMY, THIRTY-SECOND ARMY CORPS STAFF,
THIRD BUREAU, HEADQUARTERS, April 14, 1918.

No. 1870-3. GENERAL ORDERS, No. 124.

On April 12, just past, the enemy, supported by powerful artillery, made an attack in force on the lines held by the left of the Twenty-sixth American Division and the right of the Tenth Colonial Division.

The struggle continued throughout the day and the night of April 12 and 13.

In the course of the engagement, thanks to the vigorous and repeated counter attacks of the Americans and of our Colonials, the enemy, in spite of his superiority in numbers, was thrown back from several trench positions where he had gained a foothold, and left in our hands more than forty prisoners and a large number of dead.

During this fight, carried on under a severe bombardment, the American troops gave proof not only of their splendid courage, which we know, but also of a brotherhood in arms which was absolute and ever present.

With such men as these the cause of liberty is sure to triumph.

PASSAGA.

HEADQUARTERS, April 14, 1918.
General Passaga, commanding the Thirty-second Army Corps.

2. The division may well be proud of such praises from one so well qualified to speak of merit on the battlefield. I congratulate the entire command, and desire especially to mention the gallant conduct of the Third Battalion, 104th Infantry, Second Battalion, 104th Infantry, and Company C, 103d Machine Gun Battalion, who bore the brunt of the fight, as well as Batteries D, E and F, 101st Field Artillery, three platoons of 90 m.m. guns, manned by men of the 101st Field Artillery, and the 101st Trench Mortar Battery, whose able support of the infantry and machine guns made victory possible.

C. R. Edwards,

Major-General, Commanding.

#### CHAPTER IX

# How They "Kept the Faith"

The exercises connected with the awarding of decorations were an ordeal to many of the men concerned. It is related how when General Passaga was pinning the Croix de Guerre on members of the 104th Regiment, one boy, whose bravery had been of a superhuman order, turned pale and fainted. French officers stated that this was common, and that it was generally the most indomitable fighter who was most affected.

It was during this time, when one of the regiments was in billets, that its colonel made an address to the men which, for frankness and straight from the shoulder expressions of opinion, had never been equaled in the division.

He prefaced his remarks by recalling a talk he had given the outfit before starting for the front.

I asked you then [said the colonel], to have faith in me. I ask you now whether I have kept that faith, and whether what I told you then was true, and whether I have helped to redeem the promises I made you?

I feel that you have kept faith, and because of what you have done I am proud of you; your superiors, the American Army and your country are proud of you.

I told you three months ago that we were going to the front. We did, and we gave a good account of ourselves. Then we were sent to another front; we have here given an even better account of ourselves, and for this you are largely to be thanked.

I warn you that the end is not here; after our rest we shall be back in the line somewhere. Wherever we are, I count on

you for the same loyal service you have given, the same grit, the same determination to meet the Boche and to do him.

Don't let any one get the idea that we have done our full part, for we may be called on soon to do more.

We are now in a rest period. But I have some bad news for you; while resting we shall probably be requested to amuse ourselves by putting up barbed wire.

I asked you to exercise self-control in that other talk and you did. Courts-martial were wiped out. There has been a little reaction, and I am appealing to you once more on this score.

After all, it is up to you to keep your comrades from going A. W. O. L. I don't want a yellow man in the regiment, and when there is one I want you to help me get rid of him. And the next time we go in — and it may be soon — I want you to see that every man of your own squad is on his job.

Now, in spite of the presence of the chaplain, I'm going to preach a little hate. You know now what war is, and you have seen the men, face to face, who produced this war. In your hearts you know the Boche is yellow. You have shown that, man for man, you are the better. And you can beat him at his own nasty game, if he is bound to fight that way.

You have seen your fellows hit and you have taken prisoners, 4 to 1, I believe. But that's not enough.

The Boche is a bully and he is always yellow. He can fight, and he will go on fighting beyond where we can win. He will try every nasty trick to kill you and to make you suffer. Don't forget that. When you meet him remember what he has done. I shan't be satisfied with even 40 to 1, and I don't want you to be. Get every one you can. Go in cool of head, but with hatred in your hearts and venom in your bayonets. Every Boche killed brings the end of the war nearer.

The next engagement was in the rear of Fleury on May 20, the division having taken over two more kilometers of line on the right to relieve the French division.

The Boche heard of it and attacked. Major McCarthy's battalion of the 101st defended the salient.

The attack was a failure. As the enemy came over, he was met with a smashing rifle and machine-gun fire which took the heart out of him and forced him to retreat. During the engagement Major McCarthy sent back word to divisional headquarters at Boucq: "We're ready for them, but they are not coming over fast enough."

Probably the most interesting event during the Twenty-Sixth's occupancy of this sector was the early morning when a battalion of gas engineers put on a projector gas attack on the unsuspecting Boche in the vicinity of Fleury. Very little gas had been used by the Yankees up to this time.

Major Watson, commanding the gas battalion, was greatly pleased with the encouragement received from General Edwards, and made finished preparation for this attack. The projectors were placed under ideal conditions, and the atmospheric conditions were most favorable. It was learned from prisoners late that night that a regimental relief was going on when the projector gas was put over, and they estimated that 2,500 Boches were evacuated.

It is known as a fact that within an hour following the attack the Boche was desperate. He turned loose all the artillery he had and peppered the entire sector without any regard for where he was shooting. All the towns in the back area, including Boucq, were subjected to bombardment by long range guns.

The next event of importance on this sector was the raid of Major Hickey's battalion of the 101st Infantry at Reichecourt. Four or five days before the raid, about May 25 or 26, the battalion was withdrawn from the line and was taken to the rear. Here a place had been chosen

as nearly like the terrain of the German lines as possible. Aerial photographs furnished the necessary information from which trenches like the Germans' were laid out. There were also dugouts and machine gun emplacements. The men of the battalion were then sent into these imitation trenches, and for several days they practiced taking them.

On the night of May 30 the divisional artillery laid down a barrage and gassed the German second and third lines and communication trenches. Then the battalion went over. They found a few Boches left in the trenches, and these they killed or captured. The remainder had been destroyed by the artillery. This was the first big all-American raid.

During these engagements the majority of the orders were transmitted by telephone. There was constant telephonic communication between divisional headquarters and brigade and regimental commands.

On the morning of Sunday June 16, about 3.30, a German plane came over and dropped bombs on Boucq, where divisional headquarters were located, and Royau-Meix and Juy-sous-les-Cotes, the towns in which the headquarters of the two brigades were functioning. These bombs were undoubtedly dropped so that the Boche artillery could get the range.

The division suffered quite a few casualties, due to the erratic fire. Also, as there were no dugouts at Boucq, it became necessary to move divisional headquarters to Trondes, where the staff could function.

One shell landed in the midst of a crowd of men who had just come from church at Roy-au-Meix. Several casualties resulted, one of those killed being Chaplain Danker. General Shelton's orderly was another. He seemed to know by intuition where the shell was going

to burst, and threw himself between his commanding officer and the deadly projectile. The orderly was killed but Shelton received only a wound in the cheek, while his uniform, a new one that he had put on to wear to church, was torn in several places by splinters.

The last engagement in this sector was at Xivray on this date. The Boche laid down a terrific barrage, and then advanced in three columns, two from the north and one from the west. The enemy intended to surround and capture the garrison, which was made up partly of the 103d Infantry and Company D of the 103d Machine Gun Battalion.

One of the enemy columns tried to get in behind from the west and was annihilated by machine-gun fire. The other two columns became confused under the treatment they were receiving and fell back, leaving a number of prisoners and many dead. The corps commander said of this that it was the most brilliant piece of work he had seen on any front.

The Germans had brought in long-range railway guns near the foot of Mont Sec, which opened up and dropped shells on the headquarters towns. A barrage was then laid down on the first line at Xivray-Marvoisson, where the 103d Infantry was holding. About 4 o'clock a strong force came over and attacked. They got as far as the village of Xivray when the Yankees made a stand. The Germans did not get into the town. The few platoons of New Englanders who were holding the front line then counter attacked and drove the Boche back to his own lines. Several prisoners were captured by the Americans, whose casualties were slight.

Six hundred Germans were in the raiding party which had for its object the envelopment of the ruins of Xivray-Marvoisson. Before the raid had really started, the

American observers saw the Boche in front of his own lines, called for artillery and machine-gun barrage, and created considerable havoc before the German barrage started.

The Germans went forward, and one officer took a platoon across the road running from Xivray to Boucinville, following his own barrage. One of his men being wounded, he stopped to ascertain the extent of the injuries. On looking up he beheld a group of Yankees with fixed bayonets dashing at him, while his own party had disappeared. The German officer surrendered, but later complained bitterly about Yankee tactics. "The Americans had no right to be where they were," he said. "They were coming right through the German barrage and might have been absolutely wiped out."

In the meantime the reserve units had gone forward automatically to the relief of the Yankees in the front line, and the Boche was once more driven off.

It was during this time that Captain Henry D. Comerais, on the staff of Colonel Logan, was wounded. He was working on a map hanging on a wall in the head-quarters of the 101st Infantry, up near the front. Colonel Logan had just left his seat by the window when a fragment of shell flew by the spot where he had been seated, and, striking Captain Comerais on the right hand, tore most of it away. His absence in the hospital as a result was a great loss to Colonel Logan.

Before and after these engagements small raids were being carried out. The results were not of sufficient importance to obtain mention in the daily intelligence bulletins. Nevertheless, these raids frequently developed instances of dare-devil bravery and quick thinking which were typically American.

On one occasion Lieutenant Thomas J. Quirk and



Major John W. Hyatt



Underwood & Underwood, New York Sergeant John Latzig, Company E, 104th Infantry, with First German captured by an American Soldier, February 17, 1918



Guarding an Old German Dugout, Bois d'Esparges, France, September 12, 1918

thirty-six men worked through the Boche wire by means of a gateway which the enemy kept open for his own patrols. The patrol managed to get into the town of Apremont, well inside the German lines, when they were discovered.

Before the Yankees could take cover a burst of machinegun fire got six men. Lieutenant Quirk decided that his party were too few in number to stay and fight it out. He gave the order for the men to retrace their steps. This they did, taking the wounded with them. On arriving at the gate in the wire they found that the opening was being swept by a hail of machine-gun bullets, through which no man might pass. After a short time devoted to deliberation of the problem, the officer decided that all the bullets were flying at least 2 feet above the ground. Whereupon he ordered his men to lie down and roll through, which they did, dragging their wounded with them. Every man got back to the Yankee trenches.

#### CHAPTER X

# Boche Beaten at Own Game

And so the days and nights dragged by. The New Englanders had by this time found themselves. They were confident and assured, knowing that they had received everything the Boche had to offer, and had beaten him at his own game.

They had stood all sorts of hardships uncomplainingly, had gone without sleep, food and equipment. And worst of all, they had lived in horrible mud and the almost continual rain without any lowering of morale. As a matter of fact, they had grown stronger, and bore themselves with a quiet self-confidence which had been lacking in the days of training at Neufchateau.

While the Twenty-sixth Division occupied the Toul sector, it was visited by Elsie Janis, the famous actress. She immediately became extremely popular with the men, and called the Twenty-sixth "my division." The young woman, who was accompanied by her mother, wore three silver stars, so that she could outrank General Edwards, and Captain "Al" Ford was made her chief of staff. She remained three or four days, giving outdoor entertainments, and cheered the men up. Miss Janis paid the division three visits in all.

On May 25 the Germans had started a drive on the Chemin des Dames, which the Twenty-sixth had previously occupied. In order that the French on the Toul sector might send units to take part in this battle, the Yankee Division troops took over two more kilometers of front, making 20 kilometers they were holding alto-

gether, or more than twice the size of a normal sector. The line extended from Boucainville up to Limay, and included both places.

Owing to the great width of the sector, the problem of bringing up food and ammunition was a tremendous one. The roads were continually under shell fire, and during the various engagements the truck drivers worked night and day. During the Bois Brule fight, which lasted five days and five nights, the guns consumed enormous quantities of shells, but Seicheprey was the worst with which the men had had to deal. During this engagement the men of the ammunition train worked forty-eight hours steadily, despite the fact that Colonel Keville in command had attempted to arrange eight-hour shifts.

The road leading from Beaumont to Fleury ran practically parallel with the front, along a ridge of high ground part of the way. The road from Beaumont left Fleury road and wound down into a valley, toward Mandres, with a sharp curve. This was the famous Dead Man's Curve, and was the scene of many casualties. A camouflaged battery was located in the vicinity and the German shells were continually seeking it.

Throughout the Seicheprey engagement ammunition and supplies were continually brought over this road, notwithstanding the enemy shells. As a result the members of the ammunition train came out with casualties and not a few decorations.

One of the French regiments relieved by the Twenty-sixth was the 162d, commanded by Colonel Bertrand. He had been wounded six times and wore the Legion of Honor, the Military Medal and the Croix de Guerre. His regiment had also been cited many times, and was one of the élite organizations of the French Army. Colonel Bertrand, who was later seriously wounded and promoted

to brigadier-general, always led his men into action, sometimes mounted and sometimes on foot.

On the last of June an order was received to the effect that the New Englanders would be relieved by the Eighty-second American Division, less its artillery, and a French division which had just come out of the big offensive in the vicinity of Soissons. The relief occupied three days and nights. Fifty-two thousand troops were in motion in this one sector during the three days of relief. So well, however, were the plans for the relief, prepared by the staff of the Twenty-sixth, executed that the Boche had no intimation that relief was going on, and not a single casualty resulted. This was something unprecedented in the history of relief.

The division concentrated in the next few days in the vicinity of Toul, with Boche airplanes hovering overhead and continually dropping bombs.

Then orders came for the division to proceed to a new area, the location of which was not designated. However, information had been received that the division was to be stationed in Pantin, a suburb of Paris, and every one was jubilant. All believed that the Yankee Division was to march in the July 4th parade in Paris. Equipment was furbished up, and plans were made to enjoy the leaves which every one was sure would be given. The men had had but two days' rest up to this time, and they felt that they were entitled to a change from the life at the front.

The troops piled aboard the combination horse and passenger trains which pulled out with their shouting and singing freight. As the trains passed the tiny French villages the men cheered and enthusiastically returned the waving and cheering of the inhabitants.

Before the first train had reached Pantin, however, the

men experienced acute disappointment. The station was changed to Noissy-le-Sec, and the trains started back for the front. It then dawned on every one that the division was destined to go back into line.

The trains were dispatched to detraining points in the vicinity of Meaux and Le Ferte, close to the sector lying to the north of Château-Thierry.

On the 1st and 2d of July orders came in to relieve the Second with the famous 5th and 6th Regiments of Marines, which at Bois Belleau had stood off one of the worst of the German drives. The marines and the remainder of the Second Division had suffered heavily in withstanding this push, and were badly in need of rest.

On the 6th of July the Yankee Division had one brigade of infantry in line, and the Second Division had one brigade of infantry out. Then the Boche started the Marne offensive, called the second battle of the Marne. It was believed that this would extend to the north of Château-Thierry, and orders came from the higher command to dispense with the relief. General Bundy, commanding the Second Division, was told to hold the advanced sector with the troops he had, including one brigade of the Twenty-sixth. General Edwards, with his division, less the one brigade of infantry, and plus the one brigade of the Second Division, was told to hold the second line.

This situation continued three or four days, until it was clearly indicated that the Boche would not extend his operations north of Château-Thierry. An order then came to renew the relief.

The division came up to the Château-Thierry sector with the knowledge on the part of the staff officers that what had gone before was practically child's play to what was to come. They anticipated the break-through, but

it is doubtful if any one realized that this battle was to be the turning point of the war, and that much of the success gained there by allied arms would be due to the Twenty-sixth Division.

Not even General Edwards, confident as he was of the ability of his men, realized that it was here they were to make a name for themselves which would go ringing down the corridors of time; that the story of their dogged pertinacity, dare-devil courage and sheer cold nerve, which carried them forward when their overworked brains refused to function, would be hailed as the most remarkable exhibition of fighting efficiency that had as yet been seen.

As the division took over the sector General Edwards issued the following:—

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION, AMBRICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FRANCE, July 11, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 60.

- 1. At the moment that the Twenty-sixth Division takes up its position on its third sector in three months it is fitting and proper that the division commander should take this opportunity to thank and congratulate the officers and men of the Yankee Division on the record that they achieved, since the division actively took its place in the fighting lines of the allies for the common cause.
- 2. You have been taken from a sector where in three battles you have shown that the blood of New England has not attenuated, and that the same spirit and traditions which your fore-fathers made glorious at Lexington and at Bunker Hill still survive in the generation which at Bois Brule, Seicheprey, Humbert Plantation and Xivray have met and defeated the picked troops of the enemy. His four years of experience in active warfare and the ferocity of his methods have not daunted

you, and on every occasion where you have been called upon to face him you have distinguished yourself with notable valor, and brought credit upon your division and upon the people of New England from which you have come to engage in this righteous conflict.

- 3. A great honor has been conferred upon the whole division in that the French and American high command has at this time picked your division to come into this critical sector. That you have been so hurried to this sector is the evidence to you all of the opinion of the high command of the mettle of which this division is constituted.
- 4. The past months in battle have brought men and officers into that close union of confidence and affection which have resulted in the growing morale of this division. Looking back on the past four months with its spotless record and known achievements, which have been recognized by both France and America, it is with unqualified faith in the future and pride of the past that I see the Twenty-sixth Division go into a new sector, certain in my conviction that the men of New England will prove once more that they are capable of every effort and every sacrifice which the future may demand of them.

C. R. EDWARDS, Major-General, Commanding.

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# CHAPTER XI


#### "Saviors of Paris"

The entire Second Division was immediately relieved, concentrated in the Meaux area, and the majority removed to Soissons. The Yankee Division men took over the sector on an extended front, and were the only troops between Château-Thierry and Paris. As a result of their defence of this line they received the name of the "Saviors of Paris."

Then Marshal Foch pulled off the boldest stroke of the war. With the Boche very much occupied to the east of Château-Thierry in the second battle of the Marne, with his reserves drawn there in support of operations, General Foch decided it was an opportune moment for a counter attack to the right of the Boche right flank; that is, on the sector north and west of Château-Thierry. Château-Thierry was the nose of a big salient, and was the pivot of Foch's plan to envelop, by an advance towards the east and south, the Boche in the salient. It was a bold stroke in that he had no reserves, yet he knew that the Boche had pulled all his reserves away to strengthen his attack on the Marne.

At this time Colonel Shelton had been promoted to brigadier-general, and was in command of the Fifty-First Infantry Brigade, General Traub having been transferred to another division; General Cole still commanded the Fifty-Second Infantry Brigade, while Colonel Sherburne of the 101st Field Artillery had been made brigadiergeneral and commanded the artillery brigade.


"The Stars and Stripes," the paper published behind



Colonel George W. Bunnell



Underwood & Underwood, New York
Wild Boar, Mascot of M. D. S. Riders, Boucq, France,
April 4, 1918



101st Ammunition Train Theatre, France

the lines by members of the American Expeditionary Forces, comprehensively described the part taken by the Twenty-sixth Division in this battle, as follows:—

The sector northwest of Château-Thierry was not a pleasant place in the middle of July, 1918. The shallow and incomplete trenches extending from near Vaux and Bouresches around the east and north edges of the Bois de Belleau to a point near Bussares were under constant harassing fire from the German batteries running far back across the hills to the northeast, while German machine guns and snipers were comfortably installed all along the edges of the woods, the banks of the Ru Gobert creek, and in the ruined villages of Belleau and Torcy, close to the American front lines.

After a week of existence under such circumstances the situation became irksome, and there was no regret or hesitation in the ranks of the Twenty-sixth, when, on the night of July 17, orders came from General Liggett, commanding the First United States Corps, to go over next morning and chase the Germans out.

There was no hesitation, but from the tactical standpoint the problem was a difficult one. As the division lay in sector, the 101st Infantry was on the extreme right near Vaux, facing north; then came the 102d Infantry, extending to a little beyond Bouresches, facing east; then the 104th Infantry, in the Bois de Belleau, facing east and northeast; and then the 103d Infantry, on the extreme left, facing northeast and north.

By the terms of the general counter-offensive the Twenty-sixth Division was to act as a pivot until the bulge in the allied front running northwest toward the Forest de Villers-Cotterets should be hammered in. This required the left of the division to attack northward and northeastward, pivoting on Bouresches and guiding on the One hundred and Sixty-seventh French Division to its left, never getting ahead of the latter, but swinging gradually to the northeast until the whole front to its left should have been straightened.

This accomplished, it would next be necessary for the right

of the division to attack, half of it to the eastward and half of it to the northward, conquer the woods in front, and then execute a half turn to the northeast to bring itself in alignment with the general front. Then, and then only, a straightaway advance to the northeast would be in order. It was a problem for Yankee ingenuity to solve, and as usual it was solved.

Three support battalions of General Cole's brigade went through the front line without artillery preparation, but covered by a neutralization fire from the batteries of the 101st Field Artillery, at 4.35 o'clock that morning,—the 2d Battalion of the 103d Infantry, charging northeast out of the Bois de Belleau to take the railroad line in the creek valley between Bouresches and Belleau; the 3d Battalion of the 104th going north to take Belleau and Givry and the railroad between them; and the 3d Battalion of the 103d, on the left, also going north to take Torcy and the railroad beyond.

A heavy morning mist favored the attack, and the enemy—the Two hundred and First Division of General von Boehn's Seventh German Army—was taken by surprise. At 5.40 A.M. a signal rocket, thrown up from Torcy, announced to the American observation posts that Major Southard's men were in the town, which, in fact, they immediately went beyond, taking the railroad grade and creek bank, where they consolidated their position.

The center battalion, becoming confused in the darkness of the Bois de Belleau, had its attack delayed and did not jump off until 7.80. But then, although the enemy was now thoroughly aroused and making a vigorous resistance, the Americans went through everything,—cleaned up Belleau and then Givry in a sharp bayonet fight which was over by 8.80, and then, emulating the Union troops at Missionary Ridge, rushed on half-way up the slopes of Hill 193, north of Givry, before they could be stopped.

This hill, however, was in the sector of the One hundred and Sixty-seventh French Division, and though the advancing troops of the latter were still far from it, the Americans were recalled and the German machine gunners reoccupied it, as

from it they had a commanding enfilade fire westward along the front of the One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Division, and a still better fire southward on any position the Americans might take up along the creek valley or the hills east of it, as far as Bouresches.

This last fact had a direct bearing on the attack of the American right battalion which went over, with the center battalion, at 7.30 and captured the railroad and also the creek beyond, but was obliged to fall back from the latter and to remain clinging only with the greatest difficulty to the railroad grade, owing to the enfilade from Hill 193. Here Captain Hosford's men, burrowing out fox-holes along the grade, stayed all day, while many such acts of heroism were performed as those of Mechanic J. A. Thibodeau, who aided the wounded under fire until a shot in the hand prevented him from carrying stretchers any longer, when he joined the line and continued fighting until shot again in the leg.

But across the fire-swept belt in rear of them it was impossible to bring supplies of ammunition, and after dark they fell back to the edge of the woods, the detachment of the 102d Infantry, which had gone forward with them and taken the Bouresches railroad station, contriving to remain in possession of this slightly less exposed point.

The battalion in Torcy and that under Major Lewis in Belleau and Givry were not so badly off where they lay, but the ground between them and the woods was an inferno, and on it out of 22 runners going back and forth with messages during the day, 5 were killed and 12 wounded, only a few getting through, as did Private John W. Roy, Company H, who delivered one message after seeing three preceding runners killed and one wounded on the same route which he took.

There was nothing now for the Twenty-sixth to do but hold on grimly and wait for the One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Division to attain its first objective, the line Givry-Monthiers, which included the summit of Hill 193. On the evening of the 18th the French were nearly up to Licy-Clignon, and the next evening they were circling the western base of Hill 193. So,

assuming that they would take the hill in a simultaneous assault, a general advance of the Twenty-sixth Division was ordered for 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 20th, the object being to align the whole front facing northeast on an intermediate objective line along the hill crests beyond the creek valley, and extending from Les Brusses Farm, about a kilometer east of Belleau, through Hill 190 to La Goneterie Farm.

There was no preliminary fire by the corps artillery, but under such barrage as could be afforded by that of the division the attack went off on time. On the division right the assault troops of General Shelton's Fifty-first Brigade successfully solved their difficult problem, the 3d Battalion of the 102d Infantry, on the left, going northeast into the Bois de Bouresches and clearing it, after which, on the other flank, the 3d Battalion of the 101st Infantry drove north into the Bois de la Halmardiere, echeloning on the left when in contact with the other battalion, and thus swinging itself to face northeast also.

On the division left, the Fifty-second Brigade had a harder time. The shifting of battalions under the enemy's fire from a front facing north to make an attack eastward involved some nice maneuvering, but Major Lewis' tired men went out of Belleau, up the railroad, across the creek and took Les Brusses Farm on schedule time, while Major Hanson's 1st Battalion of the 103d Infantry, leaving the Bois de Belleau and surmounting the same obstacles a little farther south, rushed several machine-gun nests, took some prisoners, guns and ammunition, and was firmly in possession of Hill 190 and in liaison with the troops in the Bois de Bouresches by 6 P.M. But unfortunately, the One Hundred and Sixty-seventh French Division, in two gallant assaults, was unable to take Hill 193, and through the night the German machine guns so swept the American left that the captors of Les Brusses Farm were isolated there.

The nut, however, was cracked. On the morning of the 21st the Germans, reeling from their repulse along 60 bloody miles to the eastward, and fearful now of being strangled

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out of Château-Thierry between the Twenty-sixth and Third United States and the Thirty-ninth French Divisions, were in full retreat.

Leaving behind them at last the woods and the fields in which for more than seven weeks, while the wheat ripened and the poppies bloomed and faded, the doggedness of America had been pitted against the stubbornness of Germany, the Twenty-sixth swept forward in pursuit.

All day long it was a matter of marching across country in columns headed by advance guards, and it was not until near evening, after a march of nearly 9 kilometers had carried the advance far across the Soissons-Château-Thierry highway, that heavy machine-gun fire stopped the forward movement and brought warning that the enemy had made a stand in the broad, shallow creek valley in which lie the tiny villages of Trugny and, a kilometer north of it, Epieds.

Half a kilometer east of the villages, up the gently sloping fields, was the leafy margin of the Bois de Trugny, bristling, of course, with hidden machine guns, and spreading out southward into the greater forest of the Bois de Barbillon. The same old allied divisions, in fact, were up against the point of the same old German salient, somewhat blunted, since it had dropped back 6 kilometers from Château-Thierry, but still a point, with the Twenty-sixth United States on one side of it, the Thirty-ninth French tearing blindly at the apex in the obscurity of the Bois de Barbillon, and the Third United States on the other side scaling the ravines from the Marne, with its left flank at Mont St. Père, not 4 kilometers from Trugny.

Excepting for the advance guard under Major Lewis, most of the troops of the Twenty-sixth snatched a few hours' rest two or three kilometers west of the German machine guns in Epieds and Trugny, and along the country road between. But at gray dawn they assaulted, one battalion each of the 103d and the 104th Infantry advancing on Epieds, two and one-half battalions of the 101st moving along the edge of the Bois de Barbillon, about a kilometer south of Trugny, in an attempt to flank the villages.

The divisional batteries, emplaced four or five kilometers back, did not know where the front lines were, and could not deliver an effective barrage, while the enemy's artillery, adjusted by airplanes, poured in a deluge of gas and high explosives. Moreover, there was an uncaptured German machinegun stronghold at La Gouttiere Farm, in the sector of the One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Division, which galled the assaulting troops in left flank and rear.

Yet the men of the left and center went, 1,000 or more, into the edges of Trugny and Epieds before they were turned back, while the 101st Machine Gun Battalion, skirting with the infantry of its regiment the Bois de Barbillon, penetrated the Bois de Trugny, and, when finally forced back by concentrated fire, stopped defiantly directly south of Trugny and stayed there, on the enemy's flank. Three battalions of General Cole's troops repeated the attack on the left in the afternoon, but with no better success, for La Gouttiere Farm was still untaken, the One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Division being engaged all day in a bitter struggle beating off German counterattacks,—a struggle in which the Twenty-sixth Division artillery several times took a hand by extending its zone of fire entirely across the One Hundred and Sixty-seventh's sector.

Liaison was very difficult under such conditions, but it was maintained by men like Corporal J. L. Casey, Company I, 102d Infantry, who once established communication between his own and the regiment on the left across an open field 500 yards wide after three other men had been killed by machine guns in making the attempt.

The location of the American front line being more accurately known on the morning of the 23d, the artillery prepared the way by fire of destruction for a renewal of the attack from the right flank on the Bois de Trugny, which was made by the 101st Infantry, extended to the left by the 2d Battalion of the 101st Engineers, under Major Greenway.

At first handsome progress was made, and at noon the battle line was in the eastern part of the woods. But later it encountered concentrations of machine guns in front and on

both flanks so numerous and so skilfully concealed that they could not be overcome, and the assailants, after suffering heavy losses, were forced to fall back to the other edge of the woods, leaving a good many wounded men among the trees. The intensity of the struggle here was illustrated by such acts as that of Sergeant J. W. Casey, Company F, who, after capturing with his platoon two machine-gun nests and killing the occupants, dashed out single-handed and killed three German snipers who were shooting at his men.

The division by this time was so wearied by its losses and its desperate fighting that during the night the corps command placed Brigadier-General William Weigel's Fifty-sixth Infantry Brigade of the Twenty-eighth United States Division at the disposal of General Edwards, to assist in carrying forward the attack. Dispositions were made accordingly, but about 4 o'clock on the morning of the 24th patrols found that the enemy, like a fencer on guard, had again jumped back.

Once more came the majestic forward sweep of the allied battle front across the hills, the Twenty-sixth following in its sector with the motorized 101st Machine Gun Battalion (divisional) in lieu of cavalry, leading the pursuit in the direction of the Jaulgonne-Fere-en-Tardenois highway, a good  $5\frac{1}{2}$  kilometers northeast of the Bois de Trugny. Pushing through the central part of the Foret de Fere, the advance was held up just west of the road early in the evening by machine-gun fire, coming from the clearing and the massively constructed buildings of La Croix Rouge Farm.

The flank divisions having also been stopped by opposition along the same line, the Twenty-sixth waited for daylight to resume the push toward the Ourcq, but before that time the arrival of the Forty-second United States Division by autobus permitted the weary Twenty-sixth to be at last relieved. Leaving the 51st Artillery Brigade and the 101st Engineers to go on for a time with the fresh division, the Twenty-sixth marched back to a rest area at Etrepilly, the command of the front sector passing from General Edwards to General Menoher at 7 P.M., July 25.

The division, in its eight days of continuous battle, had advanced a distance of 18½ kilometers, captured about 250 prisoners, four field-pieces, numerous machine guns, one pontoon train and quantities of ammunition. Its losses had been about 5,300 officers and men, of whom 600 were killed. The general commanding estimated that the permanent losses, including killed, missing and badly wounded or gassed, were about 2,000, many of the casualties being due to the fact that the division, after gaining its first objectives, had to wait during two days under severe fire for the forces to the left to come up to the line established at the pivot by "New England's Own."



Colonel W. E. Sweetser



Decoration of Regimental Colors of 104th Infantry (the First American Regiment decorated with Croix de Guerre for Bravery under Fire), Boucq, France, April 23, 1918



International Film Service, Inc.

Members of 101st and 103d Field Artillery, Rangeval, France,
April 29, 1918

#### CHAPTER XII

#### Germans "Pinched Out"

The "Stars and Stripes" description of the battle, while extremely comprehensive in the larger phases, naturally omits many important details which at the time it was impossible to secure. For instance, when the division was held up at Epieds and Trugny, they were ordered to make a frontal attack, after having already made two without success. General Edwards thought that would entail too great a sacrifice.

He suggested a flank attack, which would require the division to move over to the right in the French sector to launch the attack. Permission was given to do this by the French corps commander on the right, and the attack was made, but met with very strong and determined resistance. Then, at night, a situation arose that demanded immediate action. General Edwards called General Shelton on the telephone, and again gave him verbal orders to attack through the Trugny Wood. against which General Shelton and Colonel Logan advised. Nevertheless. General Edwards ordered this movement carried out and assumed the entire responsibility. instructions were obeyed, with the result that the Germans were pinched out of the stronghold, which made it possible for the division to advance with little resistance the following morning.

We had so many casualties [said General Edwards, in speaking of this incident], that I went out and took a look for myself. "Stop it," I said, "You're disobeying the orders of your army

commander," said General Shelton. I said: "There is one thing I'm going to take home with me, and that's my own self-respect. I asked them to go and they'd go. I've got to answer my own Leader: 'Have you done everything in your power to win that battle with the least number of casualties?'"

I ordered the 101st up at Trumiere. Some one said it couldn't be done. I said: "It will be done. If necessary I will command the leading battalion myself."

Colonel Logan heard this. "General," he said, "if you want it done it certainly will be done." I was told that Logan said: "Tell General Edwards we will go any place under God's sky that he suggests."

Captain McConnell led his command through those woods. There were machine-gun nests in the trees, fox-holes and snipers, and a gas barrage. Captain Leahy was killed. That night I heard that they had left 400 of their wounded. I told them to go back and recover the wounded and keep going. They had been fighting steadily for seven days. They marched forty-eight hours, night and day, without sitting down. General Shelton said they were near done. They would fall asleep against a tree and sleep sixteen hours. The word went down: "Edwards wants it," and they went through out of personal loyalty to me. There were many dead men, but the losses, as always, were exaggerated.

When the Fifty-second Brigade relieved the marines in Belleau Wood I walked around with fingers crossed and did a little private praying. I was told of the large number of dead marines and Boches. I'm a crank on things that affect morale. It's a bad thing when making a relief to come on the dead bodies of comrades. I decided they must be buried before our men came in. I said: "Go and see if any of the engineers will volunteer." Their colonel said that every company would volunteer. That shows the camaraderie of this division. Standing two days under fire and going out to bury thousands of men.

Captain "Nat" Simpkins, my aide, begged me to keep

away from the front lines. I wouldn't pay any attention to him, and on the Marne I spent as much time with my boys as I could.

On July 21 orders were received from the corps commander to move divisional headquarters from Mery-sur-Marne to Lucy-le-Bocage. The latter was formerly a village, but at this time there was nothing left but piles of stone which afforded no shelter. This place was located on the side of a hill and was under constant shell fire. The Yankee troops were moving forward at this time, but it was decided to set up the headquarters kitchen and serve luncheon. While luncheon was being served the enemy began to drop gas shells in the vicinity, and eating became a problem for General Edwards and his staff. At length Captain Hyatt, declaring that if he didn't eat he would die anyway, took off his mask and finished lunch, an example which was followed by the others.

Headquarters was then moved to Grand Ru Farm, nearby, through fields covered with dead Germans. The farm had been a Boche dressing station, and there were a number of dead Germans in the barn.

The place was in filthy condition, and it was necessary for it to be cleaned up before the staff could occupy it. The thousands of dead men and horses had attracted myriads of bluebottle flies, whose buzzing, of course, could not be heard over the tremendous din caused by the constant shelling. There was wreckage and débris everywhere, a typical scene of death and destruction. Because of the flies, many of the men became afflicted with acute dysentery.

Owing to the fact that labor troops and engineers had been so busy in keeping up the roads, and also taking

part in the fighting, it had been impossible for them to bury any of the dead. After the fight was over, and the Boche had been driven back, Captain Hyatt made a tour of the area, and saw thousands of German bodies. He also saw enormous quantities of ammunition brought in by the Germans for their offensive towards Paris. There were piles as large as houses, some of which the enemy had tried to blow up in his retreat, but without success.

At Trugny the Yankees captured a German howitzer, which later found its way to Boston Common. The question as to how this was accomplished is answered by the following letter:—

# HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

From: Commanding General.

To: Commanding General, First Army Corps.
Subject: Disposition of Captured 210-m.m. Howitzer.

1. The troops of my division captured several field pieces and other munitions, and also a 210 m.m. howitzer. This latter piece was captured by infantry on the 22d of July at Trugny.

The piece is pretty well battered up, showing several shrapnel and shell-splinter wounds on the wheels of the piece, as well as the piece itself.

- 2. I request authority to ship this piece to Boston, to be placed temporarily, at least, on the Boston Common as a capture of this division, pending its ultimate disposition. This piece is quite an unusual relic. It would delight everybody in New England, and I believe it would have a propaganda effect of stimulating recruiting. I understand this is not without precedent, as other units have sent pieces to West Point.
- 3. I have this piece under guard at my headquarters, properly marked, and in view of the possible immediate move of this division to some other locality I request that the piece

be shipped to some A. E. F. base so that it may be forwarded to the destination I suggest.

C. R. Edwards, Major-General.

After the men of the Yankee Division had been fighting for six days or more without rest or sleep, their food was brought up and put into their mess kits. Each man would then seek a stump or rock to lean against, and it was a common occurrence to see men sitting down, sound asleep, with heaped-up mess kits in their hands.

Literally thousands of citations, both divisional and French, were made as a result of the heroism of the members of the Twenty-sixth during this battle. French commanders showered General Edwards and his men with compliments, and declared that it was the most brilliant piece of work they had ever seen.

#### CHAPTER XIII

## General Degoutte's Tributes

The following is General Degoutte's marginal comment given to the French press after the advance of the New Englanders at Château-Thierry:—

If one wants to judge the offensive spirit which animates the Americans and their tactical methods, one has only to follow in detail the operations of a division since the beginning of our counter attack between Château-Thierry and Soissons.

It was on the 18th, at 4 A.M., that the order to take the first line of German positions was received. The American division, whose movements we will relate, was at that time northwest of Château-Thierry, in the Bois de Belleau, at the pivot of the Degoutte Army. This division was made up of New England troops, and had taken the place of a division which took part in the operations of Belleau and Bouresches, and it wanted to distinguish itself as well as those élite troops. But the divisions placed at the pivot have to advance slowly, according to the progress made by the wings.

On the very first day it was necessary to moderate the order of the Americans, who would willingly have gone farther than the first objectives. Indeed, at the signal of the attack the American troops went with perfect discipline, in rear of the artillery barrage, to the Torcy-Belleau-Givry line and the railroad line up to the Bouresches station. They reached this line in one sweep, almost without meeting any resistance, and, excited by their success, they wanted to go farther.

However, it was necessary, before continuing the general advance, to take Monthiers and Petret Wood, still strongly occupied by the Germans. There was hard fighting on the part

of the French troops on the left to annihilate the resistance of the enemy.

In order to relieve them, the Americans, on the evening of the 20th, made an enveloping maneuver which was crowned with success. With splendid valiance they went in one sweep as far as Etrepilly height, the Gonetrie Farm and Halmardiere. It was a model surprise attack, and it was a revelation of American audacity. Notwithstanding the machine-gun barrage and the enemy's islands of resistance, they advanced for 2 kilometers, capturing three guns, a big minnenwerfer and numerous machine guns. Moreover, 200 prisoners were taken by the Americans.

I could not have done better in a similar occasion, with my best troops.

The Germans then found themselves in such an unfavorable position in Monthiers that they had to begin a retreat.

On the 21st the whole German line was in retreat, and the Château-Thierry-Soissons highway was reached. The Americans were cleaning the ground and vigorously pursued the enemy's rear guard.

On the 22d a battalion of Americans occupied Epieds. There was hard fighting in the village, and the enemy opened a violent barrage fire. The fight was in open country, and on that day it was not possible to take the village entirely. Rather than to sustain heavy losses the commander of the American division preferred to take his troops to the rear. It was necessary, if the difficulty was to be overcome, to start the surrounding movement again, and on the 23d the Americans sought to enter the Trugny Wood, south of Epieds. The Germans strongly opposed this attempt, and counter attacked with energy, but they learned at their expense what American tenacity is. Stopped once in the maneuver, the Americans occupied the fringe of the wood on the 24th, entered it deliberately, took a whole company of German pioneers, and continued their advance with such fury that about 3 P.M. they were at the fringe of the Fere Wood, and on the same evening had reached the road from Fere-en-Tardenois to Jaulgonne.

This American division has, therefore, realized in three days an advance of as much as 17 kilometers at certain points, fighting continuously night and day, and displaying the finest military qualities.

All the liaison services worked perfectly, both at the right and left wings, and between the units of the division, — a discipline which caused the Germans to wonder and admire animated the attacking troops. They were marching with their officers at the head of the column and their bodyguards on the flanks, as the French troops. The German prisoners were astonished. "We do not see often those who command us," they declared to their captors; "you're lucky; like the French you are led to the fight by your officers." The French and American high commands worked during the action in as close a harmony as the troops.

The general commanding the division in question is a leader of men, broad-minded, precise in his orders, of practical mind, who, from the first moment, dealt with the problems raised by the operations under way with a mastery which cost dear to the enemy.

These days, from the 18th to the 26th, give a new and emphatic proof of what the alliance of France and the United States can do on a battlefield.

Later, General Degoutte sent the following communication to General Edwards:—

ARMY HEADQUARTERS, July 29, 1918.

From: Major-General Degoutte, commanding the Sixth Army.

To: General Edwards, commanding the Twenty-sixth American Division.

The battles fought by the Twenty-sixth American Division from the 18th to the 24th of July have demonstrated the fine military qualities of this organization and the gallantry of its commander, General Edwards.

Co-operating in the attack north of the Marne, the Twenty-




Chaplain Michael J. O'Connor



International Film Service, Inc.

Anti-aircraft Gun of 101st Field Artillery, Chemin des Dames, France,

March 5, 1918



Major-General Peter E. Traub and Staff at P. C. L'Hermitage, France, May 11, 1918

sixth Division fought brilliantly on the line Torcy-Belleau, to Monthiers, to Epieds and Trugny and in the Forest of Fere, thus making an advance of more than 15 kilometers in depth, in spite of the desperate resistance of the enemy.

I wish to express to General Edwards and to his gallant division my high esteem and happiest congratulations for the manner in which they have served the common cause.

DEGOUTTE.

General Edwards, in reviewing the activities of his division in the second battle of the Marne, issued the following:—

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION,
AMBRICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
FRANCE, August 2, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 67.

To the Officers and Men of the Twenty-sixth Division.

On July 18 you entered, as part of the allied drive against the enemy, upon the offensive, and continued the offensive combat until the major portion of the command was relieved on July 25.

On the assumption of the offensive your position in the line demanded an important and difficult maneuver. Your success in this was immediate and great, and the way in which you executed it elicited high praise from the French Army commander. The eight days from July 18 to 25, marking the first great advance against the enemy in which American troops bore proportionately a considerable share, are sure of historical setting. Your part therein can never be forgotten. In those eight days you carried your line as far as any part of the advance was carried. Torcy, Belleau, Givry, the Bouresches Woods, Rochet Woods, Hill 190, overlooking Château-Thierry, Etrepilly, Epieds, Trugny, and, finally, La Fere Woods and the objective, the Jaulgonne-Fere-en-Tardenois road, belong to

your arms. You are the recipient of praise, thanks and congratulations of your Commander-in-Chief. You went unafraid into the face of the enemy's fire; you forced him to withdraw before you or to accept the alternative of hand-to-hand combat, in which you proved yourselves morally and physically his superior; you gave freely and gave much of your strength, and of your blood and lives, until, pushed beyond mere physical endurance, fighting night and day, you still forced yourselves forward, sustained almost by spirit alone.

These things are now part of your own consciousness. Nothing can detract from them. Nothing that I can say can add to them. But I can testify in this way to my pride in commanding such troops, so capable of achieving success in every undertaking; and this testimony I give to each of you gladly and with deep gratitude.

C. R. Edwards, Major-General, Commanding.

These magnificent tributes to the boys of the New England division were still further added to by commendations from President Poincaré of France and the mayors of the arrondissement of Meaux. These were contained in the following order issued by General Degoutte:—

SIXTH ARMY STAFF, THIRD BUREAU, P. C., July 26, 1918.

No. 2283-3.

#### MEMORANDUM.

The President of the Republic, during a visit to the Sixth Army, expressed his satisfaction over the results obtained, as well as the proofs of valor and endurance shown by all the units of the army.

The commanding general of the Sixth Army takes pleasure in communicating to the troops of his army the congratulations of the President of the Republic.

GENERAL DEGOUTTE.

Sixth Army Staff, Third Burnau, P. C., July 26, 1918.

No. 2284-3.

#### MEMORANDUM.

The Commanding General of the Sixth Army brings to the attention of the troops of the army the following address received from the mayors of the arrondissement of Meaux, in meeting assembled, on the 20th of July, 1918:—

The mayors of the arrondissement of Meaux, in meeting assembled, on the 20th of July, 1918, are happy to acknowledge the great victory of the Sixth Army which, as at the time of the battle of the Marne, has just saved their commune from the invasion which was threatening them.

Send to the valiant troops of the Sixth Army the most earnest expression of their gratitude and admiration.

The President of the Congress of Mayors,
G. Hugel,
Mayor of Meaux,
Deputy from the Department of Seine and Marne.

The Commanding General of the Sixth Army takes pleasure in transmitting these congratulations to the troops of his army.

General Degoutte.

Again, on August 9, General Degoutte issued a General Order, which read:—

Before the great offensive of July 18 the American troops, forming a part of the Sixth French Army, distinguished themselves by taking from the enemy the Bois de la Brigade de Marine and the village of Vaux, stopping his offensive on the Marne and at Fossoy.

Since then they have taken a most glorious part in the second battle of the Marne, rivaling the French troops in ardor and gallantry. In twenty days of incessant fighting they liberated numerous French villages and made, over difficult terrain, an advance of 40 kilometers, which carried them beyond the Vesle.

Their glorious advance is marked by names which, in the future, will make illustrious the military history of the United States: Torcy, Belleau, Plateau of Etrepilly, Epieds, le Charmel, the Ourcq, Seringes-et-Nesles, Sergy, the Vesle and Fismes.

The new divisions, under fire for the first time, showed themselves worthy of the old fighting traditions of the Regular Army. They had the same ardent desire to whip the Boche, and that discipline which always insures the carrying out of orders of their commander, whatever the difficulties to be overcome or the sacrifices to be made.

The magnificent results obtained are due to the energy and skilfulness of their commanders, and to the bravery of the soldiers.

I am proud to have commanded such troops.

DEGOUTTE,

The Commanding General of the Sixth Army.

The final eulogy came from General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, who, in a General Order dated August 28, 1918, said:—

It fills me with pride to record in General Orders a tribute to the service and achievements of the First and Third Corps, comprising the First, Second, Fourth, Twenty-sixth and Fortysecond Divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces.

You came to the battlefield at the crucial hour of the allied cause. For almost four years the most formidable army the world had yet seen had pressed its invasion of France, and stood threatening its capital. At no time had that army been more powerful or menacing than when, on July 18, it struck again to destroy in one great battle the brave men opposed to it, and to enforce its brutal will upon the world and civilization.

Three days later, in connection with our Allies, you counter attacked. The allied armies gained a brilliant victory that marks the turning point of the war. You did more than give our brave Allies the support to which as a nation our faith was

pledged. You proved that our altruism, our pacific spirit, our sense of justice have not blunted our virility or our courage. You have shown that American initiative and energy are as fit for the test of war as for the pursuits of peace. You have justly won the unstinted praise of our Allies and the eternal gratitude of our countrymen.

We have paid for our success in the lives of many of our brave comrades. We shall cherish their memory always, and claim for our history and literature their bravery, achievement and sacrifice.

This order will be read to all organizations at the first assembly formation after its receipt.

> JOHN J. PERSHING, General, Commander-in-Chief.

Official:

ROBERT C. DAVIS, Adjutant-General.

#### **CHAPTER XIV**

# Sniper "Gets" Young "Scotty"

"Scotty" was a sixteen-year-old member of an automatic rifle squad of Company H of the 101st Infantry. During the fight at Château-Thierry he was left the only member of his squad, all the others having been either seriously wounded or killed. "Scotty" was covering a defile in a round through the woods, and with his automatic rifle killed 32 Germans who attempted to get by. At length one of the enemy who could speak English cried out, "Don't shoot, I'm an American." "Scotty" raised his head, and a German sniper got him. His mother, Mrs. Stuart C. Scott of Brookline, received the Croix de Guerre awarded her dead son.

On July 15, when the enemy started his attack, the 101st Infantry absolutely wiped out a German attacking party. Other attacks were made, however, and there was almost incessant fighting for the next few days.

On the morning of July 18, when the allied offensive was launched, the Fifty-second Infantry Brigade went over with only four minutes of artillery preparation. The Fifty-first Infantry Brigade was ordered to hold up and wait for the advance of the line to the north.

One battalion of the 104th Infantry got lost in Belleau Woods while on the way to the jumping-off place. The men were subjected to gas and high explosives bombardment, and had to scatter. After the bombardment the battalion commander started to round up his men, but it was some time before he got them all together, and as a result the attack was late.

The other battalion of the 103d Infantry got off on the dot, and with a rush took Torcy, Belleau and Givry in half an hour. Then they chased the Boche up Hill 190, but were recalled.

The battalion of the 104th, although starting late captured all objectives, — Bouresches, the Bouresches railroad station, and a mile of railway line. Then the French on the left were held up and the Americans were forced to hold on for two days, the 18th and 19th, while subjected to flanking machine-gun fire. It was difficult to restrain the men, who wanted to go forward and chase the Boche into Germany. They wanted to attempt the capture of a number of big guns which the Germans had on their front.

On the morning of the 20th the line up north had advanced far enough so that the New Englanders were given orders to attack. Then the French were held at Hill 190, and General Edwards was given permission to go out and flank the hill. This was done by one battalion who helped the French to capture this German stronghold. The French then went on to Petret Woods, where they were again held up by machine guns.

On the 21st the New Englanders captured Etrepilly and Etrepilly plateau, and helped the French flank out the machine guns. General Degoutte, commanding the Sixth French Army, conducting the attack from the Ourcq River to Château-Thierry, said that the capture of Etrepilly plateau enabled the whole army to advance on the next day.

By the 22d the Yankees had reached the Château-Thierry-Soissons road, and on the 23d had gone as far as Epieds and Trugny, which the 101st Infantry had captured, but from which it was driven out by machinegun and artillery concentration. The Yankees attacked

again on the afternoon of the 23d and recaptured both towns. On the 24th the Americans reached the Jaulgonne-Fere-en-Tardenois road, where they were relieved on the night of the 24th and 25th by the Forty-second Division and elements of the Twenty-eighth Division.

When the Boche started his attack on the 15th there was not a single organization between the Twenty-sixth Division and Paris.

During this battle Major Greenway of the 101st Engineers took his battalion and helped capture Trugny. This was but one of the many times when the engineers fought as infantry.

The Twenty-sixth of course had no cavalry, and when the enemy began to retreat, was apparently "out of it." General Edwards, however, called up the motorized 101st Machine Gun Battalion, gave it the right of way, and sent it after the Boche as independent cavalry, with orders to pursue with all speed. These were the first troops to reach the Jaulgonne-Fere-en-Tardenois road.

The infantry only were relieved, the artillery and engineers remaining until the line reached the Vesle River. They were withdrawn on August 3, after having advanced over 40 kilometers.

The whole division was then concentrated around La Ferte, and on August 7 entrained for the training area at Chatillon on the Seine River.

The following report of operations in the Château-Thierry offensive was made by General Edwards:—

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION,
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONABY FORCES,
FRANCE, August 7, 1918.

1. Following the receipt of memorandum of July 16, 1918, Headquarters First Army Corps, subject, "Action to be taken by the First Army Corps in case of the withdrawal of the



Chaplain Lyman H. Rollins



International Film Service, Inc.

Interior of Post Office on "Mother's Day," Boucq, France, May 12,

1918



Officers of 101st Infantry examining Captured Machine Gun, Bernecourt, France, May 31, 1918

enemy," the division commander issued instructions No. 74, and held several conferences with his brigade commanders, discussing general plans for an offensive. (The location of the troops of this division at this time in Pas Fini sector is shown on Map A.)

## July 18

- 2. In compliance with Field Orders No. 9, First Army Corps, dated July 17, 1918, 17.30 o'clock (received at 22.15 o'clock), these headquarters issued Field Orders No. 51, July 18, 1918, 0.30 o'clock, ordering an attack by the Fifty-second Infantry Brigade (less 1–104 held as corps reserve) reinforced by three half companies 101st Engineers, 101st Machine Gun Battalion, and detachments 101st Field Signal Battalion and Sanitary Troops, and supported by the Fifty-first Field Artillery Brigade (plus 3d Battery, 181st French Artillery) and machine-gun fire by units of the 51st from Givry to Bouresches (exclusive). Brigade commanders with other essential division officers were present at division headquarters when the division commander explained the plans of the corps commander with whom the division commander had been in conference.
- 3. On July 17, the commanding general, Fifty-second Infantry Brigade, had formulated and issued his general plan of attack, and this plan, with some modifications due to a change in the initial mission given the division, was issued as an order to subordinate commanders immediately upon receipt of division order for attack. The brigade commander ordered three battalions, with machine-gun support, to attack at H hour (4.35 o'clock, July 18), the remainder being disposed as support and reserve troops. (See Map B.)
- 4. The left battalion (111-103) attacked at H hour and entered Torcy at 5.40. The center battalion (111-104) was delayed, due to its difficult march in the dark in Belleau Wood under shell fire. Captain McDade, temporarily commanding 111-104, was relieved by the brigade commander and was replaced by Major E. E. Lewis, 104th Infantry, who was in command of the front line in Belleau Wood. The attack was

launched at 7.30 and Belleau and Givry were taken by 8.30. The enemy was pursued up Hill 198 (north of Givry), but because this was outside the zone of action assigned to this division the troops were withdrawn to the northern edge of the town. The right battalion (11–103) could not reach its parallel of departure at the designated hour, but attacked at 7.30, and at 8 had gone beyond the railroad to the Ru Gobert and had taken Bouresches station.

5. The designated objectives were captured and held, but the retention by the enemy of Hill 193 enabled him to impose an effective machine-gun fire on our right battalion. This battalion was also subject to a severe fire from Bouresches Wood, both artillery and machine-gun. At nightfall, therefore, it was thought best to retire this battalion to the Belleau Wood and relieve it by 1–103. (The disposition of troops night of July 18, 19, is shown on Map C.)

## July 19

6. Field Orders No. 11, First Army Corps, July 18, 22.40 o'clock, ordered a resumption of the attack on the following morning, "particular attention being paid to regulating the advance of each unit by the progress of the unit on its left." At the request of the division on our left Major Lewis (111–104) attacked Hill 193 from the south at 22 o'clock, July 18, and established a line running north from Givry, but was obliged to withdraw upon receipt of a message from the division on our left to the effect that they could not co-operate in the attack. The commanding general, Fifty-second Brigade, reports that this difficult withdrawal "was executed with great skill by the battalion and without any casualties." In view, therefore, of the order that troops must regulate on units to their left, this division made no advance on July 19.

## July 20

7. In compliance with Field Orders No. 15, Army Corps, July 20, 11.20 (received 13 o'clock), this division issued Field Orders No. 55, July 20, 14 o'clock, ordering an attack on the

entire division front at 15 o'clock. The most serious resistance encountered by the Fifty-first Infantry Brigade was the machinegun and minenwerfer fire from the western edge of Bois de Borne, Agron and Bois du Rochets, as well as an enfilade fire from the dominating Hill 204 to the right of Vaux in the French sector on our right.

The right of the Fifty-second Infantry Brigade was subjected to disastrous artillery and machine-gun fire, but overcame the machine-gun nests and occupied Hill 190. The advance of the left of this brigade was retarded by enfilading machine-gun fire from the left. The position of the elements of the division before and after this attack are shown on Map D, the line held on the night of July 20, 21 being as follows: Givry Woods, one-half kilometer north of Les Brusses Farm, Hill 190, La Gonetrie Farm, Hill 201, Point 192 Vaux. (As shown by the map.) Major Lewis, commanding, had to make the detour into the French sector on his left north of Les Brusses Farm.

Field Orders No. 17, First Army Corps, dated July 20, 20 o'clock (received at 21.10 o'clock), directed an energetic advance in column. Orders for this advance were issued by indorsement at 21.35 o'clock, and were followed by Field Orders No. 56, these headquarters. These orders contemplated advancing without reference to the progress of neighboring divisions. Open warfare methods were employed. Field Orders No. 18, First Army Corps, July 20, 23.30 o'clock, ordered the advance continued at dawn.

# **J**uly 21

8. At 4 o'clock, July 21, the advance was resumed in accordance with Field Orders No. 57, these headquarters, and the Château-Thierry-Soissons road was crossed shortly after noon. Division headquarters was opened at Lucy-le-Bocage at 5 o'clock July 21, and was moved to Grand Ru Farm at 15 o'clock the same day. At 16.25 a message was sent to brigade commanders to press the advance with vigor. A telephone

message received at 16.36 from the corps commander, followed by a written memorandum received at 18.30, directed that the troops reach the Fere-en-Tardenois-Jaulgonne road by daylight July 22, and in further compliance therewith, Field Orders No. 58, Headquarters Twenty-Sixth Division, July 21, 17.25 o'clock, were issued directing that the attack be pushed without delay or cessation. Our troops rushed forward until our line reached the vicinity of Epieds and Trugny and road to Verdilly (as shown on Map E), where the enemy had prepared strong defences.

## July 22

9. Field Orders No. 19, First Army Corps, July 21, 22.40 o'clock, were received July 22, at 0.30 o'clock. This order at the time was not brought to my attention. As it was based on army orders, my chief of staff thought it only necessary to repeat it to the brigades, which he did, as follows:—

JULY 22, 1918, 1 O'CLOCK.

Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Fifty-first Infantry Brigade.

Herewith copy of Field Orders No. 19, First Army Corps. In compliance therewith your brigade will take over the zone of action of Twenty-sixth Division at 3.30 A.M. to-day. Fifty-second Brigade will take over zone of action of One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Division at 3.30 A.M. to-day. Make necessary dispositions to push on vigorously.

- 10. This order was received at the Fifty-first Infantry Brigade headquarters at 2 o'clock July 22, and immediately transmitted to the regimental commanders, the 102d Infantry being ordered into the zone of action of the Fifty-second Brigade. The order did not reach the commanding general, Fifty-second Brigade, until 5.30 o'clock. He had already (at daylight) launched an attack against Epieds and Trugny, the 102d Infantry participating.
- 11. As soon as this order came to my attention, I was fearful that the order delivered in the dark to troops fighting

as they were in assault night and day, and moving forward at the rush with their objectives in mind — was bound to result in the intermingling of units, and probably confusion. As soon as this matter was brought to the attention of the corps commander he gave verbal instructions to suspend it, which instructions were rushed to the front. But some units had already taken their new positions. I quote the pertinent paragraphs of this order: —

JULY 22, 1918, 1.05 O'CLOCK.

Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Fifty-second Infantry Brigade.

Herewith copy of Field Orders No. 19, First Army Corps. In compliance therewith your brigade will take over zone of action of One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Division. Fifty-first Infantry Brigade will take over that part of Twenty-sixth Division zone which you now cover. Movement will be completed by 3.30 A.M. to-day. Push on vigorously. Map herewith.

JULY 22, 1918, 1.10 O'CLOCK.

Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Fifty-first Field Artillery Brigade.

Herewith copy of Field Orders No. 19, First Army Corps. In compliance therewith following changes to be completed by 3.30 this date. Fifty-first Infantry Brigade takes over entire Twenty-sixth Division zone of action. Fifty-second Infantry Brigade takes over zone of action of One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Division Infantry on our left. Govern your dispositions accordingly.

- 1. (a) General Situation. The enemy is retreating on the entire front of the Sixth Army. At 6 P.M. our troops had passed the Château-Thierry-Soissons road between the Ourcq and the Clignon, and reached the road Bezu, Epieds, Chartreves.
- (b) Mission of the Entire Army. The same as to-day; that is, strenuous pursuit of the enemy, each unit driving ahead with all its power, without waiting for the other or paying attention to alignment, to make the enemy's retreat a rout.

To hasten the advance, division commanders will conduct the fight by going forward when they can exercise control.

(c) Action of Neighboring Corps. — The Seventh and Thirty-eighth Corps will continue to advance alongside of us. They will protect our flanks. Every one will push straight ahead.

- (d) Action of Cavalry. A cavalry division, following in rear of the Seventh Corps, will, at the proper time, pass through to the front in the direction of Clerges, Coulonges, Courville, to intercept and disorganize the enemy's communications.
- 2. (a) Action of First Army Corps. The action will continue to-night without cessation by the Twenth-sixth and One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Divisions abreast, in their respective sectors.

On account of the narrowness of the corps' zone of action, the advance at daylight will be made by the Twenty-sixth Division, covering the entire corps front. The One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Division at daylight will stand fast until the portion of the Twenty-sixth Division assigned to take up the advance in the One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Division sector has, with its reserves and divisional artillery, passed through the One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Division.

When this has been accomplished, the One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Division will follow the Twenty-sixth Division in the second line at 3 kilometers distance, taking great care to avoid interference with the movement of the rear elements of the Twenty-Sixth Division, and the replenishment of ammunition supply.

The attack on Epieds-Trugny was pushed with vigor. In the attack and after gaining the objective the troops were subjected to machine-gun fire, not only from the region of Epieds and Trugny, but also enfilading fire from La Goutterie Farm in the sector of the One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Division, which enfiladed the attacking lines from the left rear. The 101st Machine Gun Battalion (divisional), as well as the machine-gun companies assigned to regiments, advanced with and gallantly supported the infantry in the attack. The 101st Infantry simultaneously attempted to outflank Trugny on the east, but succeeded only in establishing itself in the woods south of Trugny. The troops in Epieds and Trugny were subjected to a heavy concentration of artillery and machinegun fire, and were withdrawn to permit further artillery preparation. The attack was resumed at 16 o'clock; the same character of artillery and machine-gun fire prevented retention of the forward positions gained. At this time the division on our left had not captured La Goutterie Farm, from the vicinity of

which the enemy employed machine-gun fire with telling effect. During that day our artillery vigorously shelled La Goutterie Farm, and by liaison we informed the division on our left that we would cease at 17 o'clock, hoping that that would make the way easier for its capture. (Map F illustrates the action of July 22, as well as the situation at the close of the day.)

13. Our experience in the rush forward had shown the futility, without undue losses, of attempting a head-on attack of Epieds and Trugny. The open wheat fields gave too good a sweep for the enemy's machine guns. I, therefore, determined to throw in a wedge on the road through the Bois de Trugny, and was confirmed in this decision by the verbal instructions of the corps and by Field Orders No. 20, First Army Corps, in accordance with which I confirmed my previous verbal orders by Field Orders No. 59, Twenty-sixth Division, July 22, 22.30 o'clock. These orders demanded the penetration of the enemy's line by a regiment in each division, with exploitations by the entire division. The following message was sent to the Fifty-first Infantry Brigade, and copies to other commanders for their information:—

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION, EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, July 22, 1918, 21.10 o'clock.

#### MESSAGE No. 2.

To Commanding General, Fifty-first Infantry Brigade.

- 1. Inclosing four copies of Field Orders No. 20, c. s., Headquarters, First Army Corps, for his information.
  - 2. The 101st Infantry is designated to carry out the attack.
  - 3. Orders will issue later.

By command, etc.

14. The Fifty-second Brigade had suffered a good many casualties as well as the 102d Infantry, and I ordered Major Greenway and his detachment, consisting of two and one-half companies of 2d Battalion, 101st Engineers (with headquarters at Etrepilly), to move forward and take the position previously occupied by the 104th Infantry, and exploit the thrust of the

101st Infantry extending to the right to gain liaison, anticipating that this thrust would outflank, as it did, the resistance at Trugny and Epieds. Major Greenway encountered some remaining machine-gun nests southwest of Epieds, and kept them actively engaged, struck out to the right, in front of a portion of the 102d Infantry on his right, and gained contact with the 101st Infantry, when its leading elements fell back from its advanced positions in the Bois de Trugny. He was sent orders to take defensive position and hold ground gained that night.

15. In the meantime, after a thorough artillery preparation. the 101st Infantry attack was launched at 6 o'clock, and the eastern part of the Bois de Trugny gained before noon. (Map G illustrates this phase, showing also the position of remaining troops held in readiness.) Good reports of the success of this thrust continued to reach division headquarters — that they had overcome all resistance, which consisted mainly of machine-gun fire, gas and high explosive shells. complete plans had been laid out for an additional push the next morning by this regiment, both northeast and northwest. and to move up available troops so that when it became necessary to leapfrog through, the reserve battalion of this regiment, or other troops, could push forward and force the pursuit. At 2 o'clock that night report was received that the leading battalion of the 101st Infantry had been subjected to a withering machine-gun fire from the front and on both flanks and from machine guns in trees, with much gas; that the leading elements were forced to withdraw, leaving a considerable number of wounded in their front, which they hoped to get out that night and evacuate them to the right area in safety. This announcement prevented a continuation of the artillery preparation on the following morning.

16. At 12.30, July 23, Field Orders No. 21, First Army Corps, were issued reinstating Field Orders No. 19 (directing the assumption of the entire corps front by the Twenty-sixth Division) and placing the 111th Infantry (Fifty-sixth Brigade) at the disposal of the commanding general, Twenty-sixth Division,



Colonel J. L. Bevans



Captured Boche Gun, Place de la Concorde, Paris, France



International Film Service, Inc.
Bringing in Broken Rifles after Fight at Seicheprey, Menil-la-Tour,
France, May 2, 1918

for July 23 only, as division reserve. The Fifty-first Infantry Brigade was directed by Field Orders No. 60, Twenty-sixth Division, July 23, 16 o'clock, to take over the entire zone of action of the Twenty-sixth Division, and the Fifty-second Infantry Brigade was ordered to assemble preparatory to relieving the One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Division, two battalions of the 111th Infantry being placed at the disposal of the Fifty-second Brigade to assist in accomplishing this purpose. However, Field Orders No. 22, First Army Corps, July 23, 19 o'clock, directed an attack by both the Twenty-sixth and One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Division, necessitating the revocation of Field Orders No. 60, Twenty-sixth Division, July 23, 20 o'clock.

17. About 18 o'clock, while at the front impressing brigade and regimental commanders with the necessity of sparing no men or ounce of energy in the pursuit of the enemy on the following morning. I received a telephone message that G-3 from the corps was waiting at my headquarters with important orders. I immediately returned to my headquarters, which I reached, as I recall, at about 18.30, and received letter No. 130 G-3, Headquarters First Army Corps, July 23, stating that the Fifty-sixth Brigade of the Twenty-eighth American Division was placed at my disposal, and that I was directed to utilize this brigade and place it in line without delay in order to comply with current orders of the Sixth Army Commander to drive line forward. The orders further directed that as soon as the Fifty-sixth Brigade had taken over the line from the Fiftysecond Brigade of my division to proceed promptly to the reorganization of the Fifty-second Brigade with a view to utilizing its battalions or regimental units as fast as they could be reconstructed to carry forward continuously the front line of my sector. I had before ordered two battalions of the 111th Infantry of this brigade to be placed at the disposal of the Fifty-second Brigade to assist in pushing forward his line and relieving the Fifty-second Brigade. As soon as I received this order I summoned all the brigade commanders, including Brigadier-General Weigel, commanding Fifty-sixth Brigade, and

directed him to relieve the Fifty-second Brigade, and take command of the left subsector so that he could push forward in the morning.

- 18. With the above letter I received a letter from the corps commander directing me not to commit the Fifty-sixth Brigade or elements thereof into the attack until they had time to make reconnoissance. This seemed to be in conflict, and I therefore directed my chief of staff to take the matter up, and he reported to me between 20 and 21 o'clock that the provisions of this last letter should obtain.
- 19. At 22 o'clock I received the report of the check of the leading elements of the 101st Infantry. Being forced to continue the thrust through the Bois de Trugny until I could find out whether the wounded reported in front of this element had been evacuated, I communicated to the chief of staff of the corps and was informed by him that the push forward must be made by the Fifty-sixth Brigade, and that the army orders would prevail.

# July 24

- 20. Having again summoned all the brigade commanders, as well as Brigadier-General Weigel, I directed the latter to move forward at H hour (4.05 o'clock), promising him complete artillery preparation in the left subsector. He was also instructed to send a battalion of the 112th Infantry to the commanding general, Fifty-first Brigade, to move up through the Bois de Trugny and pass through the leading elements of the 101st Infantry, and continue the pursuit in that subsector as well as the left subsector. This procedure was confirmed by Field Orders No. 62, Twenty-sixth Division, July 23, 12.30 o'clock.
- 21. General Weigel told me that his men had not had anything to eat for two days, and had no emergency rations; had been marching two nights; that his 112th Regiment was in corps reserve, and being unfamiliar with the ground, it would be difficult for him to do so. I replied that he must overcome all these difficulties and must move out as ordered, this being

in accordance with my orders and the known wishes of the corps commander. I ordered Major Greenway, who knew the ground, to report to him so that the colonel of his 111th Infantry would have the advantage of Major Greenway as a guide. I directed my chief of staff to accompany the battalion of the 112th Infantry that had been turned over to Brigadier-General Shelton with orders to explain the mission and push them forward with all haste. I furthermore ordered another of my trusted staff officers, Major Alfonte, to accompany the leading elements of the 111th Regiment on the left. These two officers, as well as Major Greenway, did everything possible to push this pursuit. In the morning, at daylight, Brigadier-General Weigel reported to me that in spite of the aid of all my officers he had not been able to get his battalions up and get them off at the H hour, and that he had had to delay About that time, through liaison with the One the attack. Hundred and Sixty-seventh Division, I learned that after artillery preparation and the advance of the infantry they had found none of the enemy on their front, and by the employment of cavalry patrols they were moving out ahead of General Weigel's left. I immediately declared off the divisional artillery preparation and directed him to send out strong patrols and to rush and get in contact with the enemy by every means possible to go out without any caution and get in touch.

22. I afterwards, being without cavalry, ordered my motorized divisional machine gun battalion to move out, gave them the right of way, and by all expedition to reach the objective, the Jaulgonne-Fere-en-Tardenois road. During the evening the advanced elements of the division, although later in starting, were the first to reach this road and this objective, where severe machine gun fighting was encountered. The other elements were abreast those of the French, the division occupying a line in the Foret de Fere (as shown on Map H).

23. Field Orders No. 23, First Army Corps, July 24, directed the relief of the Twenty-sixth Division and Fifty-sixth Brigade by the Forty-second Division. Field Orders No. 63, Twenty-sixth Division, July 24, 16.45 o'clock was issued in accordance

therewith, the Fifty-first and Fifty-sixth Infantry Brigades being directed to continue the pursuit until relieved. The Sergy plateau was designated as the next objective by Field Orders No. 24, First Army Corps, July 24, and by Field Orders No. 64, Twenty-sixth Division, July 24, 20.30 o'clock.

# July 25

24. The night of July 24, 25 was spent in carrying out the relief of elements of this division and of the Fifty-sixth Brigade, the infantry of this division being concentrated in the vicinity of Bois de Trugny and Chante Merle. The Fifty-first Field Artillery Brigade and the 101st Engineers were attached to the Forty-second Division, and continued in the operations.

The command of the zone of action passed to the commanding general, Forty-second Division, at 19 o'clock, July 25. The reports of the commanding general, Fifty-first Field Artillery Brigade, and the commanding officer, 101st Engineers, will therefore cover a longer period than that contemplated by this report.

25. During the period July 18-25, 1918, the following captures were reported:—

248 prisoners.

1 210-m.m. howitzer.

2 177-m.m. minenwerfer.

4 77-m.m. minenwerfer.

1 small minenwerfer.

188-m.m. field gun.

2 77-m.m. field guns.

9 machine guns (complete).

14 machine guns (incomplete).

1 pontoon wagon train (for infantry foot bridge).

A large quantity of ammunition, consisting of shells of all calibers and small-arms ammunition.

26. The records of the statistical section corrected to date show the following casualties:—

Casualties, Offensive commencing July 18, 1918.

	Killed.	Seriously Wounded.	Slightly Wounded.	Gamed Severely.	Gaesed Slightly.	Missing.	Total.
Division Headquarters,	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
101st Machine Gun Battalion,	8	8	26	-	. 1	-	43
101st Infantry,	54	127	111	20	282	41	585
102d Infantry,	139	415	35	44	17	308	958
102d Machine Gun Battalion,	13	2	70	18	-	13	111
108d Infantry,	176	307	290	18	335	74	1,200
104th Infantry,	115	831	151	54	55	54	760
108d Machine Gun Battalion,	18	8	83	8	-	10	122
101st Field Artillery,	19	7	18	6	10	-	60
102d Field Artillery,	23	19	13	2	3	1	61
103d Field Artillery,	13	5	42	-	2	-	62
101st Trench Mortar Battery,	1	-	2	-	-	-	8
101st Engineers,	8	18	47	2	26	1	102
101st Field Battalion Signal Corps, .	5	-	2	2	2	-	11
101st Ammunition Train,	2	2	2	-	-	-	6
101st Sanitary Train,	-	_	8	-	16	-	19
40th Engineers,	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
29th Engineers,	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Fifty-first Field Artillery Brigade, .	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Totals,	595	1,245	897	169	699	503	4,108

This does not include the evacuation of sick and exhausted which I estimated about 1,200.

27. It will be noted that this division not only gained its objectives as ordered, but on occasions went beyond and had to be restrained. Our losses were increased, due to the fact that this division, being on the pivot and so early gaining its first objectives, was exposed to disastrous artillery and machinegun fire while awaiting the general movement. After capturing Torcy, Belleau and Givry, the left wing was obliged to wait

thirty-six hours before starting out for their new objectives. The division fought continuously, day and night, for eight days. It made a total advance from its first line of 18½ kilometers, and on the second double change of direction on both flanks advanced 17 kilometers in four days.

28. The cold facts of the work of the 51st Field Artillery are set forth in Brigadier-General Aultman's report. The work of the artillery was magnificent. Every battery was ready and willing to answer any call at any hour of the day or night. Liaison with the infantry was the best liaison that was exhibited during the attack. There were times when the difficulty of accurately locating the most advanced infantry units made it impossible to employ the artillery with fullest effect, but in general the infantry was able to tell the artillery where to put its fire and the artillery always promptly responded.

The infantry of this division was relieved on July 25. The artillery was continued in the advance and paved the way, first for elements of the Forty-second Division and later for elements of the Fourth Division, being finally relieved on August 4, after seventeen days' continuous participation in the attack. That the officers and men of this brigade have returned to this division in a cheerful, enthusiastic frame of mind speaks volumes for their discipline, training and physical condition, and the fact that comparatively few animals were lost illustrates the thoroughness with which this brigade has been trained.

- 29. The particular part the engineers played in offensive action has been embodied in my report. In addition to this, the officers and men of the 101st Engineers were indefatigable in the work assigned to them. They worked in removing road obstructions and repairing roads and bridges, and made possible an uninterrupted flow of communication between the advanced troops and the ammunition and supply echelons. They were relieved August 2.
- 30. The supply system functioned perfectly. At no time was there lack of supplies nor any great difficulty in getting the supplies to the troops. The distributing points were advanced as the troops advanced, and supply trucks delivered their

rations to advanced positions, often under shell fire. The rail-head remained at Nanteuil-sur-Marne. The initial distributing points were Montreuil-aux-Lions and Villiers-sur-Marne, and later Vaux and Bouresches, although it was frequently necessary to distribute supplies at more advanced positions, particularly to elements of the Fifty-sixth Brigade, which had been obliged to cut loose from their trains in order to enter the zone of action on the prescribed day. The division continued to supply its artillery and engineers until they were relieved; some of them were 50 kilometers away.

- 31. The assistant chief of staff, G-1, suggests that during an advance it would be preferable to issue canned meats, canned vegetables, canned beans, canned potatoes, hard bread, pulverized coffee, milk, sugar, salt, pepper, canned fruits, preserves and jam in lieu of the regulation daily issue of fresh and frozen beef, fresh vegetables, extracts and such articles as were received during the advance. I indorse this suggestion.
- 32. The officers and enlisted personnel of the sanitary units exhibited tireless energy in evacuating and caring for the wounded. The commanding officer of the 101st Sanitary Train reports the evacuation of 4,065 cases, the largest number in any one day being 1,227 on July 23. These figures include some cases of other divisions evacuated over our line, especially during the latter portion of the period. The 102d Field Hospital established a sifting station at Bezu-le-Guery, receiving wounded from the ambulance companies, and, after giving such surgical treatment as was immediately necessary, evacuating them as follows:—
- (a) Seriously wounded to 103d Field Hospital at La Fertesous-Jouarre.
- (b) Wounded to Evacuation Hospital No. 7 at Montanglaust.
- (c) All others to 101-104 Field Hospital at Luzancy, where patients expected to return to duty within five days were retained and others evacuated to Hospital No. 7.

At times the stream of wounded was so heavy that the regular facilities for transportation were reinforced by 10 trucks


from the 101st Supply Train, 11 trucks and 12 ambulances from the 116th Sanitary Train, as well as the trucks of the 101st Sanitary Train, making the total number of vehicles about 140.

33. Telephone and radio connection was maintained by division headquarters with First Army Corps and with sub-ordinate commanders. The personnel of the signal battalion in the advanced areas was continually working under severe fire and exhibited exceptional bravery, at times being compelled to leave their work to join the infantry in the actual defence of positions.

Aeroplane liaison did not work out as satisfactorily as might be desired. Infantry units were reluctant to show their panels because of the frequent presence of enemy planes, but the aviation service gave us, as far as their material permitted, valuable information of the movements of bodies of troops.

Combat liaison with adjacent divisions was maintained with practically no interruption. Forward communication was continually maintained by telephone, couriers and runners, and supplies and ammunition were delivered every day to battalions.

- 34. Machine-gun Nesis. The greatest difficulty the division encountered in meeting the demands and purposes of the higher command to rush forward to pursue, irrespective of flanks or any other elements, was the cleverly and ingeniously placed machine-gun nests. Torcy-Belleau-Givry were the main German line of defence. Again, Bouresches Wood, Borne Agron and Rochet line were cleverly arranged machine-gun and artillery positions. But the toughest nut to crack was the concentrated defence on the crest of hills on the far side of Epieds and Trugny, and finally the use of machine guns in the Forêt de Fere and vicinity.
- 35. These machine guns were located generally in the edge of woods, in fox-holes, the depth of a man's shoulder, and occasionally double-gun holes. Out in front, distributed in the wheat fields, and excellently camouflaged, were any number of other of these holes, mutually supporting, giving a field of fire from 5,000 yards up to the gun. These guns not only



Colonel Ernest L. Isbell



International Film Service, Inc.

Hidden Kitchen of 101st Infantry, Bois de la Voisogne, France,
May 31, 1918



International Film Service, Inc.

Officers decorated with Croix de Guerre for Conspicuous Bravery,

Mononcourt, France, June 11, 1918

commanded the terrain of the reverse slope, but also the direct slope to the gun.

- 36. An inspection of this ground raises the question: How could they have been taken?
- 37. I believe the tactics and methods to be employed wherever time will allow is to feel out these gun nests by specially developed scouts with qualifications corresponding to those successful in our Indian warfare, to discover the positions and avoid the losses that a reconnaissance in force would suffer.
- 38. The 155's are the best agency when this information is gained. We have just received our Newton-Stokes mortars. The trench mortar battery therefore becomes another excellent agency to destroy and neutralize these nests. In addition, the woods may be combed from 3,000 yards with a hail of our own machine-gun bullets, as well as the 115's, with time fuses, to wipe out those nests cleverly located in trees, which is one of the new elements of the German defence.
- 39. It goes without saying that wherever possible machine guns must be flanked out by infiltration from both sides, and this method was constantly used by battalion and regimental commanders whose function it becomes in a rush of this kind.
- 40. Automatic Rifles. The casualties of the Chauchat men were abnormal. A great majority of the teams of the 102d Infantry were casualties. As soon as a man dropped another man would pick up the Chauchat and he would become a casualty. Plainly, the cause to my mind is the exposure, greater than with the rifle, of the man necessary to the effective use of this arm, and I fancy furthermore that the glistening barrel which results from the extra care necessary with this arm, keeping it well oiled, discloses it to the German sniper who has been instructed that it must be destroyed.
- 41. I understand that this exposure is eliminated in the Browning automatic rifle, which has many other points of superiority over the Chauchat. From reports it would appear to me that the supply ought to be great enough to arm this division immediately with these rifles. I cannot too strongly urge that course in the reconstitution of this division, and I

recommend a slightly greater proportion of Brownings than the present Chauchat equipment. The Chauchat, since this battle, is an unpopular arm in this division, due to the excessive casualties. Men used to volunteer for it.

- 42. Artillery. The function of the division artillery in such an advance is solely to protect and permit the advance of the infantry. The artillery did its work excellently. They had too few gas shells. The proportion should be much greater hereafter, even in open warfare. They can be effectively used against machine-gun nests where the proper interval elapses between the preparation and the assault. I also recommend a much greater allowance of gas shells for all calibers for counter battery work of the corps artillery as one of the best agents in the neutralization of opposing batteries.
- 43. Tanks. Several occasions in this eight-day advance showed the practical use of tanks. Three or four times it came forcibly upon us that we could get through with tanks easily and save lives.

I have already made a special report recommending that where the terrain permitted their use, tanks should be provided in the proportion to each infantry battalion of three mitrailleuses tanks and one field-gun tank.

General Passaga, my former French corps commander, wrote a memorandum on this subject, which I submitted to General Headquarters. I am more convinced than ever that his recommendations should be indorsed; that with our 155 artillery, the use of the tanks that I suggest is the solution for overcoming the German machine-gun tactics if we ever expect a clean march through.

- 44. There is need of greater air service than we had in this engagement, although I cast no reflections upon that air service. Its personnel was excellent, and where the material held out they did everything that could be expected, considering their numbers. We suffered much from artillery concentrations in conjunction with the opposition of machine-gun nests.
- 45. Information. The most important thing of all to my mind that confronts a division commander is the answer to

the question: "Where is my infantry?" The French and English commanders tell me it is the most difficult problem of all. This information is essential for divisional artillery to perform its rôle. Brigade and regimental commanders are reluctant to give it its full protective employment unless the infantry line is definitely known. We had a great casualty list of runners; in some cases five runners would be shot down one after the other, and it would be next to impossible to get through. The wires provided in an organization would be cut by shell fire. Airplanes, especially in a wood, could not discover infantry panels. Our service in this sector, which made it mandatory to take cover from all airplanes, made it difficult in the midst of a fight, and hail of shells and machine-gun bullets, to distinguish between friendly and hostile airplanes, and the character of the terrain, covered with woods, as I say, when panels were displayed, made it difficult for the machine flying even at 100 meters' height to distinguish them.

- 46. I purpose to use hereafter, if I can get the material, two thin, light-weight wires per company, with three or four spools, each holding a kilometer of wire, per telephone. This will give eight wires to a battalion, the least number, I believe, that will insure this information which must be had. Scientific men tell me that a wireless field telephone is the answer. But in the meantime I recommend the eight wires per battalion.
- 47. The Ford ambulances with which the divisional machine gun battalion is equipped, though insufficient in numbers, were of value in quickly transporting elements of this battalion to the zone of action and in carrying ammunition. This battalion could be made of much greater tactical value if equipped with armored cars. It could then be used to material advantage in exploiting a successful attack.
- 48. It was the constant endeavor of my staff to issue attack orders as soon as possible after receipt of corps orders, for the purpose of giving the maximum amount of time to subordinate commanders to study the local problems and make appropriate dispositions. Often, however, changes in the situation necessitated changes in approved dispositions, and left insuffi-

cient time to subordinate commanders for the deliberate execution of their missions. The telephone and verbal warning anticipating army orders of which I was advised by the corps were invaluable. The officers of my staff, as well as the commanding officers of troops, were indefatigable in the performance of their duties.

49. Morale. — The morale of the division was beyond all praise. The infantry had to be restrained. The ground they gained, casualties suffered and length of time of their effort speaks for itself. I submit a copy of General Orders No. 67, these headquarters, as my estimate of the conduct of officers and men.

C. R. Edwards, Major-General, Commanding.

This report gives an intimate view of the manner in which modern battles are conducted from the various headquarters of the high commands. It also shows some of the difficulties encountered, and the manner in which they were overcome. It will be noticed that General Edwards speaks of the lack of airplanes, and also condemns the French "Chauchat" or automatic rifle. He advocated the use of the new Browning gun, but it is interesting to observe that although the War Department claimed to be turning out thousands of these weapons daily, the division was never outfitted with them.

In connection with the number of missing, reported by General Edwards, it may be observed that the majority of these men later reported to their various commands. In the excitement of battle many men become separated from their individual units, and attach themselves to others. Then, when the battle is over and things get straightened out, they return to their own organizations.

#### CHAPTER XV

# St. Mihiel Salient Wiped Out

The division got no rest at Chatillon, but at once began work on training problems which are usually given to troops before they enter the front line. The men worked ten hours a day, going through close order drill and open warfare, putting in three weeks.

On August 30 and 31 the division entrained at Chatillon and proceeded to Bar-le-Duc and stations near by. Then by night marches they moved to Suilly, south of Verdun. It was originally the intention of the high command to put the Twenty-sixth into the sector around Suilly and supply tanks. It is believed that extensive operations looking to the reduction of Metz were contemplated. These plans were changed, however, and the Yankee Division was put into line between Les Eparges and Vaux-les-Palameix.

An attack was decided upon for the purpose of reducing the salient, and the artillery preparation started at 1 A.M. September 11. The troops who were to take part were concentrated as secretly as possible by night. The Germans, however, had some inkling of what was to take place, but believed the attack would be made two or three days before the scheduled time. When it did not take place they decided that it had been postponed, so that on September 12, when it was actually launched, they were taken by surprise.

The 26th Artillery was augmented by other regiments of artillery, and a tremendous bombardment was put over. At 7.30 p.m. on the night of September 12 General

Edwards was alone in divisional headquarters at Rupten-Woevre, when a telephone order was received for the troops to jump off that night. The chief of staff and all the staff officers being out, the General telephoned to General Shelton's headquarters. Lieutenant F. M. Linton answered the phone and reported that the brigade commander was at the front. General Edwards asked the young officer if he thought he could deliver a message to General Shelton in a very short time. Lieutenant Linton replied that he was sure he could. He was then given an order to have troops pull out as soon as possible for Vigneulles. Making his way through the lines of trenches to the actual front, the lieutenant found General Shelton, delivered his message, and at 9 P.M. the 102d Infantry was under way for Vigneulles. This is considered a remarkable feat, owing to the difficulty of getting through the lines during an action. In less than one and one-half hours from the time the order was received at divisional headquarters it was delivered at the front. 18 kilometers away, and immediately carried out.

Rupt-en-Woevre, the seat of divisional headquarters, had absolutely no protection. That night, just at dusk, a German flew over the town in a captured Allied plane. Descending to within about 100 feet, he opened fire with a machine gun and swept the streets. Fortunately there were no casualties.

That same night airplanes bombed La Ferte, destroying the railroad station where four or five American officers, ordered home, were waiting, together with a number of French poilus. By some peculiar freak the poilus were killed and the American officers escaped. They drew their pistols, and, rushing outside, opened fire in a vain attempt to bring down the aviators. At Nanteuil, near Meaux, General Edwards, staff officers,

and every one else were driven into the cellar of a château one night by Boche avions. They found, however, that the floors offered no protection so went back upstairs.

The bombs made tremendous holes, two of which were about 500 yards from the château. These were in an orchard, but when Captain Hyatt went over to examine them, strange to say he found the trees were uninjured. The noses of the bombs were pointed, causing them to stick into the ground, and the force of the explosion was downward.

At Couvrelles the Boches flew over every night on their way to and from Paris, and seemed to be about to fly into the windows of the billets.

One of the most beautiful sights I ever saw [said Captain Hyatt], was after we took the St. Mihiel salient. The British planes were bombing over Metz, and were focussed in German searchlights. Way up in the air one could discern a tiny twinkle, then two long fingers of light would go reaching up and up, until one would locate the airplane. Then the other would be thrown on it in such a way that they held it like a pair of shears. Immediately shells would begin bursting around the plane, which either rose higher and disappeared, or was brought down in flames.

At the St. Mihiel fight [said Captain Hyatt], the troops on our southern side went over at 5 A.M. There were two American corps with reserves, and they had tanks and cavalry. On the northwest side the Twenty-sixth attacked alone with a French division on either flank. We had no cavalry and no tanks. We did not attack until 8 A.M., so that the Germans were warned and ready from the earlier attack. However, when we went over we did it so quickly that the Boche was taken by surprise. During this scrap a battalion of the 103d captured a battalion of Germans. The German major was a count, while Major Shumway, commanding the Yankees, was only twenty-four years old.

We got our objectives on time, after heavy fighting over the most terrible terrain. This was filled with concrete pill boxes and machine-gun nests, and the woods were full of barbed wire. There were scores of ravines running perpendicular to our attack, so that it was necessary for the men to fight over each one. The ground was covered with bushes about 5 or 6 feet tall, with a few trees, and barbed wire interwoven. This sector had been held by the Boche since September, 1914, and naturally was as well fortified as they could make it.

I don't know yet how the men got through this country in the time they did, and with only 55 killed. I am willing to wager that a man could not go there now, and with the same obstacles, less the enemy fire, cross that ground as rapidly as our men did that day.

After the first day's objectives had been gained we were supposed to go to Thillot on the heights of the Meuse. The telephone message received at 7.30 p.m., however, changed the orders and directed us to proceed southeast to Vigneulles and make contact with troops from the south. General Cameron, who gave the order, in doing so said to General Edwards: "Go to it, old boy; its a race between you and the First Division." The Twenty-sixth had been ordered to reach there by daylight if possible, but the town was captured at 2 a.m. Patrols were immediately put out and they established contact with the First Division at Creue. The First Division did not arrive until 10 a.m.

It was in this battle that Captain Joseph McConnell was killed.

Captain McConnell was leading his men over the Veau-St. Remy road on the morning of September 13, in an attack on the German positions, when he was hit by a shell fragment. When the shell struck, McConnell ordered his men to dive for cover, but did not have time to get into it himself.

At this time Major Parker of the 103d Field Artillery was also killed, the only man to meet death in that regiment on that day.

At Vigneulles American aviators were bombing, and on



Colonel Beaumont B. Buck



International Film Service, Inc.
Second Lieutenant Daniel Willard, 102d Field Artillery, being decorated with the Croix de Guerre for Conspicuous Bravery, France



International Film Service, Inc.

Members of Battery B, 103d Field Artillery, examining Damage done
by German Shell, Rambucourt, France, June 24, 1918

account of poor liaison did not know that the Twenty-sixth Division had captured the town. As a result thirty New Englanders were wounded by bombs dropped by their own aviators.

General Edwards, in arranging the original plan for the attack, had put three regiments in the front line, with one in reserve. As a result, when the change of orders came the reserve regiment was immediately sent forward.

The fight lasted twenty-seven hours and was over by noon of September 13. General Edwards and myself went into Vigneulles in an automobile, about 11 A.M. at which time we could see the Germans retreating. The 101st Engineers had done their usual wonderful work, and had built up the shell-torn road so that it was perfectly passable.

When General Edwards sent the order to General Shelton to go shead. Colonel Alfonte, the divisional signal officer, was sent out to see that the order was executed. By automobile and on foot Alfonte caught up with the 102d after they had been on the way about two hours. With his chauffeur he joined Colonel Bearss and Captain A. F. Oberlin at the head of the column, reaching the town about 150 yards in front of the troops. As the four men were proceeding down a side street they came upon a long German wagon train rolling down the main thoroughfare. As the head of the wagon train column came up Colonel Alfonte fired his pistol rapidly in the air. Captain Oberlin in the meantime had dashed around the block, and he too discharged a number of shots, giving the Boche the impression that the Americans were present in force. They immediately scrambled down from the wagons and threw up their hands. They were ordered to pass by the officers and drop their weapons on the ground. As the first rifle fell. Colonel Bearss, who was unarmed, picked it up. In the meantime the chauffeur had gone back and hurried up the troops, who took charge of the prisoners.

Then Colonel Alfonte started a personal tour of inspection of what buildings were left standing. Opening a barn door he came upon an entire German machine-gun crew, asleep with

their guns, and waking them up he took them prisoner, single handed.

The Germans had a cage in the town in which they had been wont to display captured Americans. This was immediately filled with Germans, who seemed to resent turning the tables,

In the wagon train the Americans found 70 French boys. about the age of fifteen, who were being carried into captivity. Great was the rejoicing of the youngsters when they were freed by "l'Americains." These boys had been torn from their homes in St. Mihiel. In this train were also found quantities of ammunition and plenty of good food, with the exception of bread, which was very poor; and a lot of stationery which was captured in a near-by town. As we were short of stationery at the time it came in very handy.

After the St. Mihiel fight, General Edwards and Colonel James L. Howard, the divisional machine gun officer, rode up and down in front of the front lines in an automobile, preparing for the defence of the heights. The Boche had not consolidated his position at that time, so the two officers were unmolested. During this time Captain "Nat" Simpkins, General Edwards' personal aide, was in a perpetual fidget, fearing that the General would be wounded or killed.

Colonel Alfonte was a remarkable character. Reserved and quiet, he was always anxious to get into action, and continually begged the General to allow him to go over the top. In the raid of Major Hickey of the 101st Infantry, Colonel Alfonte got permission to go along. His idea was to tap the German telephone system and listen in on their conversations. He went over with the raiding party, carrying telephone lines with him, and kept in constant communication with divisional head-quarters. The place was so shot up, however, that the German telephone system was out of commission, so Colonel Alfonte only got gassed for his pains.

During the battle of Château-Thierry Colonel Howard, Colonel Duncan K. Major, the new chief of staff, and several other staff officers were at the front, when a shell landed near them. The officers dived for a shell hole, but Howard, who

was the last one in, was struck in the back by a splinter. He was then forced to walk 2 miles before he could get an automobile to take him to the hospital.

In the St. Mihiel fight a German officer brought up a train of empty trucks on the Tranchée-de-Calonne and drove right into our lines. Before he realized his mistake he, his men and the trucks were captured. There were eleven trucks, automobile ambulances and 70 horses with wagons. The troops needed the horses badly, and as everything reported captured had to be turned in, they failed to report the animals.

At Vigneulles we captured railway cars loaded with machinegun ammunition. We also got butter, sugar, meat and bread, together with moving-picture machines and a very poor quality of tobacco, with 2,600 men. We furthermore secured quantities of beer.

We sent 150 men to the rear in charge of two guards and put up a sign which read: "This way to the prison pen," so the Germans would be able to find it.

#### **CHAPTER XVI**

# Flank of Twenty-sixth Uncovered

At the beginning of the St. Mihiel fight the direction of the American attack was southeast, the left half of the front through open fields, the right half through bushy woods. The French on the left of the Twenty-sixth ran into stiff opposition and did not really get started at all. The left flank of the New Englanders was therefore uncovered, but they kept going. There was very little German artillery fire, the majority of the Boche guns having been withdrawn to prevent capture. They had left a number of machine guns, however, which delayed somewhat the advance of the 101st Infantry. By enfilade fire the 101st drove out the Germans, capturing one lieutenant and his whole platoon. The right of the line then ran into machine-gun nests in the Remy Wood, but cleaned them out.

The Yankees crossed the Grande Tranchée-de-Calonne, the main artery for German supplies, and reached their objectives. Then it was that the telephone change of orders came, and the 102d passed through the line of the 101st and took up the advance to Vigneulles.

Many Germans were taken prisoner, the enemy seeming only too anxious to "Kamerad" whenever Americans came upon them. Sergeant "Larry" Conry of the 101st brought the first prisoners in to divisional headquarters. He was in a party that got lost going through No Man's Land, when they came upon three Germans, one of whom spoke English. Conry told him to lead the way to the American lines and have no funny business about

it. The prisoner replied that indeed he would make no trouble, and that he would advise every German they met to surrender. The result was that Conry eventually arrived at headquarters with 37 prisoners.

On the night of July 14, at midnight, the Germans put over a barrage of high explosives and gas which lasted for four hours and a half. The 101st Infantry was holding the line at this spot, which included Vaux, the farthest forward of any town in the line. Owing to the difficult terrain, consisting of alternate woods and wheat fields, both sides had night and day positions.

On the morning of the 15th the platoons which had been holding the front line withdrew to their day positions. A short time later bodies of men were seen coming down the hill and into the edge of the town. It was believed that these were Americans going into day positions. The oncoming troops established a machine-gun stronghold in the old railroad station at Vaux, and occupied a row of shell holes which comprised the only front line at that place.

Then it was that Lieutenant Frank E. Bolin discovered that the men were Germans, and this information was sent back to Colonel Logan. The regimental commander turned to Captain Thomas F. Foley, who had brought the message, and said: "You've got to drive out those dogs or we will be the laughing stock of the army."

Captain Foley went back and communicated by telephone with the lieutenants commanding the front positions, who were "Jimmy" Rose and E. J. Price.

Lieutenant Price went forward, and after securing a flanking fire on the enemy, started a counter attack. This was organized in groups of two or three men. In one of these groups was Douglas Ross of Hingham and Arthur G. Irwin of Hull. Coming upon a machine gun at a corner,

with two men operating it, Ross sent Irwin back for bombs. When Irwin returned he found Ross in charge of the machine gun and the two Germans dead beside it. While waiting for Irwin, Ross shot one of the gunners. The other stooped over his comrade, and straightened up in time to see the young American charging at him. The unwounded Boche turned and fled, whereupon Ross shot him too.

Ross was also in a group that stormed the railroad station, of which there was nothing left but four walls. They ran up on two sides, tossing grenades over the walls and bombing out the German machine gunners. As they ran out Alfred Hall of Hingham, armed with an automatic rifle, picked them off from a strategic post which he had taken on the railroad line. There was no time to take prisoners.

Lieutenant Price extended his line to the left when the front-line shell holes were reached. Corporal Christopher Sullivan with Privates Reginald Bates and James Creswell were sent to the left of a shell hole, and Arthur Irwin and Thomas Kraus were sent to the right. There were several of the enemy in the crater, and Private Reginald Beale was ordered to keep them down with an automatic rifle. The party worked up on the shell hole, with Corporal Christopher Sullivan tossing in bombs. At length they heard a cry of "Kamerad!" and, advancing, discovered ten frightened Germans with their hands in the air.

Throughout this time various small engagements were taking place, little groups of Americans rushing the enemy, and either taking him prisoner, or putting him out of action. A hail of German shells was falling continuously, and it seemed a miracle that there were so few casualties.

Another party of Germans was discovered in a crater on the right, and when Yankees advanced on them in skirmish formation the Boches dove into little dugouts in the bank along the road. Lieutenant Frank E. Bolin noticed sniping, traced it to the bank, and led his men up. One of them who spoke German hailed the dugout and advised the Boches to come out and surrender. They promptly took him at his word and emerged. As they did so two Americans who had been lying in a near-by shell hole for some time, afraid to move, stepped out and took charge of the prisoners, who were eight in number.

Company A, which was some distance back of the line, sent up a party of volunteer stretcher bearers. These men, who had begged for a chance to get into the excitement, were Sergeant W. G. Weir, Musician David Henry, and Privates John Mead, Garret Piggot, Roderick McLeod, Chester Griffin, Frank Manning and John Mitchell. The ground was so rough and so thoroughly covered by the enemy fire that it was some time before burial parties could go out and bury the German dead. It was here that the 101st Engineers had volunteered to bury dead marines and Germans after the Twenty-sixth took over the sector; and it was also at this place that Floyd Gibbons, the Chicago war correspondent, was wounded and lost an eve.

The New Englanders were highly elated at their success, and for hours visited back and forth among the shell holes after the enemy had been driven off. The prisoners said they had been ordered to hold the railroad bridge, and that a line regiment was expected to follow up their attack and consolidate the position. They said that four companies had been engaged in the attack, two of them in the center and two on the flanks in support. They were from a regiment in the rear.

The part played by Major Murphy of the Machine Gun Battalion in the capture of Vigneulles was of such a character that General Shelton, commanding the brigade, felt called upon to express his appreciation in a personal letter. This action is most unusual in military circles, and testifies to the importance of Major Murphy's accomplishments:—

HEADQUARTERS FIFTY-FIRST INFANTRY BRIGADS,
TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
September 15, 1918.


DEAR MAJOR MURPHY: — The march of the leading elements of this brigade, consisting of the 102d Infantry and the 102d Machine Gun Battalion, on the night of September 12, 13, 1918, from our position at the close of the first day in the attack on the St. Mihiel salient, for more than 9 kilometers along the Grande Tranchée de Calonne to Hattonchatel and Vigneulles, was of such unique and important character, and was performed in such efficient and spirited manner, that I desire to place on record my personal appreciation of this accomplishment.

Our orders required the brigade to pursue the retreating enemy and to reach Vigneulles by daylight on the morning of the 13th and there gain contact with our forces advancing from the south and thereby prevent the escape to the north of any bodies of the enemy still in the salient. To have attempted to push forward a line covering our whole sector would have meant, in view of the woods and difficulty of the terrain, to fail in the accomplishment of our mission. The only alternative was to push boldly forward on the only accessible road through unknown hostile country, losing for the time being liaison with the elements of our forces on our right and left, and exposing the advance elements of this brigade to the possibility of being cut off and surrounded by the enemy. This alternative was chosen, and the 102d Infantry and your Machine Gun Battalion were selected to lead the advance.

. The results are known to you. You took up the march



Colonel John F. J. Herbert



Watering Horse Section, 101st Ammunition Train, France



Underwood & Underwood, New York Group of Soldiers and Officers of Twenty-sixth Division who were Decorated for Conspicuous Bravery at the Front, La Ferte, France, July 12, 1918

about 21 o'clock on the night of the 12th. Before 2 o'clock the following morning the leading elements of the column were in Vigneulles. Hattonchatel and Vigneulles were completely in our possession by 3 o'clock. Soon afterwards the mission of the brigade had been completely accomplished. The roads leading from the southwest had been blocked. The surrounding towns had been garrisoned, our patrols seeking contact with our forces from the south were in the plain below the heights, and later this contact was established. Many prisoners and a large supply of stores fell into our hands.

I congratulate you and your battalion upon this success and upon the bravery and fine spirit manifest throughout its accomplishment.

Very sincerely yours,

GEORGE H. SHELTON,

Brigadier-General, U. S. A., Commanding.

During the battle of St. Mihiel, the little town of Rupt-en-Woevre was the advance post of command of the Twenty-sixth Division. After the Yankees broke through Les Eparges, driving back the Germans, General Edwards received a letter from the old curé, who had remained at his post while the enemy held the country for four years. This letter, voicing the heartfelt thanks of a people released from bondage, was made public in General Orders, and was as follows:—

RUPT-EN-WOEVRE, September 13, 1918.

Sir: — Your gallant American Division has just set us free. Since September, 1914, the barbarians have held the heights of the Meuse; have foully murdered three hostages from Mouilly; have shelled Rupt; and on July 23, 1915, forced its inhabitants to scatter to the four corners of France.

I, who remain at my little listening post upon the advice of my Bishop, feel certain, Sir, that I do but speak for Monseigneur Ginisty, Lord Bishop of Verdun, my parishioners of

Rupt, Mouilly and Genicourt, and the people of this vicinity, in conveying to you and your associates the heartfelt and unforgettable gratitude of all.

Several of your comrades lie at rest in our truly Christian and French soil.

Their ashes shall be cared for as if they were our own. We shall cover their graves with flowers, and shall kneel by them as their own families would do, with a prayer to God to reward with eternal glory these heroes fallen on the field of honor, and to bless the Twenty-sixth Division and generous America.

Be pleased, Sir, to accept the expression of my profound respect.

A. LECLERC, Curé of Rupt-en-Woevre.

At the same time General Edwards received a personal letter from General Hennocque, whose division, the 2d Cavalry (Dismounted) was on the right of the Twenty-sixth during the battle of St. Mihiel. The French officer's father served as an officer in the Union Army throughout our civil war, and married a Gallipolis, Ohio, woman. The letter read:—

2D CAVALRY DIVISION (DISMOUNTED) STAFF, P. C., September 16, 1918.

My Dear General: — Your letter of September 14 moves me greatly. My division and I are very grateful for the congratulations and thanks that you so kindly sent to us all, and especially to the 8th Cuirassiers. Great is my joy to have been able to be of service to one of those fine young American divisions which have not hestitated to leave their homes and to cross the Atlantic to come to our aid in the destruction of the noxious beast, the Boche.

I am extremely happy to have fought by the side of such a commander as you, who, by communicating to his agreeable staff and to his troops his own dash, his optimism and his will

to conquer, enabled his gallant division to smash the resistance offered to it on the 12th and 13th of September, and to win a brilliant victory.

In return, be pleased, General, to accept my most sincere and enthusiastic congratulations upon the occasion of this fine success which, added to the Château-Thierry achievement, is but the first chapter of a famous epic.

Repeating the expression of the deep friendliness I felt for you at the time of our first meeting, and my hope to fight again at your side, I beg you, Sir, to accept this expression of the most kindly feeling from your devoted "buck-eye."

HENNOCQUE.

#### CHAPTER XVII

# 102d Infantry Cited

The obliteration of the St. Mihiel salient was a momentous event, and won plaudits for the New Englanders from all sides. On September 18 the Fifth Army Corps of the American Expeditionary Forces issued in General Orders a citation which read:—

1. During the recent operations for the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, one regiment in particular of the Twenty-sixth Division should be mentioned as having acquitted itself in a most inspiring manner. The 102d Infantry (Colonel Hiram L. Bearss, commanding) was ordered late in the evening to march at once on Vigneulles, in order to close the remaining gap between the two attacks.

The regiment marched 5 miles in darkness through woods infested with the enemy, captured 280 prisoners, and completed its mission long before daylight. The main roads of the salient were cut off, and no more of the enemy could escape.

This fine example of courage and soldierly acceptance of battle conditions is worthy of emulation. The corps commander congratulates them and looks forward with confidence to a continuation of their good work.

By command of Major-General Cameron, W. B. Burtt, Brigadier-General, Chief of Staff.

In his Order of the Day, issued September 28, General Edwards commented on the activities of his division as follows:—

1. Again it becomes my duty and pleasure to congratulate this division on the important part it played in the battle of the St. Mihiel salient, September 12-14, 1918.

Our task was to attack on the historic and hitherto impregnable ground near Les Eparges, where in the past so many thousands of French lives have been sacrificed.

In front of us the fortifications were manned by Germans, with a No Man's Land on difficult slopes, churned and pitted by four years of shelling, and with a mass of wire and other obstacles from trench to trench.

The three infantry regiments in line, — the 101st, the 103d and the 104th, — with the brigade machine-gun units, met a determined resistance. The enemy machine-gun fire was intense. The artillery without daylight registration did well, during that part of the night allowed for preparation, in cutting breaches through this mass of wire, which were completed by the infantry before and during the attack.

The determined and effective methods of the infantry in the attack on the machine-gun nests, the deliberate locating of these nests, and the subsequent infiltration processes used in overcoming these nests; the bold dashes wherever opportunity offered, in one case resulting in the 2d Battalion of the 103d Infantry rushing and capturing a hostile battalion of greater strength before the enemy could raise his head; the fine liaison and co-operation of the artillery; the expedition with which follow-up roads were constructed by the engineers; the enterprise of the medical, supply and other auxiliary units, all combined to prove that its wide service and experience have made this a veteran division.

I was pleased with all elements of the division.

2. By dark on the 12th the principal resistance of the enemy had been overcome. Then came the order to close the gap between our forces on the north and our troops advancing from the south, in order to prevent the escape of the enemy from St. Mihiel. Our mission then was to reach Vigneulles before daylight, and there establish contact with troops of our Fourth Corps.

3. The 102d Infantry, in the division reserve, which had followed the advance closely throughout the battle in readiness for any such emergency, was ordered to spare neither energy nor blood to accomplish this mission. The whole division was pushed forward through the night, the rest of the Fifty-first Infantry Brigade following the dash of the 102d Infantry, and the Fifty-second Infantry Brigade moving out on the left rear of the 102d Infantry, with the towns on the plain to the northwest of Hattonchatel, to include St. Maurice, as objectives.

In less than one-half hour after receipt of this order the 102d Infantry and the 102d Machine Gun Battalion were on the march, led and inspired by the regimental and battalion commanders in person. They marched over 9 kilometers on the only existing road, through a dense forest, in an unknown and hostile country infested with the enemy, losing for the time being liaison both to the right and left. The leading elements, passing through Hattonchatel, reached Vigneulles before 2 o'clock in the morning, took complete possession of these two towns by 3 o'clock, and pushing out occupied Creue and Heudicourt and blocked the roads leading from the southwest, while sending patrols further into the plain to gain contact with the American forces coming from the south.

This advance force captured many prisoners, much ammunition, stores of all kind, and released many captive civilians from St. Mihiel that the enemy in his hasty retreat was forced by the 102d Infantry to abandon.

With this advance force were the entire 102d Infantry, three companies of the 102d Machine Gun Battalion, and part of the 101st Machine Gun Battalion from the division reserve. This last part, abandoning its motors, marched 14 kilometers, carrying its guns by hand the entire way.

By morning the whole command had taken possession of all the towns in the sector of its advance, and was impatient to pursue the enemy across the Hindenburg Line.

4. The towns of St. Remy, Dommartin, Thillot, St. Maurice, Billy-sous-les-Côtes, Vieville-sous-les-Côtes, Hattonchatel, Hannonvalle, Vigneulles, Creue, Heudicourt, Wadonville, Avillers,

and Butgneville, as well as the entire length of the Grande Tranchée de Calonne, with a gain of 14 kilometers, belong to your arms.

The division captured about 2,400 prisoners, large stores of supplies and ammunition, horses, and motor transportation, and about 50 guns.

I am proud of you. You are a shock division.

C. R. EDWARDS, Major-General, Commanding.

## **CHAPTER XVIII**


# Edwards' Report on St. Mihiel

In his report of operations in connection with the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, issued October 7, General Edwards went into the fight in some detail. As was customary, he also made certain recommendations based on his observations. The report read:—


1. On September 6, 1918, Battle Instructions No. 1, Headquarters First Army Corps, giving the general outline of proposed operations against the St. Mihiel salient, were received. On the same date the Twenty-sixth Division relieved the Second Division de Cavalerie à Pied in the Rupt sector, the Commanding General, Twenty-sixth Division, taking command of the sector on the 8th.

On September 11 Field Orders No. 77, Twenty-sixth Division, were issued in accordance with Field Orders No. 17, Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, ordering an attack on D day at K hour. The attack was to be made with three regiments in line, the 102d Infantry and 101st Machine Gun Battalion being designated as division reserve. In each brigade sector there were to be two battalions in the front line, each battalion being assigned a machine-gun company, Stokes mortar and 37 m.m. platoons, a section of smoke and thermite troops of the 1st Gas Regiment, one-half company of engineers and one 75 m.m. gun. The attack was to be preceded by an artillery preparation and accompanied by a rolling barrage.

2. The following additional artillery units were put at the disposition of the Twenty-sixth Division: 13th Field Artillery, 77th Field Artillery, 203d Regiment (9 batteries) (French 75s motorized), 22d Battery, 5th R. A. P. (220 m.m. howitzers), 1st Battalion (2 batteries), 73d Regiment (270 m.m. coast



Colonel William F. Hayes



Horse Section, 101st Ammunition Train, France



International Film Service, Inc.

General Pershing decorating Members of the Infantry, Engineers, Artillery and Medical Corps with the D. S. C., La Ferte, France, July 12, 1918

howitzers), 28th Battery, 176th Regiment (240 m.m. trench mortar).

- 3. The artillery bombardment commenced at 1 o'clock September 12. The targets included five gaps in the wire to be cut by 75s, and one by 150 m.m. mortars. This work was done satisfactorily. Fire ceased for five minutes at H minus three hours, and for ten minutes at H minus one hour and five minutes, to allow sound ranging to be carried out. The pauses were followed, respectively, by five and ten minutes' gas concentration on back areas.
- 4. At 8 o'clock, September 12, the infantry attacked, following a rolling barrage, which advanced at the rate of 100 meters in four minutes. Liaison was maintained with flank divisions by mixed combat groups, each consisting of one company of infantry and one platoon of machine guns from each division, and between brigades by one platoon of infantry and one section of machine guns from each brigade, all groups advancing in line with support battalions. The terrain was exceptionally difficult, being wooded and rolling and much broken by trenches and shell holes and covered with mazes of wire entanglements. The crossing of the latter was made possible by the gaps cut by the artillery, and by gaps opened by the infantry and engineers by means of wire cutters and Bengalore torpedoes.

For the first kilometer little resistance was encountered, but later considerable machine-gun fire developed from Kiel, Essen, Stettin and Prusse trenches. There was also some hostile artillery fire; this was not very strong. The machine-gun resistance was overcome by infiltration combined with fire from the infantry weapons, and by gas and flame troops which rendered invaluable assistance.

A half hour's halt took place on the first intermediate objective, the Vaux-St. Remy road, during which the assaulting battalions reorganized. Resistance was strongest on the right, and this had caused considerable disorganization of the right battalion, 101st Infantry. The reserve battalion was ordered forward, and the 1-102 was ordered to leapfrog, the division

reserve having at 10.15 o'clock been ordered to follow up the assaulting troops. The advance continued from the first intermediate objective without much opposition on the right, but meeting with stiff resistance on the left in Le Chanot Bois. In spite of this resistance the objective for the first day, the Longeau Perme-Dompierre-aux-Bois road, was reached at about 19 o'clock.

5. At 15.15 o'clock in the afternoon of the 12th Field Orders No. 19, Fifth Army Corps, were received, stating that the 15th D. I. C. (French) would not advance beyond the line Hannonville-Longeau Ferme; that it would organize the captured front from Montgirmont to Herbeuville (inclusive); that it would transfer to the Twenty-sixth Division the captured territory lying between Herbeuville-Dommartin; and that the Twenty-sixth Division would take over from the 15th D. I. C. the captured territory above and would continue its advance to Thillot-sous-les-Côtes (exclusive) and Dompierre-aux-Bois (inclusive).

A little later in the afternoon the commanding general of the 2d D. C. A. P., on my right, came to my P. C. and stated that as the left of his division had reached its objectives with the right of my division, he purposed, knowing the above orders, and although the 15th D. I. C. had not captured the above terrain, to continue his advance after the retreating enemy, bearing to the left, or west, his objective in direction of St. Maurice, and asked me if I would not go along on his left because it was the purpose to take the Heights of the Meuse. I agreed to the proposition and sent out one of my staff officers to the Fifty-first Infantry Brigade to get the troops ready to participate.

In accordance with later instructions, which I received about 19.30 o'clock, this order was canceled, and I directed a push-through advance on Vigneulles on the Grande Tranchée de Calonne. I immediately transmitted this order myself by telephone to headquarters Fifty-first Infantry Brigade, received at 20.10 o'clock, and to the Commanding General, Fifty-second Infantry Brigade, received at about 21 o'clock.

An aide-de-camp of Brigadier-General Shelton received the message at headquarters Fifty-first Infantry Brigade and took the message to Brigadier-General Shelton, who was arranging the pass-through of the 102d Infantry which had been held in division reserve with the other elements in order to start this turning movement above described; but he immediately changed the objective to Vigneulles, and in a half hour after the order had been received the 102d Infantry was on the march. These orders were confirmed afterwards by Field Orders No. 78, these headquarters.

The 102d Infantry, Machine Gun Company of 101st Infantry, and the 102d Machine Gun Battalion led the advance. The 101st Field Artillery was ordered to follow, escorted by one battalion of the 101st Infantry, and followed by the rest Due to the impassable condition of the of that regiment. roads the artillery could not go forward, and when this became evident the 101st Infantry proceeded without them. The 101st Machine Gun Battalion, in division reserve, was also ordered to take part in this advance, and followed the 102d Infantry. The leading elements of the 102d Infantry, after cleaning up Hattonchatel, reached Vigneulles at 2 o'clock. September 13, and the 101st Machine Gun Battalion arrived at the same place at 4.40 o'clock. One company of the 102d Infantry, accompanied by machine guns, was sent to Creue. and two companies, accompanied by machine guns, were sent to Heudicourt. Detachments had been left to block the roads crossing the Grande Tranchée de Calonne from the southwest and prevent the passage of the enemy. Patrols sent out from Vigneulles to the east and southeast gained contact with the leading elements of the First Division. The 101st Infantry reached Hattonchatel at 8 o'clock on the 13th.

6. The Fifty-second Infantry Brigade had been making dispositions to participate in the movement above indicated by the commanding general, 2d D. C. A. P., and at the same time I gave orders for the advance of the 102d Infantry I advised the commanding general of the Fifty-second Infantry Brigade that he would move out by any roads that were possible, if he

could find any, on the left and rear of the 102d Infantry advance. The left of the Fifty-second Brigade had been advancing irrespective of the fact that the 15th D. I. C. on the left had not kept up, and was subjected to a good deal of enfilled fire from the territory in front of this French division throughout the day.

Afterwards, when I learned of the impassability of the roads, I gave the objective of this brigade from Hattonchatel to and including St. Maurice. This brigade encountered considerable resistance from machine-gun nests, but reached their objectives indicated the next morning. There was great difficulty in the dark, and going forward as they had to in battle formation, to get messages from the leading assault battalions to the regimental headquarters.

- 7. The movement forward of the artillery was delayed until a road could be constructed across No Man's Land. However, two of the accompanying pieces succeeded in crossing at 17 o'clock on the 12th. The road was made practicable at 18 o'clock, September 13, and the 101st Field Artillery, 102d Field Artillery and 77th Field Artillery immediately moved forward to new positions.
- 8. Infantry. As stated above, to each assaulting battalion were assigned a machine-gun company, Stokes mortar and 37 m.m. platoons, a section of smoke and thermite troops from the 1st Gas Regiment, one-half company of engineers, and a section of 75 m.m. guns. This was found to furnish the infantry powerful means of overcoming machine-gun nests, but the accompanying thermite or gas weapons could have been more effectively used if commanders concerned had had more training together. The problems encountered were those of transporting the material across the difficult terrain and making the proper tactical use of them by infantry commanders. Combined training is necessary to produce complete co-operation and secure the best results in battle. Possibly the Stokes mortar units could be equipped with the new long-distance shell with thermite charges.
  - 9. Engineers. The divisional engineers are insufficient in

number in an attack against long-established positions. The various missions of assisting the infantry advance by wire cutting, both by hand and Bengalore torpedoes; of getting the artillery, including the accompanying guns, over to No Man's Land; and of road building and general road repairing are more than one regiment can cope with. Although in this operation the 101st Engineers did unusual and devoted work, yet it was twenty-four hours before the main body of the artillery was able to cross No Man's Land. Engineers assigned to advanced road work should be given the authority of Military Police, and should receive instructions from the A. P. M. They will thus be assisted in their own work of road repair, and at the same time lighten the burden confronting the Military Police.

- 10. Artillery. The rolling barrage, advancing at the rate of 100 meters in four minutes, and uniform over the divisional front, proved to be too fast for the right battalions, whose terrain was covered with underbrush and much wire and entanglements, although the left battalions were able to keep close up behind it. It may not be practicable to have different rates of barrage on the same divisional front, but in this particular operation the difficulty might have been met by the employment of progressive concentrations rather than a real barrage. This would not have given as much moral support to the infantry as would a rolling barrage, but it is believed that in this particular case our infantry has such confidence in our artillery that this added moral support could have been dispensed with in view of the advantages to be gained.
- 11. Machine Guns. The 101st Machine Gun Battalion (partially motorized), forming part of the division reserve, was pushed forward behind the 102d Infantry to Vigneulles. The roads across No Man's Land being impassable, the battalion unloaded its guns and ammunition and carried them by hand, accomplishing the march of 18 kilometers in seven hours, only one man failing to finish. This performance was remarkable, and was more than can normally be expected. Inasmuch as the condition of the roads in No Man's Land will seldom permit the motors to be pushed forward in the critical stages of the

battle, it is believed that some form of light-wheeled mount should be provided that can be carried on the motors with the guns for use in such emergency.

- 12. Reserve. The advance on Vigneulles showed strongly the advantage of keeping a regiment as a unit in reserve. As this regiment had been kept well in hand, the march on Vigneulles commenced within one-half hour after the order was received.
- 13. Intelligence. Prearranged plans for the collection and transmission of intelligence information worked well as far to the rear as brigade headquarters, but in rear of that intelligence was often sidetracked. It is recommended that a forward division intelligence center be established with direct wire connections to the brigades and to the G-2 office, and with runners for use in emergencies.

In this operation the division observers were divided into two echelons so that one post was always in operation. The assignment of an officer to the observer squad, though not provided in the tables of organization, greatly increased the value of the information obtained. It is believed that the tables of organization should provide for two officers with the division observers. This would greatly increase the efficiency of the service during attacks, and in quiet sectors these officers could be used to supervise the training of the observers of lower echelons. Observation posts selected during an advance should be as near the axis of liaison as possible; but even so, runners, telephone, wire, optical signalling apparatus and other portable means of liaison should be provided to enable information to get back promptly enough to be of value.

- 14. Traffic Control. Experience in this advance emphasizes the need of pushing traffic control posts forward closely behind the advancing infantry, and of laying down a schedule of traffic priority. During such an advance the allowance of Military Police is none too great for the needs of a division. They should not be depleted by detachments for corps or army duties in an advance.
  - 15. Air Service. Although every effort had been made to

improve the liaison between the air service and the infantry, the results were not satisfactory. Perfect telephone communication between division headquarters and the aerodrome is essential, and squadrons if not forming a part of a division should at least be permanently assigned to it, if perfect liaison is to be obtained.

- 16. Liaison Agents. Division liaison agents were assigned to both divisions on our flanks and to brigade headquarters.
- 17. Posts of Command. As above stated, the fact that the commanding officer of the regiment in reserve was able to be actually with his regiment enabled that organization to get in movement very promptly when orders for the march to Vigneulles were received. On the other hand, an order received at a brigade P. C. could not be delivered to the commanding general for one hour, due to the fact that he was out with his troops. The lesson is that though a commander should be well to the front in order to follow the development of events and to have his units in hand, he must nevertheless be in touch with the higher command. These considerations can be reconciled by pushing P. Cs. well to the front, and by requiring each commanding officer when he leaves his P. C. to have ready liaison with it, preferably, depending on the distance, by some means more rapid than runners.


#### CHAPTER XIX

#### 102d Takes Prisoners

Having eliminated the big St. Mihiel salient, the Twenty-sixth Division was pulled back to its original sector, which extended way to the front due to the evacuation of the Boche. This sector was on the crown of a range of hills with the advanced posts far out in the plain below. It was an ideal position, and the New Englanders dominated the territory for miles around. The sector had originally included the little town of St. Hilaire, but because the terrain was difficult to hold, and because of the fact that the town was well within range of the American artillery, it had been relinquished. It was here that the Germans sent over a raiding party, but it was met with a terrific fire, and turned back with heavy losses, leaving a number of prisoners behind.

Meantime a conference of officers was held to meet the officers of the Second French Colonial Corps. Here Colonel Bearss, commanding the 102d Infantry, asserted that the Germans were showing signs of activity opposite his position, moving men down into the wood of Warville and the town of St. Hilaire. He asked and received permission to send out a strong patrol for the purpose of taking prisoners.

Colonel Bearss, who was formerly an officer in the Marine Corps, then selected four platoons, taking them from every battalion in the regiment. Two of them, commanded by Captain Oberlin, were ordered to go straight into St. Hilaire and secure prisoners. The other two were to support the flanks of the attackers. Then



Lieutenant-Colonel William J. Keville



One of United States Railway Guns in France



Hearst News Film

President Wilson saluting American Soldiers who aided in winning Victory at Château-Thierry, France

four more platoons were picked, under Captain A. W. Dillard, and an hour later than the St. Hilaire attack were sent into the Bois de Warville.

While waiting for the artillery preparation to cease, members of the two parties made many wagers on which would come back first with prisoners.

At 10.45 P.M. the artillery strafing changed into a rolling barrage, and the St. Hilaire party jumped off. Then a box barrage was laid around the town, and the platoons went forward, finding heavy iron wire on iron stakes stretching across the road into town. Under an intense machine-gun fire this obstruction was removed, and the main body, headed by Captain Oberlin, rushed for St. Hilaire. Just then there was a terrific explosion, and a section of the road rose in air, carrying the captain and several of his men with it. It had been mined by the enemy. Fortunately, no one was seriously injured, and the party surged on. There was a scrambling in the town, and when the Americans reached there not a Boche was to be found. Angry and disappointed, the raiders were forced to return with no prisoners.

At 11.45 the guns opened up on the woods which the other party were to attack, changed to a rolling barrage, behind which the American platoons crept, and then switched into a box barrage. The Germans had planted machine guns in the trees, and the bursts of flame from these were seen by Colonel Bearss, who was watching the course of the attack. He immediately got in touch with the heavy guns, and after a few high explosives had dropped into the woods the machine-gun firing ceased.

The New Englanders advanced into the woods, and there in the dark they engaged in hand-to-hand combat with a considerable number of the enemy. There was a good deal of confusion, owing to the darkness, but the

enemy fought only half-heartedly, and the Americans secured a number of prisoners. Then, the time being up, they returned to their own lines carrying fifteen of the enemy with them. Only two slight injuries were reported among the Yankee forces.

Dr. Charles Comfort of New Haven went along with the St. Hilaire raiders, but had nothing to do. The Rev. James P. Sherry of Lowell, chaplain of the regiment, attached himself to the other party, and justified his action by boosting Private John Cummings of New Haven up a tree. Cummings wanted to locate a field piece and a machine gun that were firing from somewhere beyond the woods. This he succeeded in doing, despite the heavy fire and the fact that he afforded an excellent target for the enemy.

The next engagement of the division was on September 26, when the Argonne-Meuse offense opened. The Yankee Division made a diversion attack at this time in order to prevent the enemy from utilizing his artillery from Woevre. While this engagement was of practically small importance compared to the great offensive, it was one of the most intense struggles in which the division participated.

Out in the great plain of the Woevre were two towns, Marcheville and Riaville. These towns were held by the enemy, and the Yankees were ordered to take and hold them for twenty-four hours.

For weeks the preparations for the Champagne offensive had been going quietly on, and the Twenty-sixth were beginning to feel that they were to be overlooked. On the night of September 25, however, orders arrived. Company cooks were told to prepare two cooked meals, and the officers were then called to a conference at divisional headquarters. It was then learned that the

artillery preparation would begin at 11.30 that night, and at 5.30 the following morning the regiment, commanded by Colonel Bearss, would start an attack against Marcheville. At the same hour the 103d Infantry would move against Riaville, over to the left.

The whole attack was in charge of Colonel Bearss, who went over the top with the men, accompanied by Colonel James L. Howard, as liaison officer, and Major E. E. Lewis, who commanded the attacking battalion.

The two objectives were little villages, consisting of groups of houses on country roads. There is a road leading across the plain from Champion to Riaville, and another from Saulx to Marcheville, while a third road runs from Marcheville to Riaville. Crosswise there were trenches, and around each town broad belts of wire.

It was still dark at 5.30, with blankets of smoke hanging over the positions, and concealing the men. attacking parties worked up the trench systems until they encountered machine-gun opposition, which they flanked out. They reached the two towns some time after daylight, and were immediately subjected to a smashing artillery bombardment. Colonel Bearss and Colonel Howard rode into Marcheville ahead of the troops, and Colonel Howard personally directed the machine-gun fire. Major Lewis and Major Hanson were in and out of the two towns several times during the day, and continually exposed themselves while directing the attacks. At dark, orders were received to retire to the original positions, and the men went back in good order, one group holding back the enemy while another withdrew. Twenty-nine prisoners were taken at Marcheville.

Major Hanson and the battalion attacking Riaville early encountered opposition. They took cover in two

mottes of trees, at the corner of a trench which ran across the foot of the hill in front of Riaville. Shelled out from these the Yankees came out into the fields, and under what cover they could find re-formed and moved up to the second ditch. Twice they reached a point a short distance from the town, and each time were held up by machine-gun fire. Then Major Hanson called for artillery, but the German positions were impregnable. The Boches were huddled in concrete pill boxes, against which artillery fire was useless.

At 12.30 the artillery ceased, and the attacking forces managed to make their way into the town, driving off a counter attack. Then their machine guns held off the Boche, while the enemy artillery pounded the town.

In the meantime the other party was having troubles of its own. On the brow of the hill it ran into machinegun fire, and immediately started to flank out the emplacements, which were mostly pill boxes. Colonel Bearss, Colonel Howard and Major Lewis, with about twenty men, most of them runners, reached the westerly edge of the town, and took shelter under a high wall which was still standing. From there they penetrated to the main street, discovering a strong point and abri in a little square where the road made a turn. Here headquarters were established.

In the meantime the troops had gotten into the town, and the Yankee machine guns drove the Boche out. The enemy retreated up a trench toward the next town, and from there launched a counter attack preceded by a terrific artillery bombardment. When this counter attack was made the New Englanders dropped back to the trench in front, as the enemy had gone around to the south and were attempting to flank them.

The headquarters party knew nothing about this, and

before they realized what was happening were menaced on three sides. They took up a position with their three machine guns in the middle of the town, and began to stand off the Germans. They managed to drive off the enemy from the south, and then, their ammunition running low, fell back around the wall, to the ditch. Here they were again forced to fight, and eventually fell back to the corner under an enfilading fire from the enemy.

The members of the little party were in a precarious position when Lieutenant Linton, of General Shelton's staff, came to their rescue. He had heard of their difficulties back in Saulx, where he had gone with an order. Lieutenant Linton gathered together some 25 men, and dashing across the open country in face of the enemy's fire reached the town. The other party signaled from the trench, and he joined them. The increased forces were sufficient to get the entire party to a safer position.

It was during this time that Lieutenant Paul Hines, a Boston newspaper man and assistant to the regimental adjutant of the 102d, did something which won him the Distinguished Service Cross. A wounded officer was lying in the open in front of Marcheville, and Lieutenant Hines announced he was going to get him. It looked to be impossible, but the remainder of the little head-quarters party agreed to give him what assistance they could. Spreading out they opened a hot fire, and while thus keeping the Germans busy the young lieutenant and two men rushed out and brought back the wounded officer.

It was at Marcheville that Lieutenant Linton met his death, after conducting himself through the day in a manner which gained for him the Distinguished Service Cross. The citation read:—

First Lieutenant Frederick M. Linton, deceased, Fifty-first Infantry Brigade. For extraordinary heroism in action near Marcheville and Riaville, France, September 25–26, 1918. Lieutenant Linton, while acting as liaison officer with brigade headquarters, volunteered to carry a message from the front lines to the rear through a terrific barrage and murderous machine-gun fire. After successfully accomplishing this mission he returned with a platoon of reinforcements across an open field through the same heavy fire. When the town of Marcheville fell into the enemy's hands he volunteered to lead a platoon in the counter attack, and was wounded while in command. He retained command and held his ground with the platoon until he received his second and fatal wound. Home address, Mrs. Frederick M. Linton, 38 Fletcher Street, Roslindale.

## CHAPTER XX

# Colonel Bearss's Report

The report of Colonel Bearss, who led the attack on Marcheville and Riaville, is a brief, soldierly document, and is of interest at this time. It read:—

HEADQUARTERS 102D UNITED STATES INFANTRY, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, September 28, 1918.

From: Commanding Officer, 102d United States Infantry.


To: Commanding General, Twenty-sixth Division (through

military channels).

Subject: Report of attack on Marcheville and Riaville, September 26, 1918.

- 1. In accordance with the orders of the commanding general, Twenty-sixth Division, the following troops attacked Riaville and Marcheville: 1st Battalion, 102d Infantry; 1st Battalion, 103d Infantry; Companies A and B, 102d Machine Gun Battalion, Fifty-first Infantry Brigade; Company B, 103d Machine Gun Battalion, Fifty-second Infantry Brigade; Machine Gun Company, 103d Infantry; Company B (less one-half), 101st Engineers; Company F (less one-half), 101st Engineers; Fifty-first Artillery Brigade; detachment, 101st Field Signal Battalion; detached Sanitary Troops and Stokes mortar platoon; 37 m.m. platoons of 103d and 102d Infantry regiments.
- 2. At 5.30 a.m. the troops commenced their advance. At 6 a.m. a thick smoke screen, accompanied by a heavy barrage of artillery and machine-gun fire, was put down in advance of our line. At this juncture progress was very difficult and necessarily slow, and because of poor visibility, due to the smoke and resulting fog, our troops at times got to within 20 feet of machine guns without detecting their presence. Hand grenades too were thrown at us in abundance by a few of the enemy, unnoticed through the thick fog, in shell holes near by.

- 3. The town was entered after stubborn fighting at 9 A.M., and our objective reached at 10 o'clock. In this primary action we captured about thirty prisoners. We found the town of Marcheville infested with machine-gun nests, pill boxes, snipers and grenade throwers. Old ruined buildings, broken-down walls, innocent looking pieces of tar paper and other débris concealed within or underneath machine guns and crews of grenade throwers. Undaunted by the constant sniping from ambush, and the persistent sputter of the hidden and unsuspected machine guns, our men charged in the direction of the fire, routed the crews, and engaged them in a most bitter handto-hand struggle. The treachery of the enemy was once more manifest when they threw up their hands shouting, "Kamerad!" Hardly had we ceased firing and called to them in German to surrender, when we were greeted with a volley of grenades and a fusillade of machine-gun bullets from points in the rear and between the intervals of their formation.
- 4. The enemy was reinforced several times during the day and counter-attacked violently, with the result that the town changed hands four times, leaving us, however, in full possession when at 19.45 o'clock, in accordance with our orders, we returned under cover of darkness.
- 5. Our retirement was accomplished under the most terrific artillery and machine-gun fire, but fortunately without any serious casualties.
- 6. Of the valor and courage of the officers and men who participated in the attack too much cannot be said in honor and eulogy. Those who survived the combat, as well as the brave officers and men who fell in the field, displayed that dashing, courageous spirit, that tenacity of purpose and willing acceptance of hardship and sacrifice, that have become traditional in the Twenty-sixth Division. They fought from sunrise to sunset with but one thought and purpose, to divert the enemy from every other direction and purpose, and engage him as busily as possible throughout the day.
- 7. Our losses due to the extremely heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, and the hand-to-hand fighting incident to



Lieutenant-Colonel Frank S. Perkins



International Film Service, Inc.

Company B, 101st Supply Train, unloading Bread for Use en Boute to Front, Chatillon, France, August 28, 1918



International Film Service, Inc.

First American Wounded of the 103d Infantry, Bois d'Esparges, France, September 12, 1918

carrying on our mission, are greatly compensated by the realization that we carried out as perfectly as we could our mission contained in division orders.

8. Among other officers who displayed exceptional courage and bravery I must mention Major E. E. Lewis, 102d Infantry, second in command of the attack, for his extraordinary initiative, energy and bravery. He organized the position in Marcheville, collected all the scattered units, established liaison, and in the hand-to-hand fighting attendant on the retaking of the town displayed a natural-born leadership, — those soldierly qualities of coolness and bravery that were an inspiration to all, and begot in the men under him a confidence and bull-dog tenacity of purpose that are always productive of success.

H. I. BEARSS, Colonel, U. S. M. C., Commanding,

In indorsing this communication Brigadier-General Shelton said:—

1. This attack was made under division orders and in accordance with the plan of the 2d Colonial Corps for a deep raid on each division sector on the corps front simultaneously with and as a diversion for the main attack of the American and French armies northwest of Verdun. The division orders directed a raid by a battalion of the 102d Infantry on Marcheville, connecting with the raid by a battalion of the 103d Infantry on Riaville. Both operations were placed under the command of Colonel H. I. Bearss, 102d Infantry. The limits of the raid and objective were fixed practically by the limit of effective artillery fire from our guns on the heights of the Meuse. The plan further contemplated, after attainment of the objectives, that the troops should remain in possession thereof until nightfall. This was understood to be important in accomplishing the purpose of the diversion on this front, and was necessary to admit withdrawal of the troops across the open plain under cover of darkness. The artillery prepara-

tion began at 23.30 o'clock, September 25, and continued until the infantry advanced at 5.30 o'clock, September 26.

- 2. The foregoing report of Colonel Bearss covers briefly the main facts of the attack on Marcheville in so far as data were available at the time it was prepared, immediately after the return of his command to its normal positions. It does not cover so fully the attack on Riaville by the battalion of the 103d Infantry because at the time of its preparation complete reports from this battalion were not at hand. But Colonel Bearss's bare recital of facts in no way does justice to the remarkable accomplishment of his troops throughout the day of September 26, and still less to his own fine conduct of the attack, his brilliant leadership, and his remarkable personal courage. The position attacked, known to be strongly held. had been reinforced, it appears from statements of prisoners. during the night preceding the attack. This reinforcement may have been due to the warning afforded by the artillery preparation, or to the activity of our troops in this sector during the preceding ten days. The difficulties confronting the attacking forces in this way were increased through the artillery fire which the enemy was able to bring upon the position while in our possession, and against which, due to the reactive location of the enemy artillery and ours, it was possible to bring no effective counter-battery work.
- 3. Due to the darkness and fog and the smoke screen employed by the enemy, there was some delay in the first entry of the main attacking forces into Marcheville. Colonel Bearss, accompanying the advance with the liaison group connecting the two attacking battalions, was, with his staff, actually on this account the first of our forces to enter Marcheville. Thereafter he personally shared with his staff in all that his command endured throughout the day, and personally directed the combat on the ground. It is not easily possible to do full justice to all that was endured by all concerned in this part of the operations, or to describe the courage and fortitude that was displayed in the complete accomplishment of the assigned mission. In my judgment these operations

form one of the unique and heroic achievements of the war in which every man taking part is entitled to credit.

4. Colonel Bearss showed himself throughout these operations, as he has shown himself on every other occasion since coming under my command, fully capable of exercising brigade command. Separate recommendation for his appointment as brigadier-general will be submitted. Recommendations for suitable rewards for others who distinguished themselves in these operations will be forwarded as soon as they can be prepared.

GEORGE H. SHELTON, Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

### CHAPTER XXI

### Yankees Create Diversion

While occupying the Troyon sector, which it organized after the battle of St. Mihiel, the Yankee Division named its two subsectors "Massachusetts" and "Connecticut." Its various P. Cs. were also given names of the capitals of the States of New England.

At the beginning of the engagement of September 26, from the Meuse beyond the Argonne, the rôle of the Yankees was to make the Germans believe that they purposed to break through and attack Metz. In this way they created a diversion and helped out the main attack on the Argonne-Meuse front. As a result of their activities the following letters were received:—

HEADQUARTERS, SECOND COLONIAL CORPS STAFF, October 5, 1918.

No. 29329.

From: General Blondlat, Commanding Second Colonial Corps.

To: The Commander-in-Chief (through channels, General commanding Second Army).

Subject: Proposition for Citation in Army Orders in Favor of the 1st Battalion, 102d Regiment of Infantry, U. S.

I have the honor to send you the report which I had the General commanding the Twenty-sixth United States Division make on the very hard and glorious combat in which this division engaged on September 26, 1918.

The Second Colonial Corps had received orders to carry out extensive raids to attract and fix the attention of the enemy as

follows: "General Orders No. 20, September 20, 1918, of the General commanding the First United States Army. The Second Colonial Corps will hold the front of Bois le Chauffour, inclusive, to Mesnil, exclusive. The Second Colonial Corps will make a demonstration along its front, launching artillery bombardment as well as making extensive raids at H hour."

The dimension and duration of the raid executed by the Twenty-sixth United States Division certainly deceived the enemy as to our intentions; the losses suffered by the troops taking part in this operation were fairly severe, but there is no doubt that those suffered by the Germans were much more serious.

The spirit of sacrifice and magnificent courage displayed by the troops of the Twenty-sixth United States Division on this occasion were certainly not in vain. They seem to me worthy of recompense and praise. Therefore I directed the General commanding the division to address propositions to me on this subject.

I urgently request that the 1st Battalion of the 102d Infantry be cited in Army Orders on the following grounds:—

Picked troops who, trained by Colonel Hiram J. Bearss, who led the attack in the first line, carried out brilliantly and with splendid energy a particularly delicate operation; engaged battle with a superb dash; won a victory after a violent combat over an enemy who was both stubborn and superior in numbers, entrenched in concrete shelters, strongly supported by numerous machine guns and powerful artillery, and who made use of, in the course of the action, infamous methods of warfare; heroically carried out their mission in capturing in heavy fighting a village where they maintained themselves all day in spite of four enemy counter attacks, and thus furnished the finest example of courage, abnegation and self-sacrifice.

I request further that the officers and men mentioned in General Edwards' report receive each and severally the rewards suggested for them by name.

BLONDLAT.

HEADQUARTERS, SECOND COLONIAL ARMY CORPS STAFF, October 7, 1918.

No. 29431A.

At this time, when the Twenty-sixth Division is leaving the zone of the Second Colonial Army Corps, I wish to forward to General Edwards and to his gallant division the expression of my complete satisfaction, my best wishes for its successes to come, and my hearty thanks for the brilliant services in the attack on the St. Mihiel salient.

Although the Twenty-sixth Division was only under my orders for a short time, I discovered on the part of all, both officers and men, those qualities of discipline, ardor and *ésprit de corps* which characterize picked troops.

I thought it but my duty to call to the attention of the French high command the fine conduct under fire of your men in the glorious battle of September 26; they demonstrated once again their high qualities of energy and spirit of sacrifice. I have requested that citations be bestowed upon the brave men whose conduct has been especially reported to me.

BLONDLAT.

The Distinguished Service Cross and the Bronze Oak Leaf "for extraordinary heroism in action" were awarded Colonel Bearss, Lieutenant Colonel (formerly Major) Lewis and Lieutenant Colonel Howard for the part they took in the attack on Marcheville and Riaville. In announcing the awards the commanding general issued the following:—

Colonel Hiram I. Bearss, 102d Infantry, for extraordinary heroism in action at Marcheville and Riaville, France, September 26, 1918.

Colonel Bearss's indomitable courage and leadership led to the complete success of the attack by two battalions of his regiment on Marcheville and Riaville. During the attack these two towns changed hands four times, finally remaining in our possession until the troops were ordered to withdraw. Under terrific machine-gun and artillery fire Colonel Bearss was the

first to enter Marcheville, where he directed operations. Later, upon finding his party completely surrounded, he personally assisted in fighting the enemy off with pistol and hand grenades.

Lieutenant Colonel Evan E. Lewis, 102d Infantry, for extraordinary heroism in action near Marcheville, France, September 26, 1918.

Being second in command of the assaulting troops, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis displayed great bravery and rare initiative. While under terrific artillery and machine-gun fire he reorganized scattered units, established and organized positions in depth, set up liaison from front to rear, and in hand-to-hand fighting personally led his men, inspiring in them a confidence and tenacity of purpose that were productive of success.

Lieutenant-Colonel James L. Howard, division machine gun officer, Twenty-sixth Division, for extraordinary heroism in action at Marcheville, France, September 26, 1918.

Lieutenant Colonel Howard directed the machine-gun attack in person. Entering Marcheville ahead of the troops, he rendered great assistance while the town changed hands four times. When he was in a small party, cut off and surrounded by the enemy and under fire from every direction, by his coolness and resourcefulness he assisted materially in aiding the party to withdraw. He effectively organized machine-gun defences when the enemy was endeavoring to drive our troops from the town. During the entire day he was under intense artillery bombardment, machine-gun and rifle fire, and in hand-to-hand conflict with the enemy.

Thirty-two other officers and men were awarded the same decorations at this time for the part which they had played in various engagements. These included Captain Robert Blood, Medical Corps, 103d Infantry; Captain Charles W. Comfort, Medical Corps, 102d Infantry; First Lieutenant Henry Christiansen, Medical Corps, 101st Ambulance Company; and First Lieutenant Joseph H. Dunn, ambulance section, 101st Sanitary Train.

## CHAPTER XXII

### Transferred to Verdun

Following the successful diversion in the Woevre, the Yankees were pulled out and transported up to the famous citadel at Verdun, where they became the army reserve. On October 16 three companies of the 104th Infantry went into line. They marched 24 kilometers with nothing to eat, and then, assisted by fifteen French tanks, fought until morning. Fourteen tanks were lost in this engagement, and the New Englanders had about 250 casualties. That afternoon they again attacked and gained all their objectives.

As a result of this action, General Andlauer, the French commander, sent the following commendation:—

THIRD BUREAU, October 17, 1918.


From: General Andlauer, Commanding the Eighteenth Division of Infantry.

To: The Commanding General, Twenty-sixth Division.


GENERAL: — At the moment that the Eighteenth Division of Infantry is relieved in its sector by the Twenty-sixth Division of Infantry, United States, I wish to send you my heartiest thanks for the support given to its comrades of the 77th Regiment by the 104th Infantry, which since its arrival in the sector, attacked with tanks and succeeded, thanks to a stubborn infantry battle, in forcing the evacuation of half of the edge of the Bois d'Haumont by the enemy.

ANDLAUER.

The attack in question was of comparatively small moment in the general scheme of things, but for those



Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph W. Beacham, Jr.



General Pershing, General Edwards and Brigadier-General Cole reviewing Troops at the Front, France



German Signal Station, captured by Twenty-sixth Division at Bois des Têtes, Ferme, France, September 13, 1918

who participated it was one of the hottest engagements they had seen. The troops gained their objective, but were unable to hold it, owing to the intensity of the fire from the enemy. The ground was extremely muddy, and the tanks went out of action either by sliding into shell holes or capsizing.

There were numerous instances of personal bravery. Lieutenant W. M. Leonard with his men held their place for an hour and a half. Lieutenant Walter A. Tisdell, who was alongside, joined Lieutenant Leonard, and with two squads of men the young officers crawled through the devastated area that had once been a wood to find and rescue wounded. Lieutenant Dwight T. Colby also gained his objective when the tanks gave out, and he also returned with his wounded at the close of the day. Corporal John LaFleau was in a platoon which was surrounded by the enemy and which shot its way out; the corporal, however, was captured. Sergeant Benjamin Shapiro captured a machine gun single handed. Only one of the crew got away.

Charles R. Reville, a stretcher bearer, carrying in a wounded man with a companion, felt the other end of the stretcher sag. He looked around and found that his comrade had been hit. Reville managed to drag the man on the stretcher into a dressing station, and then went back five times, bringing in a wounded soldier each time.

Another typical incident illustrating the spirit of the division occurred during this tank attack. A company of the 104th Infantry was lying in reserve near a dressing station. The wounded were coming in faster than the stretcher bearers could transport them to the ambulance post two kilometers below. The "doughboys" were asked for volunteer stretcher bearers, and the whole company responded. They were immediately accepted,

and for the rest of the day passed back and forth over a shell-swept road, carrying wounded, although they knew that it would be necessary for them to go back into the line shortly.

The next day the division came up, and relieved the Eighteenth French Division. The 101st Infantry was given the left end of the line, on the crest of a hill. Next to the right was the 102d, with the 103d on another hill and the 104th in reserve. This sector was under severe and constant shelling, which made it extremely difficult to get up supplies and ammunition. Even the back areas were sprayed by shells each day, and the German guns were registered on crossroads and traffic thoroughfares.

However, the Fifty-first Artillery Brigade was heavily reinforced, even naval 14-inch railway guns coming up on the far side of the Meuse. These guns constantly replied to the German bombardment, and the resultant din was terrific.

It was at this time that the division received its greatest blow, and one from which it never fully recovered. On October 22, while General Edwards was organizing an attack to start the next morning, he received orders relieving him from his beloved command. The men of the division were stunned. General Edwards had just taken over a sector on the worst point of the whole line; for three days he had suffered the most intense grief over the death of his only daughter Bessie, who fell a victim to pneumonia while working in a cantonment hospital in the United States; and his personal aide, "Nat" Simpkins, was also at death's door from the same disease.

The order relieving the General stated that he was to be detached from the division and the American Expeditionary Forces, and return home to train a new division.

For days he had been laboring under a tremendous responsibility, submerging his own troubles under a mass of details which customarily were handled by his aides. Captain Hyatt had been promoted to major and sent to the Staff College. Then Captain Simpkins was taken sick and on October 12 was evacuated to the field hospital. At the same time Brigadier-General Shelton was also evacuated, suffering from Spanish influenza, and Colonel Bearss replaced him. Lieutenant Colonel E. E. Lewis, who had just been promoted, succeeded Colonel Bearss in the command of the Connecticut regiment.

The story of how he received the news of the death of his only child at Camp Meade was told by General Edwards in the following words:—

I was up in the trenches when some one approached me. "What is the worst news you could receive?" he asked. "Madame?" I asked, in return [that being the manner in which the General refers to his wife]. He shook his head and said that wasn't it. Then I knew it must be Bessie. He gave me a clipping. I was worrying about Captain Simpkins at the time.

The night was a terrible one. The roads were almost impassable and were raked by shell fire. The nearest cable office was about 14 miles away. I spoke to some of the motorcycle despatch riders. I told them I must send a cable. Every man volunteered. One of them then rode through with the cable for Madame.

The gloom caused by this latest bereavement is best reflected in a letter which the Rev. M. J. O'Connor of Roxbury, senior chaplain of the division, and formerly chaplain of the 101st Infantry, sent to General Edwards:—

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION,
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, October 17, 1918.

My Dear General Edwards:—I know how futile are words to assuage the grief that has come to you in the loss of your only daughter. I know how dear she was to you, and her loss by death at a time when you are far from home and so deeply interested in the destinies of the men under your command will draw from you all the virility of your manhood to sustain the blow.

I realize that a heart like yours which has caused you to show so much sympathy for afflicted parents and wounded soldiers must feel deeply the grief that has come to you. Were it possible for the officers and the men under your command to lighten this burden, every man of them would feel it an honor if his life could restore hers to you.

But we are powerless; yet if there be consolation in knowing that there are thirty thousand hearts which desire to lessen your sorrow, the Twenty-sixth Division grieves with you.

May God, who has placed this burden on you and your good wife, give both of you the strength to accept it with Christian fortitude.

Sincerely yours,

M. J. O'CONNOR, Chaplain.

In that letter Chaplain O'Connor expressed the sentiments of every man in the division. General Edwards replied thus:—

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION,
AMBRICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, October 25, 1918.

My Dear Chaplain O'Connor: — Your note will be treasured by my poor wife. It is beautifully like you, and I appreciate it very much.

I got an official cablegram from the War Department about Army Nurse Bessie Edwards, quoting a message from Mrs. Edwards, the first I had received, that she had cabled me three

times, that she was with our daughter to the last, that she died happy, and that Bessie had sworn in as a nurse with a chance to come to France.

I did not believe that God's inscrutable ways would demand a daughter for the cause, and a second but more successful sacrifice than the other member of the family. However, it has come, and it must be borne, together with this last separation.

Just say to the individuals of this Yankee Division as you see them that my one wish is that they should carry on under the new commander and continue in their glorious record. That is the thing that is on our conscience that nobody can deprive us of, and their loyal devotion and success are a great compensation and a great comfort to me.

I will see you before I go.

Faithfully yours,

C. R. EDWARDS.

On the morning of October 12 word came from the hospital that Captain Simpkins was very low and could not recover. The Spanish influenza, from which he first suffered, was complicated with nephritis, and pneumonia set in. Word was sent to his two brothers, Captain John Simpkins of an artillery outfit, and Lieutenant William Simpkins, aide to General Shelton.

Captain John Simpkins managed to reach the hospital shortly before noon, and found his brother conscious. A short time later the stricken officer lapsed into a coma and died.

In the meantime a press of business kept General Edwards at his headquarters at Bras. When he did manage to get away and rush to the hospital in a motor, he arrived too late. His aide was gone.

The young man's death was a tremendous shock to the General. They had been almost inseparable, and occupied more the position of father and son than superior

officer and subordinate. From the time the New England division entered the Chemin des Dames until he became ill, Captain Simpkins was constantly with the General, and did what he could to protect him. General Edwards' custom of exposing himself on the front was a source of tribulation to his young aide, who vainly begged him to be more careful.

Captain Simpkins seemed to possess the faculty of knowing what the General was going to say before he said it, and anticipating his wishes. After the departure of Captain Hyatt, all the details of General Edwards' business at headquarters fell on him, in addition to his other duties.

Before visiting the hospital General Edwards summoned his commanding officers to headquarters to bid them good-by. They came, hardened fighters, who had participated in all the famous battles of the division, and General Edwards was the only cheerful appearing man of the lot. Bravely and skilfully hiding his sorrows and disappointments, the sturdy old soldier broke the news. In a few simple words he told them what they and the division had come to mean to him, and declared that he would never forget them. He said that he had received permission to remain with the organization until the arrival of his successor, Brigadier-General Bamford, for whom he bespoke the same loyalty and devotion.

At the conclusion of that conference, hardened, warworn officers, who had been through all the hell that the enemy had to offer without a sign, came out with tears openly streaming down their faces. The most intense gloom settled down over the division as soon as the news became generally known.

For about nine months, with General Edwards to lead

them, the New Englanders had gone through the most strenuous experiences with only a few days of rest. Undeterred by fatigue, sickness, shortage of supplies or any of the fiendish methods employed by their resourceful enemy, they had piled up a record which vied with that of the élite troops of the French Army. They had been complimented and cited and decorated time and time again. They had been hailed as shock troops and "Saviors of Paris," and their fame was known throughout the length and breadth of the land. And all their glory they attributed to the leadership of Clarence R. Edwards. He it was who stimulated them with his own indomitable spirit, and caused them to go forward when it seemed that human nature could do no more. It was he whose unflagging optimism and cheery words lifted them up, superior to privations and hardships. It was their General who watched over them, cared for them, and saw to it that their lives were not unnecessarily sacrificed.

New Englanders carried on. On the night of October 22 Colonel Bearss sent out an order announcing that the attack on the following morning would probably be the last fight the men would have an opportunity to make under their beloved commanding officer. He urged every man who was to take part to make the engagement a fitting climax to the brilliant record of General Edwards.

In Colonel Bearss's original order, which was issued somewhat earlier, the last paragraph read:—

Every officer, non-commissioned officer and man, is depended upon to uphold the glorious traditions of the Twenty-sixth Division. All hell's flying artillery cannot stop this brigade when it has once gone into action.


On the following morning the attack began on the Bois d'Haumont, the Bois des Chênes and the Bois d'Ormont, with Hill 360 at its eastern edge. All the objectives were gained except Hill 360. It was here that Colonel Logan and Major Greenway of the Engineers personally urged their men forward. It was also in this fight that Major Hickey's battalion came to grief in the Bois Belleau, when his rockets were not seen by two other battalions which were to join in the advance.

The official notes on the operations of the division at this time said: —

The first day of the present effort to obtain possession of the commanding heights in the easterly part of the region between Bois de Consenvoye and Flabas ended to our advantage. At 19.15 o'clock of October 23 it was announced that the division had reached its normal and exploitation objectives (the latter being the Bois Belleau). The work of consolidating the new positions and rectifying the line was ordered to be begun at once, so as to insure us the possession of the Bois Belleau, Bois des Chênes and the ground between, while patrols were directed to maintain close contact with the enemy in the Bois d'Ormont.

But the Germans came back strongly and at once. Under the pressure of a heavy counter attack, supported by an intense flanking artillery fire, the battalion of the 101st Infantry which had gone through Bois Belleau was forced to relinquish its gains, so that morning (October 24) found that part of our newly won ground still in the hands of the enemy, — an enemy who, as was learned from prisoners and deserters, had just been reinforced and partially relieved by fresh troops of the one Hundred and Ninety-second Division, — a class one organization.

Our attack was, however, promptly renewed. Supported most efficiently by the preparation, encaging, and smoke screen concentrations of the divisional and corps artillery, and by



Lieutenant-Colonel P. W. Arnold



International Film Service, Inc.
Rushing Supplies to the Front, Mouilly, France, September 14, 1918



International Film Service, Inc.

Members of 101st Engineers filling in Shell Holes near St. Remy,

Meuse, France, September 16, 1918

the machine gun battalions, the 2d Battalion, 101st Infantry, advanced against Bois Belleau at 15 o'clock October 24, while the 102d Infantry (less 1st Battalion) attacked a line in which the principal objective was Hill 360, starting at 16.30. more a violent resistance was encountered. By the most varied means, ranging from machine-gun nests hidden in trees and the work of skillful snipers to bombardment by minenwerfers regulated by aeroplane observation, the enemy contested every inch of our advance. This was pushed steadily, nevertheless. until darkness made a halt and a new consolidation necessary. We had penetrated Bois Belleau to a depth of 500 meters, and, further to the south, had advanced to the lower slopes of Hill Night brought a new enemy reaction. Against the heavily tried battalion of the 101st no less than four furious counter attacks were directed in quick succession. Three were resisted successfully, but the fourth pushed our troops back again beyond the western edge of the Bois Belleau, only to have them re-form and return to the attack at 2.30 o'clock. This time they succeeded in establishing a line well in advance of their original parallel of departure, while the 3d Battalion, 101st Infantry, moved up and extended the new line westerly. Two companies of the brigade reserve (1st Battalion, 101st Infantry) were sent in to support the 2d, which had suffered considerably. At 11.30 o'clock (October 25), following a violent interdiction and destructive fire by our artillery, the 2d and 3d battalions of the 102d Infantry took up their advance once more against Hill 360, while the 101st (less one battalion) moved again to penetrate and exploit the Bois Belleau. Despite the determined character of the attack, the enemy's resistance was not overcome, and our line at noon of October 26 remains practically where it was established at the conclusion of the initial attack on October 23. The advance will be renewed October 27.

Losses have not exceeded the normal, considering the intensity of the fighting and the strength of the enemy's resistance. What is noticeable is the unflagging spirit and determination of the troops, the tirelessness of the artillery, and the

prompt and liberal assistance and co-operation we have received from the resources of the corps. The task is recognized as exceedingly difficult by all competent critics, but there is every expectation that it will be successfully accomplished.

The fighting continued for five days and nights, through underbrush and stumps that was old fighting ground. On every hand were skeletons of French and German dead, which had lain there unburied for several years. The artillery concentration was terrific, and frequently caused the New Englanders to relinquish their gains, only to counter attack and retake them. The 101st Infantry fought back and forth across one strip of territory at least four times. On October 27 the objectives were gained, and the fighting died down, to remain quiet until after the 1st of November.

In the meantime, on October 24, General Edwards issued his famous good-by order to his division. It read:—

- 1. In compliance with paragraph 48, Special Orders No. 293, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, the undersigned relinquishes command of the Twenty-sixth Division.
- 2. He thanks the division for its loyalty to him and for what it has accomplished in the common cause. He bespeaks for his successor in command the same loyalty and devotion, and he leaves the division in full confidence that its same fine work will continue to the end.

C. R. Edwards, Major-General, Commanding.

At the same time he issued a farewell commendation order to the Fifty-first Artillery Brigade, saying: —

1. To the artillery of the Twenty-sixth Division is due my expression of admiration for its efficiency and aggressive fighting qualities, and for its indefatigable support of our fine infantry. Artillery can desire no higher tribute than the

conscious fact that it has gained the confidence, reliance and thanks of the infantry.

- 2. During more than eight months of fighting service the spirit of loyalty displayed by every officer and man of the Fifty-first Artillery Brigade toward his duty, toward the Yankee Division and toward the division Commander has been fine.
- 3. The record of the Fifty-first Artillery Brigade in the second battle of the Marne is glorious. It went with, supported and protected the infantry in its advance of 18½ kilometers by Château-Thierry, and afterwards, in succession, two other divisions in the advance from the Marne to the Vesle for a period of eighteen days, between July 18 and August 4, with a gain of over 40 kilometers. It is a record of which the entire division and our country justly may be proud.

I congratulate and thank the artillery brigade of the Yankee Division.

C. R. Edwards, Major-General, Commanding.

#### CHAPTER XXIII

### Praised for Action at Hattonchatel

On October 23 General Edwards issued a citation of his troops for their work in the operations at Hattonchatel. This citation, which was issued in General Orders, read:—

- 1. The division Commander extends to the commanding officer, Fifty-first Infantry Brigade, and the officers and men of the following organizations, his hearty congratulations on their great success in the operations of this date for the capture of the heights of the Meuse in the region of Le Houppy Bois and Belleau Bois: Fifty-first Infantry Brigade; 101st Infantry; 102d Infantry; 101st Machine Gun Battalion; 102d Machine Gun Battalion; Detachment, 101st Field Signal Battalion; Detachment, 101st Sanitary Train; 281st Aero Squadron (French); Balloon No. 25 (French); Fifty-first Artillery Brigade; and 1st Battalion, 211th Field Artillery (French).
- 2. The attack as planned was difficult of execution, and only to be attempted by trained troops. You carried it out like the veterans you are, and with a dash and valor worthy of the best traditions of the Twenty-sixth Division.

C. R. Edwards, Major-General, Commanding.

In connection with the same operations the following tribute was paid by the French corps commander:—

HEADQUARTERS, SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS STAFF, 1ST BUREAU.
October 24, 1918.

From: General Claudel, commanding the Seventeenth Army Corps.

To: The Commanding General, Twenty-sixth Division.

GENERAL: — The reputation of your division preceded it here far ahead.

To all its titles of glory gained in fierce struggles, and only recently at the signal of Hattonchatel, it has added on the 23d of October a page which perhaps is more modest, but still does it great honor.

In a few hours, as at a maneuver, it has gained all the objectives assigned it in the difficult sector of the Woods of Houppy, Etrayes and Belleau.

This operation is evidence, indeed, of superior instruction, mobility and will.

I do not know how to thank you sufficiently for your assistance, dear General, and it is my great desire to express to you all our grateful admiration for your splendid division which thus has added its name to all of those who have fought to hurl the enemy back from the outskirts of Verdun.

On October 26 Brigadier-General Bamford arrived, and General Edwards took his last farewell. He had been given permission to take with him one aide, and therefore asked for and obtained Major Hyatt, who had been with him for years. His aide at the time of his departure was Lieutenant Daniel Willard of the artillery, a son of the president of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.

The final leavetaking was described by Dr. Morton Prince of Boston in a letter to Governor McCall of Massachusetts. He said in part:—

The American soldier from every part of the Union, as all know, has won his place as a fighting man, and the Yankee Division has earned a fame that can never be taken from it. It need only point to its record when asked, "How have you done?" Although the boys have been almost continually fighting for nine months, with scarcely a respite, they are still full of grit. The morale is as fine as ever, and the ésprit de corps and pride in the division undiminished.

I mention these things now because the first chapter in its

war history is completed, the division having just bidden good-by and God-speed to its beloved Commander, who has handed over his devoted troops to another's able hands.

His great work in the field is finished unless the war continues. He trained and welded into a fighting unit an inexperienced collection of 27,000 men, a little army in itself, self-sustaining in that it comprised every branch of the service, — infantry, artillery, transport, intelligence, supplies, medical corps, etc., and then he fought with them and led them to victory in one battlefield after another.

No wonder his soldiers are proud of their Chief. His great talents as a soldier, testified to by his corps and army commanders, are now to be utilized by the high command for other important service.

I arrived at divisional P. C. (the advanced post of command during battle) just as the Commanding General was transferring his command to his successor, an able officer of experience who surely will lead the Yankee Division to further victories. Headquarters was a picturesque group of dugouts arranged in two rows facing one another along an alley camouflaged overhead with boughs of leaves from enemy aeroplanes.

In the Commanding General's dugout were high officers and members of his staff, while in the alley were grouped other staff officers and headquarters troops. It was but natural and pardonable that depression and gloom were depicted on the faces of all, and that they should speak in subdued voices.

Though anxious to give the same loyalty to their new commander, they could, for the moment, think only of the past. They were losing their chief to whom they owed everything, and whom they had followed during nine months of constant fighting.

The departing General was the only cheery one of the lot. Whatever he may have felt when leaving the soldiers he loved and who loved him, he did not betray, nor did he give the least sign of his private sorrows, for sudden news had just brought grief into his heart in the death of two that were very near to him, — his own daughter and an aide who was like an own son.

This we all knew. But private grief was not allowed to weigh with duty. He was a soldier through and through.

A few routine details had to be finished, papers had to be signed. Then came the presentation of his staff to the new commander, with a generous word of commendation for each; a word of good-by and a grasp of the hand with one another; the same with a kind word to each enlisted man at headquarters; then he sprang into the motor car. At his invitation, I was privileged to accompany him, and with a wave of his hand and a last cheery good-by we were off, leaving sad faces behind us.

The next day after a night at the main working headquarters a final good-by was said by the remainder of the staff, and as we turned back from where the departing motor left us we heard the explosion of a great 14-inch shell that dropped its fragments close to the car as it sped away, as if the German in a last vain effort sought to destroy in impotent rage the man who had beaten them on many a field, and there came to us from a distance the cheers of the soldiers wishing their general Godspeed.

There is not a soldier or officer in the division that does not take the General's departure as a personal loss.

Following the relief of General Edwards the division sustained another shock when Colonel Logan was relieved from command of the 101st Infantry. With this famous Boston outfit, a part of which as the old 9th Massachusetts he had commanded on the Mexican Border, Colonel Logan had taken part in every battle fought by the division. The regiment was considered one of the best in the Yankee Division, and Colonel Logan was always actively in command during its engagements. He was sent to the reclassification area at the rear and there acted as counsel for officers sent to Blois or Hendrecourt for reclassification. He never lost a case.

A week after Colonel Logan's departure Colonel Frank

H. Hume of the 103d Infantry was also summarily removed from command and sent to the rear. That left only Brigadier-General Cole, Colonel Bunnell of the engineers and Colonel W. J. Keville of the ammunition train as the only commanding officers who went abroad with the division. Major Pendleton, the G-1 appointed by General Edwards, who had the task of looking after supply from Neufchateau to Verdun, was also relieved and sent home.

Lieutenant Colonel Cassius M. Dowell, who had been the G-3 or operations officer of the Division, was given command of the 103d, and his post was taken by Captain Emmons H. Taylor of Hartford, who had been Colonel Dowell's assistant. Colonel Dowell first appeared in the division as chief of staff, succeeding Colonel Shelton. He was replaced by Colonel Duncan K. Major, and then sent away to a Staff School.

Colonel Logan was replaced by Colonel Horace B. Hobbs, who had been division inspector for a few months.

The next blow sustained by the New Englanders came on November 8, just three days before the signing of the armistice, and was a crushing one. It consisted in no less than the removal of Brigadier-General Charles H. Cole from the command of the Fifty-second Infantry Brigade, which he had held from the time of its organization. Officers and men alike were stunned. They wondered where the lightning would strike next. Great was the astonishment, not to say a stronger feeling, when it was learned that General Cole was charged with lack of "aggression" and permitting his troops to fraternize with the enemy.

The man who had led one of the most famous brigades in the American Expeditionary Force, a brigade contain-



Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred F. Foote

Diction Diagnos



International Film Service, Inc.

General Edwards decorating Sergeant Joseph W. Casey, Company F,

101st Infantry, Moulin Brule, France, October 15, 1918



International Film Service, Inc.

Members of 103d Field Artillery inspecting 6-inch Gun near
Samogneux, Meuse, France, October 19, 1918

ing the 104th Infantry, the first American regiment to be decorated by the French, was not considered aggressive! It was also pointed out that General Cole had issued orders prohibiting fraternization before such orders came down from the high command.

General Cole was relieved by an order from Brigadier-General Bamford, who had been in command of the division but a short time, and knew practically nothing concerning his brigade commanders or other officers.

"I immediately demanded a board of inquiry," said General Cole. "They never called it. I was reinstated by special order of General Pershing, as were both Colonel Logan and Colonel Hume. They never asked me to submit any evidence in support of my assertion that there was no foundation for the charge against me. And they never submitted any evidence in support of the charge, although the burden of proof was on them. They did not have anything to submit."

The other regiment in General Cole's command, the 103d, was cited by both the French and the American high commands for valor in action, and has a record for prisoners captured superior to any unit in the American forces in France.

General Cole's report to General Pershing gave a detailed account of the work of the Fifty-second Brigade, showing that it had earned the plaudits of the French during the heaviest fighting of the war. He also showed that he had served under eight division commanders without a single complaint.

Within a short time official vindication and reinstatement was received by the Massachusetts officer in the following order:—

FRANCE, November 30, 1918.

From: Adjutant-General, American Expeditionary Forces.
To: Brigadier-General Charles H. Cole, Center of Infor-

mation, A. P. O. 714, American Expeditionary

Forces.

Subject: Relief from Fifty-second Infantry Brigade.

1. I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to inform you that upon his personal examination of the papers reporting the facts incident to your relief from command of the Fifty-second Brigade, he is of the opinion that the facts did not warrant your relief, and he has therefore directed that you be reinstated to your former brigade.

2. Accordingly, orders will be issued in the near future.

By command of General Pershing,

ROBERT C. DAVIS, Adjutant-General.

The reinstatement of Colonels Logan and Hume did not come until February 4, during which time Colonel Logan was busily engaged at Blois acting as counsel for other officers so unfortunate as to come beneath the ban of general headquarters.

This last battle of the Argonne was part of a gigantic offensive planned by General Foch, which broke the German line in several places and forced the enemy to come to terms. Picked American divisions were used in conjunction with the Allies, and the Twenty-sixth was one of ten of the American divisions which went into line twice during this battle.

Following the pinching off of the St. Mihiel salient, which the New Englanders were instrumental in doing, the stage was set for the big drive. The Yankee Division held the right of the American line in what was known as the Neptune sector. They were on the right bank of the Meuse, with the other American outfits on the left

bank, driving towards Sedan. To the New Englanders fell the lot of pushing into the Argonne Forest, where Major Whittlesey's "Lost Battalion" gained its fame.

The Yankee Division at this time was in the Fifth Corps, commanded by General Charles P. Summerall, which was a part of General Hunter Liggett's First Army. In describing operations after the Twenty-sixth entered the battle, General Pershing said:—

On October 18 there was very fierce fighting in the Caures Woods east of the Meuse, and in the Ormont Wood. On the 14th the First Corps took St. Juvin, and the Fifth Corps, by hand-to-hand encounters, entered the formidable Kriemhilde line, where the enemy had hoped to check us indefinitely. Later the Fifth Corps penetrated farther the Kriemhilde line, and the First Corps took Champigneulles and the important town of Grand Pré. Our dogged offensive was wearing down the enemy, who continued desperately to throw his best troops against us, thus weakening his line in front of our Allies and making their advance less difficult.

On the 23d, the Third and Fifth Corps pushed northward to the left of Bantheville. While we continued to press forward and throw back the enemy's violent counter attacks with great loss to him, the regrouping of our forces was under way for the final assault. Evidences of loss of morale by the enemy gave our men more confidence in attack and more fortitude in enduring the fatigue of incessant effort and hardships of very inclement weather.

With comparatively well-rested divisions the final advance in the Meuse-Argonne front was begun on November 1. Our increased artillery force acquitted itself magnificently in support of the advance, and the enemy, by its persistent fighting of the last weeks and the dash of this attack, had overcome his will to resist. The Third Corps took Aincreville, Doulon and Andevanne, and the Fifth Corps took Landres-et-St. Georges, and pressed through successive lines of resistance to Bayonville and

Chennery. On the 3d the First Corps joined the movement which now became an impetuous onslaught that could not be stayed.

On the 3d advance troops were hurried forward in pursuit, some by motor trucks, while the artillery pressed along the country roads close behind. The First Corps reached Authe and Chattillon-sur-Bar, the Fifth Corps, Fosse and Nouart, and the Third Corps. Halles, penetrating the enemy's line to a depth of 12 miles. Our large caliber guns had advanced and were skillfully brought into position to fire upon the important railroad lines at Montmedy, Longuyon and Conflans. Third Corps crossed the Meuse on the 5th, and the other corps. in full confidence that the day was theirs, eagerly cleared the way of machine guns as they swept northward, maintaining complete co-ordination throughout. On the 6th a division of the First Corps reached a point on the Meuse opposite Sedan. 25 miles from our line of departure. The strategical goal which was our highest hope was gained. We had cut the enemy's main line of communications, and nothing but surrender or an armistice could save his army from complete disaster.

In all, forty-four enemy divisions had been used against us in the Meuse-Argonne battle.

One incident in this last fight, when the names of Bois d'Ormont and Bois Belleau were added to the rolls of the Twenty-sixth Division, was related by General Cole. Between these two places the New Englanders sustained a bombardment exceeding anything which they had ever undergone. High explosive and gas, mingled with machinegun fire, created a hell in which they fought and struggled on for days.

On October 13 [said General Cole] General Edwards read the newest list of citations to the men of the 104th Infantry. Included in this list was the name of Lieutenant Chester R. Howard. The citation was for extraordinary heroism in action

at Trugny on July 22. Although twice wounded, the young officer had refused to be evacuated, and continued on duty with his company during the attack and capture of Trugny under heavy fire, until he was incapacitated by a third wound. Lieutenant Howard disclaimed this citation, declaring it must be for some one else. Questioned by General Edwards it was learned he had performed similar feats but on a different date. The General promised to investigate the matter.

Howard told my aide, Captain Leggat, that he could not wear a medal belonging to another man, and asked him to keep the matter before me.

The following day, when the 1st Battalion of the 104th was detailed to the French, Lieutenant Howard was ordered to take twenty-nine men and reach the town of Flabos. Howard and his men never came back.

Until November 9 it was impossible to reconnoiter the ground over which they had passed. On that day, however, — the day on which I was relieved from command, — my brigade went forward, taking the town of Flabos and passing beyond its objectives. It was then we learned what had become of Lieutenant Howard and his platoon. The bodies of the thirty men were discovered in skirmish line on the ground, that of the lieutenant slightly ahead of the others. Apparently they had charged a machine-gun strong point, and had been wiped out.

We also found out later that Lieutenant Howard was the right man named in the citation.

When General Cole was relieved, Brigadier-General Shelton was transferred to the Fifty-second Brigade, and Brigadier-General L. L. Durfee was assigned to the Fifty-first. The division continued to carry on, although the majority of their old officers were gone. Daily and nightly they harassed the enemy. Many were the heroic feats performed, and many were the Distinguished Service Crosses and Croix de Guerre awarded as a result. It was shortly before this time, on October 23-24, to be exact,

that Captain David J. Brickley of the 101st Infantry won the Distinguished Service Cross and promotion from first lieutenant. Brickley, who had risen from the ranks, was decorated for "stubbornly resisting three strong enemy counter attacks, and then, without aid, going forward, and by effective machine-gun fire, driving the enemy from and capturing a strong pill box which had been raising havoc in our ranks."

Another Distinguished Service Cross man was Captain Edward Edmunds, Jr., of the 102d Infantry. On October 27 Edmunds, then a first lieutenant, having received an order from division headquarters for an accurate report of the strength present in the front line, crawled from shell hole to shell hole in broad daylight and in plain view of the enemy, who kept him under continuous sniping fire from numerous machine guns. Undeterred, Edmunds counted every man in the front line of the battalion he was commanding, and then returned and made his report to the regimental commander.

First Lieutenant George L. Goodridge of the 101st Infantry, on November 8, with about thirty men, secured a footing in an advanced enemy trench. The attacking battalion met with stubborn resistance and fell back to the starting point. Goodridge and his men held on until relieved November 11. He also received the Distinguished Service Cross.

On October 25, Mechanic William F. Bolack, Machine Gun Company, 104th Infantry, while taking a train of machine-gun carts to the relief of his company in the front line, was caught in a terrific bombardment. His train was scattered, several of the mules killed and Bolack was wounded. He had his wounds dressed, and, refusing to be evacuated, passed through the bombardment three times while reorganizing his train and carry-

ing out his mission. He received the Distinguished Service Cross.

On November 9 Private First Class Abraham Cohen, Sanitary Detachment, 103d Infantry, after three others had failed in the attempt and were wounded, went out under terrific machine-gun fire and gave first aid to a wounded soldier. He also received the Distinguished Service Cross.

The above are but a few instances, but they give a good idea of the morale of the division, which, despite its casualties, hardships and the loss of its favorite officers, including the beloved General Edwards, fought sternly on.

#### CHAPTER XXIV

### The Cessation of Hostilities


Despite the fact that rumors of the signing of an armistice were being freely circulated, there was no let-up. In fact, on the morning of November 11 the 101st Infantry was ordered to advance three times, and the 103d was engaged in cleaning out machine-gun nests when the firing ceased.

This cessation of hostilities was so abrupt that for a time the New Englanders could not realize what had happened. The artillery, of course, had been forewarned, and shortly before 11 o'clock the shell fire increased in intensity. Shells of all calibers went shricking across, and the din was terrific. The infantry paid but slight attention, however, being inured to bombardments. were going about their allotted tasks in the thorough manner for which they were famed, when they suddenly realized that the guns had ceased. The first feeling of the "doughboys" was wrath, because they thought the artillery had left them unprotected. Then they noticed that the enemy were appearing openly behind their own Gray-clad figures were seen capering about in strange postures. It seemed like a nightmare. when panting runners came through, and confirmed the shouted tidings of the Germans, the only feeling was that of incredulity. When at last it was borne in on the dazed minds of the men that war was over, at least for the time being, they had but one thought, - at last they could rest. All over the sector they dropped to the ground and proceeded to take the first real rest they had enjoyed




Lieutenant-Colonel Horace P. Hobbs

Bachrach



Actual Combat between Allied and Hun Planes



Manœuvering for Position

since leaving home,—it seemed years before. Throughout the long days and nights when they had struggled on, fighting on sheer nerve, peace had appeared to be something which would never come. Those who thought about it at all were in the minority, and even these regarded it hopelessly and dully as a beautiful dream which would never come true.

It was some time before the men in the front lines were able to participate in the gaieties indulged in by those in the rear. The Germans, however, seemed overjoyed, and attempted to fraternize with the Americans.

French and American troops in the rear, together with civilians, cheered and shouted. The artillerymen had attached ropes to their lanyards, so that every member of a gun crew could help fire the last shot. After this salvo they too joined in the celebration.

In villages behind the lines there were celebrations and flag raisings all day. At night, in the city of Verdun, French and New England troops took part in a parade. This parade, held in one of the most historic and venerated cities of France, was a climax to days of toil and bloodshed and exhaustion. The parade, which included Sengalese, the colored Colonial troops of the French forces, was led by General Marchand. Four of the Yankee Division regimental bands took part and gave concerts on every public square. General Marchand made speeches, and the populace and soldiers cheered until they were hoarse.

In the meantime the sky was emblazoned with rockets and flares sent up from all along the line, so that, except for the lack of noise, it resembled an intensive bombardment. That was the peculiar part of the whole day after 11 o'clock, — no noise; also lights burning at night, where for years there had been darkness.

The celebration in Verdun continued for several hours, during which time Yankee Division men raised an American flag to the top of the wireless tower, and it flung out over the broken land of France like a comforting hand.

Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities General Bamford secured permission for a percentage of the men to go to the leave area at Grenoble. Shaved, bathed and attired in clean clothing, the fortunate soldiers were rejuvenated, and departed for their first leave in months like a crowd of schoolboys.

On November 18, the day the division left the line, General Bamford was relieved of command and Major General Harry C. Hale assigned. On this day General Bamford issued the following order:—

Officers and enlisted men of the Twenty-sixth Division, I congratulate you upon your success in the war which has been fought to a victorious end.

From your entry into the battle line on February 5, 1918, at Chemin des Dames, as a division of recruits, until the cessation of hostilities on the 11th of November, 1918, when you laid down your arms, fighting in the front line as a veteran division, you have shown yourselves worthy sons of the country that gave you birth.

Bois Brule, Xivray-Marvoisin, Torcy, Belleau, Givry, Bouresches, Hill 190, Epieds, Trugny, St. Mihiel salient, Bois d'Haumont, Bois Belleau, Bois d'Ormont and Bois de Ville are indelibly written on your banners.

Of what followed after this, Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton R. Horsey, assistant chief of staff, G-2, said:—

On November 18 the division was relieved in the sector north of Verdun by the Sixth Division. It was then ordered to march to the area east of Chaumont at Montigny le Roi, or

the eighth training area, a distance of about 137 kilometers from the Neptune sector. The march was completed in seven days by the division, with the exception of the artillery brigade, which suffered casualties among the horses which made it barely possible for the 101st and 102d Field Artillery to withdraw their guns from the lines. It was necessary to furnish motor trucks to haul the guns and caissons of the 103d Field Artillery (155m.) from the line. For this reason it was impossible for the artillery to proceed farther than Suilly, about one-third of the distance, where was located the headquarters of the First American Army. The artillery remained in the vicinity of Suilly until late in December, when the brigade with material moved by train to the Montigny le Roi area, where it again joined the balance of the division.

Three days after arrival in the training area the division began work on a program of intensive training, and started at once to receive replacements for its greatly depleted units. Every effort was made to bring the equipment of the division up to a high standard, as we were constantly reminded by corps and army headquarters that the existence of the armistice did not necessarily mean a complete suspension of hostilities. It was also stated that there was a possibility that the division might have to go back in line.

The morale of the division at this time was especially good, with the exception of the keen disappointment, which almost bordered on disgust, felt by all officers and men that the Twenty-sixth had not been included in the Army of Occupation and permitted to move forward from the advance line taken from the Germans, together with the First, Second and Forty-second Divisions, into and actually occupy the enemy territory. However, this point soon was forgotten, and the sole idea that seemed to predominate the command was to adhere closely to the training program and polish up the efficiency of the division, absorbing the large percentage of replacements in order that they could present the best possible appearance to the people of New England upon arrival home, which every one thought would be in a short while.

### CHAPTER XXV

# President Wilson Dines with the Twenty-sixth

The division took a keen interest in the arrival in France of President Wilson, because they rather anticipated they would receive recognition from him while he was on foreign soil. They were not disappointed in this, as an announcement soon came from general headquarters that the President planned to spend part of one day which he would devote to the troops in the field with the Twenty-sixth Division, and would take Christmas dinner with them.

The President, after reviewing a composite division made up of troops from all divisions in the First American Army at Hume (Haute Marne) on Christmas morning, proceeded by motor, together with General Pershing, Mrs. Wilson, Ambassador and Mrs. Jusserand, General Liggett, commanding the First American Army, General Summerall, commanding the Fifth Army Corps, General Harts, commanding the Paris district, Admiral Cary Grayson and the personal staffs of these generals, to Montigny le Roi, where dinner was taken with all of the officers of the Twenty-sixth Division.

The 102d Infantry, at the request of General Pershing, sent to Chaumont on Christmas morning one battalion which acted as a guard of honor for the President at general headquarters. This battalion afterwards received letters of congratulation from the Commander-in-Chief on its fine appearance and soldierly bearing throughout the ceremonies.

After dinner the President, accompanied by General Pershing and his party, inspected several of the billets of the 103d Infantry, and later returned to Chaumont, where he was again met by the honor guard of the 102d. They conducted the President to his train on which he returned to Paris.

The first indications received that the division had been scheduled to return with the first units of the American Expedi-

tionary Forces of the United States was closely following a general inspection made of the division by fifteen staff officers from headquarters of the First American Army. This inspection was the most thorough to which the Twenty-sixth had ever been subjected, including as it did a close investigation and survey into every phase of equipment and tactical efficiency. Reports made by these officers to the army commander were most flattering. Personal comments of the inspectors before their work was half completed were that of five divisions they had already inspected in the First Army, the Twenty-sixth Division was rated by far the highest in every way. In fact, this report was so flattering that many comments were heard among the officers that it really sounded too good.

Telegraphic orders then arrived from the army directing the Twenty-sixth Division to move by train into the American embarkation center and prepare for their embarkation to the United States. The movement was to begin on or about the 17th of January.

Close upon this order followed advices from general headquarters that French general headquarters had cited the 1st Battalion of the 102d Infantry for its remarkable work in connection with the operations against Marcheville on September 26, and that the battalion would be decorated with the Croix de Guerre with palm by Marshal Petain, commander of the French Armies of the East, on January 15.

Preparations for the ceremony were made, and Marshal Petain, accompanied by General Pershing, arrived. The ceremony was very impressive. The battalion was paraded and presented to the Marshal, together with the regimental colors, and the latter was decorated, in the name of the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, with the French war cross.

At this ceremony Marshal Petain took the opportunity to also decorate General Pershing with the Croix de Guerre, which was one of the few foreign decorations which the American Commander had not received from the Allied governments.

The Yankee Division arrived complete in the Le Mans area of the American embarkation center on February 4, and division

headquarters was established at Econmoy (Sarthe). Immediately a plan was evolved by the division commander, General Hale, for a training program to cover a period of one month, which was to be in the form of elimination contests, including both military and athletic features, to culminate in an extensive military and athletic tournament.

The entire division entered into this idea of training with the best possible spirit and enthusiasm. As a consequence the tournament was held on March 10, 11 and 12 with wonderful success from every standpoint. This scheme of training and organized amusement for the division was a novelty in the American Expeditionary Forces, and has since been adopted by them for other divisions remaining in France. There were no individual contestants in the tournament. All units were represented by teams of one squad of eight men to one company of two hundred and fifty men. Prizes were given to each member of winning teams. These were handsome silver and bronze medals presented by Mr. E. A. Filene of Boston, and especially struck by a Paris jeweler from a design prepared by the division.

General Hale also presented a beautiful silver cup to the regiment whose team scored the greatest number of points in the tournament, the cup going to the 104th Infantry.

Frequent comments were made by the headquarters of the American embarkation center on the high efficiency of administration of the Twenty-sixth Division while they were in the Le Mans area. The division being a veteran organization, having eighteen months' experience in service in France, they seldom found it necessary to call upon other headquarters for assistance or advice in administering their own affairs. This was in decided contrast to other organizations who lacked the advantage of long service overseas.

Orders were received at last for the division to proceed by rail to the port of embarkation at Brest, where transport would be provided to Camp Devens, Ayer, Mass. It was announced that the division would sail about April 1, and tremendous enthusiasm was aroused by the announcement that Boston

had been designated as the port of debarkation in the United States.

A fitting climax was then reached in the Yankee Division service in France, where they had acted as the advance guard of the American Army, and were pioneers in blazing the trail for other divisions which followed them. They had also been of great assistance to the balance of the army by furnishing both officers and men for the establishment of many army services which later cared for the supply and training of the American Expeditionary Forces.

This climax consisted in the erection at Le Mans of an immense building to be used as a Y. M. C. A. hut for the American Army who would return after the Twenty-sixth and pass through the embarkation area on the way to the United States. The funds for construction of this hut were contributed by the town of York Harbor, Me., who sent Miss Grace Thompson to France to arrange the location of the building.

Actual construction work was done by the 101st Engineers who added to their already enviable record in the American Expeditionary Forces by completing the building, including grading the ground, construction and wiring for electric lights, in the remarkable time of thirty-two hours.

This building was located by permission of the French government in the Place des Jacobins in Le Mans. Facing the large and historic cathedral is a most complete recreation plant, containing a theatre, a large rest and social room with cozy fireplaces, a canteen, administrative offices, ladies' rest room, five sleeping rooms and a kitchen.

The building was made as typical of New England as possible, being painted white with green trimmings, and latticework effect which broke the severe lines. The interior was decorated with shields on which were painted the seals of each of the New England States, and the insignia of the diferent units of the Twenty-sixth Division, including the famous "Y. D."

The structure was dedicated "York Harbor Y. D. Hut," and at a formal ceremony held in the theatre, at which were

present representatives of all units in the division, was placed in the care of Major-General Edward Read, commanding the American embarkation center. Co-operating with the Y. M. C. A. he will operate this Yankee Division Memorial for the comfort and pleasure of the American soldiers in France.

The Christmas dinner, described so briefly by Colonel Horsey, was indeed an event for the Yankee Division. Because of their long service, and the fact that they were one of the premier fighting divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces, the Twenty-sixth was selected by President Wilson to act as hosts for him at dinner.

It was originally planned that he should eat with the enlisted men only, and preparations were begun days ahead of time. However, because of weather conditions, and the fact that it would be necessary for the Chief Executive to wade through mud, the plan was changed. It was then decided that the presidential party would dine with selected officers only.

The President arrived at Chaumont early in the morning and was greeted by General Pershing. The honor guard from the 102d Infantry was on hand, as was the famous band of the 101st Infantry, said to be the best military band in France.

The official party proceeded to Humes, near Langres, in automobiles, and found troops of a composite division drawn up at attention waiting for the review. The Yankee Division was represented by Company B of the 101st Infantry; Company K of the 102d Infantry; Company F of the 103d Infantry; Company L of the 104th Infantry; a company of the 101st Field Signal Battalion; Company F of the 101st Engineers; and Companies A, B, C and D of the 102d Machine Gun Battalion.



Colonel Robert Goodwin



Underwood & Underwood, New York

Members of 102d Infantry loading Supply Wagons with Food for
Men at Front, France, October 27, 1918



"Fanny," the Kaiser's Goat, 101st Infantry, Company K, Hartford, Conn.

A reviewing stand, draped in red, white and blue bunting, had been erected, and from this the President conducted the review. The troops were drawn up in a hollow square, under command of General Alexander of the Seventy-seventh Division. On every hand were thousands of cheering French villagers, soldiers and officers who were not taking part in the ceremonies.

The President addressed the throng of soldiers before the review began, speaking with extreme brevity. His speech followed a few introductory remarks by General Pershing, who said:—

Mr. President and Fellow Soldiers: We are gathered here to-day to do honor to the commander of our armies and navies. For the first time an American President will review an American Army on foreign soil, — the soil of a sister Republic beside whose gallant troops we have fought to restore peace to the world.

Speaking for you and your comrades, I am proud to declare to the President that no army has ever more loyally or more effectively served its country, and none has ever fought in a nobler cause.

You, Mr. President, by your confidence and by your support, have made the success of our army, and to you, as our Commander-in-Chief, may I now present the nation's victorious army.

# Then the President stepped forward and said: —

General Pershing and Fellow Comrades: I wish that I could give to each one of you the message that I know you are longing to receive from those at home who love you. I cannot do that, but I can tell you how every one has put his heart into it. So you have done your duty, and something more, — you have done your duty, and you have done it with a spirit which gave it distinction and glory.

And now we are to hail the fruits of everything you have conquered since you came over, — what you came over for, — and you have done what it was appointed for you to do. I know what you expected of me. Some time ago a gentleman from one of the countries with which we are associated was discussing with me the moral aspects of this war, and I said that if we did not insist upon the high purpose which we have accomplished the end would not be justified.

Everybody at home is proud of you, and has followed every movement of this great army with confidence and affection. The whole people of the United States are now waiting to welcome you home with an acclaim which probably has never greeted any other army, because our country is like this country. We have been so proud of the stand taken, of the purpose for which this war was entered into by the United States.

You knew what we expected of you and you did it. I know what you and the people at home expected of me, and I am happy to say, my fellow countrymen, that I do not find in the hearts of the great leaders with whom it is my privilege now to co-operate any difference of principle or of fundamental purpose.

It happened that it was the privilege of America to present the chart for peace, and now the process of settlement has been rendered comparatively simple by the fact that all the nations concerned have accepted that chart, and the application of these principles laid down there will be their application.

The world will now know that the nations that fought this war, as well as the soldiers who represented them, are ready to make good, — make good not only in the assertion of their own interests, but make good in the establishment of peace upon the permanent foundation of right and of justice.

Because this is not a war in which the soldiers of the free nations have obeyed masters. You have commanders, but you have no masters. Your very commanders represent you in representing the Nation, of which you constitute so distinguished a part.

And everybody concerned in the settlement knows that it must be a people's peace, and that nothing must be done in the settlement of the issues of the war which is not so handsome as the great achievements of the armies of the United States and the Allies.

It is difficult, very difficult, men, in any normal speech like this, to show you my real heart. You men probably do not realize with what anxious attention and care we have followed every step you have advanced, and how proud we are that every step was in advance and not in retreat; that every time you set your face in any direction you kept your face in that direction.

A thrill has gone through my heart as it has gone through the heart of every American, with almost every gun that was fired and every stroke that was struck in the gallant fighting that you have done, and there has been only one regret in America, and that was the regret that every man there felt that he was not in France too.

It has been a hard thing to perform the tasks in the United States. It has been a hard thing to take part in directing what you did without coming over and helping you to do it. It has taken a lot of moral courage to stay at home. But we are proud to back you up everywhere that it is possible to back you up, and now I am happy to find what splendid names you have made for yourselves among the civilian population of France, as well as among your comrades in the armies of the French, and it is a fine testimony to you men that these people like you and love you and trust you, and the finest part of it all is that you deserve their trust.

I feel a comradeship with you to-day which is delightful. As I look down upon these undisturbed fields and think of the terrible scenes through which you have gone, and realize how the quiet of peace, the tranquillity of settled hopes, has descended upon us, while it is hard to be far from home, I can bid you a Merry Christmas, and I can, I think, confidently promise you a Happy New Year, and I can from the bottom of my heart say, God bless you.

With blaring of bands the review then took place, the long columns swinging by in company front. The men plowed doggedly through the mud, and in a short time had all passed the reviewing stand.

The President and his party then re-entered automobiles and proceeded to Montigny-le-Roi, where the Yankee Division was anxiously awaiting them.

The dinner had been prepared under the direction of Mess Sergeant Herbert A. Hoey, a former Worcester, Mass., restaurant proprietor. He was assisted by Sergeant Paul Dufourd, a Boston restaurateur. The two men had secured chickens, turkeys with dressing, cauliflower and mashed potato, with cranberry sauce and pumpkin pies. It had been a tremendous task to gather together enough turkeys, to say nothing of plates, chairs and tables, but it was done.

The menus were gotten up by the topographical section of the intelligence department of the division, and contained eight pages. On the front page was the famous "Y. D." with mistletoe. On the inside cover was the title page, headed by an American eagle perched upon a shield over which swords were crossed. Under this was printed:—

Memento, Christmas Dinner for President Wilson, by officers of the Twenty-sixth Division, American Expeditionary Forces, Montigny-le-Roi, France, December twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and eighteen. Printed in the field by Headquarters Twenty-sixth Division, American Expeditionary Forces.

This last sentence was at the bottom of the page, and was flanked by two more shields, the whole page being done in colors.

Other pages were bordered with war sketches, while the fourth and sixth contained brief histories of the battles and service of the Twenty-sixth.

The main ambition of the New Englanders at that time was deftly set forth upon the back cover, by the reproduction of a steamship plowing the Atlantic and headed for the United States.

As the Presidential party entered the old school and former hospital in which the dinner was given, the band of the 102d Infantry outside gave ruffles and then played "The Star Spangled Banner."

The party took their seats, and, despite the fact that there was no napery or silverware, the meal was thoroughly enjoyed. There was no speaking. As soon as the dinner was finished the President left, merely waving his hand and shouting "Good-by!" to the thousands of villagers and soldiers clustered outside. He then entered his automobile and drove to some billets occupied by the 103d Infantry, which were on the road to Chaumont. Two or three of these the President inspected, and in one occurred an incident that brought many smiles to the soldiers for some time afterward.

On each man's bunk was laid out his equipment, with each article in a certain place, as prescribed by regulations. Noticing a jointed stick the President called it to the attention of General Pershing. The latter picked up the stick, and straightening it out, explained that it was one of the poles for a "pup" tent, so called, — the little two-man tents which are carried on the march. After examining it the President handed the pole back to General Pershing, who tossed it carelessly on to the bunk. "But," said President Wilson, "suppose that man's bunk is inspected again. He would get into trouble with that pole lying like that. As your commanding officer I order you to replace the pole the way it should be." General Pershing snapped to attention, saluted and replaced the pole in its proper position.

This billet was on the second floor of a French stable, and in order to enter it the President was forced to ascend a ladder. While engaged in this more or less awkward feat he was snapped again and again by moving-picture operators and photographers.

In another billet the President started to relate a story to a squad of men who were standing rigidly at attention. Although the Commander-in-Chief put all his personality into the tale, it apparently had no effect on the soldiers, who continued to stare straight ahead. At last the Chief Executive of the United States stopped talking, considered a moment, and then said: "I don't know what command to give you to make you do it, but I wish you would all relax a minute and look as though you were interested in the story."

Promptly the corporal stepped forward one pace, faced smartly to the left, commanded: "At ease!" and the thing was done.

The visitors then went on their way to Chaumont, while the remainder of the division proceeded to enjoy their own Christmas dinners.

Later a telegram was received from General Pershing by General Hale, which read:—

I desire to congratulate the division on the excellent work of the battalion which represented it as guard of honor at Chaumont; on the fine appearance and discipline manifested by the men during the visit of the President of the United States to the billets of the division; and on the splendid appearance made by the detachments representing the division in the review for the President at Humes, France, December 25, 1918.

It was impossible for all of the officers of the division to attend the Christmas dinner, so only a certain percentage were picked. A list of these follows. It will be

noted that even this brief roster shows a great many changes in officers:—

Major General Harry C. Hale, Commanding General.

Brigadier-General George H. Shelton, commanding Fifty-first Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General Pelham D. Glassford, commanding Fifty-first Field Artillery Brigade.

Brigadier-General Charles H. Cole, commanding Fifty-second Infantry Brigade.

Colonel B. Frank Cheatham, commanding 104th Infantry.

Colonel Percy W. Arnold, commanding 103d Infantry.

Colonel Duncan K. Major, Jr., chief of staff, division headquarters.

Colonel Horace P. Hobbs, commanding 101st Infantry.

Colonel Douglas Potts, commanding 102d Infantry.

Colonel Jacob A. Mack, commanding 102d Field Artillery.

Colonel George W. Bunnell, commanding 101st Engineers.

Colonel Warren E. Sweetser, commanding 101st Head-quarters Train.

Colonel Robert E. Goodwin, commanding 101st Field Artillery.

Colonel J. Alden Twachtman, commanding 103d Field Artillery.

Lieutenant Colonel Cassius M. Dowell, assistant chief of staff, G-3, division headquarters.

Lieutenant Colonel William J. Keville, commanding 101st Ammunition Train.

Lieutenant Colonel Alfred F. Foote, division inspector.

Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Stevens, division adjutant.

Lieutenant Colonel Elon F. Tandy, division quartermaster.

Lieutenant Colonel Harry B. Anderson, division judge advocate.

Lieutenant Colonel William H. Dolan, division ordnance officer.

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Murphy, division machine gun officer.

Lieutenant Colonel Frank S. Perkins, 101st Field Artillery.

Major Amaury du Boisrouvray, French Army.

Major Thomas L. Jenkins, division surgeon.

Major Fred E. Jones, commanding 101st Sanitary Train.

Major William P. Carpenter, commanding 102d Machine Gun Battalion.

Major Felix B. La Crosse, commanding 101st Field Signal Battalion.

Major Thomas F. Foley, 101st Infantry.

Major Edward J. Connelly, 104th Infantry.

Major Henry H. Wheelock, 101st Supply Train.

Major Norman D. McLeod, 103d Field Artillery.

Major Herbert L. Bowen, 103d Machine Gun Battalion.

Major Hamilton R. Horsey, assistant chief of staff, G-2, division headquarters.

Major Albert Greenlaw, assistant chief of staff, G-1, division headquarters.

Major Stanhope Bayne-Jones, division sanitary inspector.

Captain Rawdon W. Myers, 101st Machine Gun Battalion.

Captain Linwood M. Gable, Medical Corps, 104th Infantry.

Captain Roger Williams, 103d Infantry.

Captain Irving E. Doane, 103d Infantry.

Captain John R. Feegal, 102d Infantry.

Captain James Brown, 104th Infantry.

Captain William F. Howe, 102d Field Artillery.

Captain James G. Rivers, 104th Infantry.

Captain Lee H. Cover, 102d Field Artillery.

Captain John Rachek, 104th Infantry.

Captain Robert O. Blood, assistant to division surgeon.

Captain Joseph H. Dunn, Medical Corps, 101st Ambulance Company.

Captain Charles W. Comfort, Medical Corps, 102d Infantry.

Captain James H. Erlenbach, Medical Corps, 103d Infantry.

Captain John Humbird, 102d Machine Gun Battalion.


Captain Harry R. Howe, 101st Engineers.

Captain Thomas G. Holt, 101st Field Artillery.

First Lieutenant John P. King, division headquarters.



Lieutenant-Colonel Frank P. Williams



Boston Committee on its Way to meet the Home-coming Yankee Division



Transport "America" bringing Home Some of "New England's Own"

Chaplain Michael J. O'Connor, division chaplain.

Chaplain Lyman Rollins, 101st Infantry.

Chaplain William J. Farrell, 104th Infantry.

First Lieutenant Ross E. Weaver, Medical Corps, 102d Infantry.

First Lieutenant Harry Christiansen, Medical Corps, 101st Field Hospital.

First Lieutenant Crawford J. Ferguson, 104th Infantry.

Chaplain Thomas G. Speers, 102d Infantry.

First Lieutenant William H. Murphy, 104th Infantry.

#### CHAPTER XXVI

## Animals of the Division

At this point it may be of interest to include a history of the animals of the Twenty-sixth Division, which was compiled by Captain Nicholas Biddle, the remount officer. This history was gotten up and forwarded to General Edwards because of the latter's love of animals, together with the fact that they had served the Yankee Division well and played an important part in its successes. The history, although drawn up in military form, shows a deep understanding and love for animals on the part of Captain Biddle, and also again emphasizes the affection felt by officers and men for the former commanding officer. It follows:—

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION,
AMBRICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
FRANCE. February 14, 1919.

From: Division Remount Officer.

To: Major-General Clarence R. Edwards.

Subject: Report.

The first issue of animals was received by the division during the middle of November when in training in the Neufchâteau area. This issue consisted of some 400 head of French draft stock, mostly horses. When unloaded at Rebeuville many of them were in wretched shape, and a number died from emaciation. A telegram was sent for curry combs and brushes, but it was some time before a supply was received. The animals were later distributed to the various infantry units, but this distribution was delayed, as there were not sufficient wagons or trucks on hand to haul forage for them.

Shortly after this two shipments of good American stock, made up of some 665 mules and 230 horses, arrived at Liffol-le-

Grand from St. Nazaire. These animals were distributed to all organizations, with the exception of the artillery, which at this time was detached from the division.

The artillery brigade in the meantime, at Coetquidon, received from the French remount service numerous issues of animals, so that early in January it had some 3,000 horses and 200 mules. It was while there that the French mange first appeared among the artillery animals. The 1st of February, just previous to the division moving to the Chemin des Dames sector, north of Soissons, there were on hand approximately 280 draft horses, 330 riding horses, and 830 draft mules in the units outside the artillery.

In the latter part of February, when the division was north of Soissons, some 1,000 mules and 700 horses, mostly of American stock, were received from Bordeaux, St. Nazaire and the remount depot at Bourbonne-les-Bains. These animals were distributed to all organizations, including the artillery, which had left Coetquidon early in February. While in this sector nearly all the animals in the division were clipped.

On March 1 a detail from the 101st Ammunition Train was sent down to the remount depot at La Rochelle and drew 500 horses of American stock, part of whom were turned over to the artillery brigade in the rest area at Rimaucourt.

On April 3, when the division moved into the Boucq sector north of Toul, there were several more small issues of French stock. It was at this time that the French mange made its appearance in earnest among the animals. Every effort was made by the division to stamp it out. A dipping vat was established at Sanzey, in charge of the Mobile Veterinary Unit. Practically all animals were dipped at least four times, so that when the division entrained for Château-Thierry scarcely a case of mange remained.

It may be of some interest to relate at this point an incident told by Major Merrillat, later chief veterinarian of the First Army. At the time the division left the Neufchâteau training area, in early February, he was in charge of the veterinary hospital at Neufchâteau. In a certain unit of the division horses

of French stock had been received already badly infected with mange. An officer of the unit was most anxious to remedy conditions, and in order to try to do so he arranged with Major Merrillat to turn in to the hospital at Neufchâteau a number of the worst mange cases and receive in return lighter mange cases, no other animals being available. This incident gives an interesting sidelight on the animal situation in the American Expeditionary Forces at this time.

The 1st of July the division entrained for Château-Thierry. From July 10 to July 25, when the division participated in the great drive that was to decide the war, the horses and mules were called upon to do heart-breaking work. In the artillery brigade and ammunition train, especially, not only were the animals exposed to constant shell fire, but were continuously in harness from twenty-four to thirty-six hours, hauling guns, ammunition and supplies. Many a poor beast died in harness from sheer exhaustion, while others were blown to pieces by shell fire. Forage rations at this time were far below the allowance, and in order to keep the animals going at the front it was necessary to send forward most of the grain that was received. leaving the animals in the rear echelons to subsist on hav and such grazing as was possible. As an illustration of the extreme exhaustion to which the animals had been subjected, 800 animals were evacuated at Nanteuil-sur-Marne between August 13 and 22 by the Division Veterinary Corps. Thirty of them died on the road, over a distance of 8 kilometers. The artillery brigade and ammunition train remained in line in this drive until early August, after other units had been withdrawn.

The story is told by an eye-witness, after this drive, of a poor bedraggled artillery man who was seen literally dragging his exhausted horse behind him. Finally, both could go no farther, and man and beast lay down together on the side of the road, the man's head resting against the body of his faithful animal, both utterly worn out.

At the time of the Château-Thierry drive the division had several issues of French draft stock, including draft stallions. A word about these stallions. Although big and powerful ani-

mals they could not stand up under conditions at the front. They worked hard at first, in fact, too hard, and soon exhausted themselves, and fell off so in flesh and strength that most of them were later evacuated. Doubtless, previous to their purchase for the army, they had lived the well-regulated life of the French farm horse, — short and easy hauls, ample feed and shelter, with little or no hardships. Some of them had evidently been used for breeding purposes, which made them soft and unfit for hard continuous draft work without previous seasoning. The division at this time also received several issues of big fine French mares, beautiful stock, but many of whom later slipped foals prematurely on account of gun fire. Immediately they lost flesh and strength and appeared to shrink away, so that most of them also had to be evacuated.

On August 11, when the division moved to the rest area at Chatillon-sur-Seine, forage was again extremely short, so much so, in fact, that the quartermaster authorized supply officers to purchase grain and hay direct from French civilians. Every opportunity was utilized to graze animals in this area.

From Chatillon the division entrained for Bar-le-Duc, and from there proceeded over the road towards St. Mihiel, where, on September 8 to 12, it prepared and took part in the great American coup which flattened out the salient that had been a thorn in the side of the French for four years. Again the animals were exposed to heavy shell fire, but were not subjected to the tremendous exhaustion that they underwent at Château-Thierry.

After the St. Mihiel push a new lease of life was given the animals of the division, and for about three weeks they enjoyed more rest, comfort and care than they had received for considerable time.

The division was moved September 14 to the Troyon sector, and in the woods on either side of the Grande Tranchée most of the animals were picketed. At first a certain number of horses in the artillery were held up in the forward echelons, but after a number of the horses were severely gassed, and still others lost by shell fire, it was considered advisable to move practically

all of them back to the rear echelons. This was done in spite of the fact that they were a considerable distance to the rear of the gun positions. However, as the sector was a quiet one, it was thought better to move them back where they were far more protected from shell fire, and take the chance of rushing them forward if the gun positions had to be suddenly changed. If this had not been done it is doubtful whether the artillery would have been able to remain mobile, as there were no replacements of animals at this time. The plight of the gassed horses was pitiable. Their skin became rough, they refused to eat, with a consequent falling off in flesh, so that practically all of them were subsequently evacuated.

Previous to this time a motor truck had been converted into an animal ambulance by Captain William C. VanAllstyne, assistant division veterinarian. The ambulance held five animals placed crosswise and separated by partition boards dropped in grooves. By means of a runway which let down behind it could be fully loaded in ten minutes. This truck ambulance did most excellent work transporting gassed, wounded and debilitated animals to the veterinary hospitals many kilometers to the rear.

In spite of all efforts to prevent it, mange at this time again appeared among the animals, especially in the artillery, and this devastating disease appeared set on unhorsing the division.

In the St. Mihiel drive from 70 to 80 horses were abandoned by the Boche and taken over by the division. Several of these were suspected of glanders and destroyed. Most of the remainder were good specimens, and later did excellent work. Unfortunately the exact number of horses captured remained somewhat of a mystery, as organizations were always most modest in reporting them on their returns.

On October 8 the division, less the artillery brigade, moved over the road from the Troyon sector to Verdun, the animals making the distance of some 50 kilometers in excellent fashion. The artillery brigade followed a few days later, having to wait for the Fifty-fifth Artillery Brigade, attached to the Seventyninth Division, to relieve them. This brigade was sadly handi-

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capped by lack of animals, and consequently did not arrive when first expected. In fact, so limited was their animal strength that it was necessary for the horses of the Fifty-first Field Artillery Brigade to pull practically all of their guns into position. These had previously been hauled by motor trucks as far forward as possible.

The artillery brigade came over the road toward Verdun in two night marches in excellent fashion, considering that many of the caissons and guns were drawn by only four horses. The brigade encamped in the Bois Sartelles, 5 kilometers south of Verdun.

On October 18 the division received orders to enter the lines and organize for an attack. Immediately guns were hauled from 15 to 20 kilometers into position, all marches being made by night.

It was at this time that a most stringent order was issued by General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, in view of the serious situation of the artillery and animal transport of the First Army, due to the shortage of animals. It stated that every measure possible to conserve the strength and improve the condition of animals on hand must be taken, and that the continued mobility of the army depended upon the immediate adoption of most radical measures. This order further stated that only prescribed drivers should be permitted to ride on teams or vehicles, and that drivers of machine-gun carts and cannoneers would carry their own packs the same as infantry. In the artillery the drivers would alternate, riding one hour and leading the next, and at all halts drivers would dismount.


The plan of keeping animals in forward echelons was again tried in the Verdun sector, but was met with the severest kind of animal losses from exposure, shell fire and gas. As a result, the greater part of the artillery animals were taken back to the more or less sheltered rear echelons, while the animals of the infantry and other divisional units were stabled in the somewhat demolished but nevertheless sheltered casernes of Verdun. Mules for the rolling kitchens, ration carts, water carts, and a

number of mules for machine guns, had necessarily to be kept up fairly close to the lines, and it was these animals that shared the brunt of shelling and exposure. The plan, however, was adopted to alternate these animals, so that after one had served several days at the front it was brought back to a rear echelon, rested and cared for, while another took its place.


Up behind the lines picketing of animals in small groups of three, four and six was employed as protection from shell fire. There was an instance, however, in a certain machine gun company, where this was not done, and twelve fine mules tied together on one picket line were completely wiped out by a shell landing directly beside them.

A word here, it is believed, should be said about the men who drove the rolling kitchens, ration and water carts up the lines, often along roads with no protection whatsoever, and exposed to heavy shell fire. These so-called "mule skinners" took care of their animals under conditions when it was bad enough to have to look after one's self, yet without the glory of the men in the trenches, although their work was often equally as hazardous and courageous. An instance is brought to mind of one of these men in the 102d Infantry grooming his mules under shell fire who, when raising his head, was found to have a piece of shrapnel lodged in under the skin of his forehead. On being questioned as to why he did not go to a dressing station which was near by and have it removed, he replied, "I ain't had time as yet, but when I'm through grooming this here mule I expect I'll drop over there." "Did the shrappel in his forehead hurt?" "Sure it did."


Once more mange began to run its devastating and disheartening course through the artillery horses. As a preventive measure the manes of all animals in the division were clipped down close to the neck, while tails were clipped to a point 3 inches below the dock. Shortly before this an order had been issued from the army that all horses infected with mange, or animals suspected to be infected, should be evacuated immediately. The situation now became extremely grave. No stone was left unturned in an endeavor to procure animal replace-




S. S. Agamemnon steaming into Boston Harbor, April, 1919



Welcoming Home the 102d Infantry and 101st Machine Gun Battalion, April, 1919



Crowded Transport nosing into Pier, Boston Harbor, April, 1919



Members of Twenty-sixth Division returning on S. S. Agamemnon, April, 1919

ments at this time, but the demand was so far greater than the supply that the task was well-nigh hopeless. The fact that was always brought forward when a desperate appeal was made for animals was that there were twelve or more divisions who were even worse off than the Twenty-sixth, certain artillery brigades not being able to move at all. Consequently what animals were being received at the army depots were being sent to them.

At last, about October 17, a shipment of French stock en route from Bordeaux was switched at St. Dizier to the Twentysixth Division to be unloaded at Baleycourt. This shipment of 144 animals left Bordeaux made up of 96 artillery horses. 32 cavalry horses and 16 mules. One of the horses died en route, and 38 horses and 4 mules were evacuated at the veterinary hospital at Treveray, being in far too poor condition for service at the front. Out of the 101 animals that arrived at Balevcourt, 48 had to be evacuated immediately for debilitation and mange, so that only 44 horses and 9 mules were left to be issued to the division. From this number only 10 of the horses could be considered draft animals, while only 5 of the mules could be considered for heavy draft purposes. The little, light-boned horses and mules, the latter doubtless Spanish, were issued to the machine gun battalions for use in the machine-gun carts. Later the majority of these horses broke down on the march back from the front. The little mules, on the other hand, as usual went through everything, and at the end were still ready for more.

The above shipment is just one illustration of the difficulties of securing animals at this time for a division at the front. In defence of this shipment it must be said that just previous, on account of the desperate animal situation, telegraphic instructions had been issued to all remount depots to send forward all animals that were even in fair condition.

Another order issued from general headquarters at this time stripped all wagon companies attached to depots in the S. O. S. to half strength. As a result of this the division was fortunate to receive 200 draft mules from one of these companies. These

were all excellent animals of American stock, and literally saved the day for the infantry supply companies. Shortly afterwards there was one other shipment from Bordeaux, mostly horses in poor shape, besides one or two small or miscellaneous issues of animals, obtained only after the greatest effort.

The Argonne-Meuse offensive was then at its height. As poorly horsed as the division was, all units were ready to push forward at a moment's notice. In fact, practically all animals and vehicles had been moved forward a short distance on a preliminary order, ready to take the road again at any moment. Events now happened in rapid succession. On November 11 the armistice was signed, and on November 14 instead of going forward in the Army of Occupation, the division was ordered to the rear. For nine full days the division, with the exception of the artillery brigade, moved straight from the trenches over the road to the eighth training area, east of Chaumont. This was the last and longest hike the men and animals had been called upon to undergo. They both came through with flying colors, — certainly a record to be proud of.

The artillery brigade, when it reached the area north of Barle-Duc, was detached from the division and became a part of the army artillery. At the same time all but 400 of their animals were turned over to the divisions that were going forward in the Army of Occupation. The brigade again joined the division in the eighth training area on the 20th of December.

From the last of November to the middle of January the animals were billeted in the various towns of the eighth training area, some sheltered in temporary wooden stables, and others in the stone stables of the French peasants. The constant rain and mud during this period were the most discouraging features in the care of animals. There were also cases of mange that cropped out here and there among the animals, but these were evacuated so that mange generally was kept fairly well in hand.

On December 4, by orders of the Fifth Army Corps, the divi-

sion turned over some 800 draft mules and 200 riding horses to the Twenty-ninth and Eighty-second Divisions in the same corps. These divisions, after the signing of the armistice, had been ordered to turn over the greater part of their animals to divisions going forward in the Army of Occupation, and consequently were in a sadly depleted condition as far as animal transportation was concerned. The Twenty-ninth Division in particular had only some 350 animals at this time.

The last part of December the Fifth Army Corps sent out notice of a horse show to be held at Nogent-en-Bassigny early in February, in which the division was to participate, along with the Twenty-ninth and Eighty-second Divisions. While preliminary plans were being made for entries from the division, orders for its return to the United States were received. As the first units were to leave for the embarkation area January 20, all plans for the participation of the division in the show were abandoned. However, four mules and an escort wagon belonging to Headquarters Troop had already been prepared for the show. They made a splendid turnout, and it is firmly believed would have carried off the blue ribbon. Significant of this is the fact that when the last turnover of animals was made to the Eighty-second Division, a special request was made for this team to be turned over ahead, so that it could be entered by them in the coming horse show. There were other equally excellent teams in nearly every other organization in the division which should have taken a prominent place in the show.

The latter part of January, just previous to organizations entraining, all the remaining animals in the division were turned over to the Twenty-ninth and Eighty-second Divisions, as, with the exception of a few private mounts, no animals were to be taken back to the United States. There were many sad separations at this time. Officers gave over their mounts who had carried them since the division entered the line, while teamsters gave up horses and mules who had borne every hardship with them at the front from Soissons to Toul. Each, doubtless, would never meet again.

If the question were asked: "Who did more for the animals


of the Twenty-sixth Division than any one else?" the unanimous answer would be, "Major-General Clarence R. Edwards." It was not only that he was a true horse lover and possessed a thorough knowledge of animals, but it was the rare faculty that he possessed of making the men take a pride in their animals that did more for them than all the inspectors in the American Expeditionary Forces, and there were many of them. There was not a team that escaped his notice, and it was his quick and hearty words of praise that made the driver feel that, after all, his efforts were worth while. It was he who sat down and wrote off the horse order in the Neufchâteau area when the first animals were received, and which was so excellent and complete that it was later republished by general headquarters as General Orders No. 65, April 30, 1918, to be followed by all officers and men charged with the care of animals in the American Expeditionary Forces. It was also he who gave unlimited backing to the division animal inspector and remount officers who later joined the division, and made their work count for something.

Great credit should be given to Captain John W. Mahoney, who was appointed inspector of animal transportation by General Edwards in April, 1918, when the division was in the Toul sector, as well as to Captain H. Kendrick, who was remount officer with the division at St. Mihiel. Both of these men, through their conscientious and untiring efforts on behalf of the animals, were of great assistance to the division.

The Division Veterinary Corps, although operating often under great difficulties, rendered much valuable service. A great deal of individual credit is due to a number of veterinary officers.

In compiling this brief history of the animals of the division it is the hope of the writer that it will help the faithful beasts, who did so much towards its glorious record, to receive their share of the praise. They are now scattered far and wide, but the memory of many of them, it is believed, will remain forever with officers and men.

To Lieutenant Colonel E. F. Tandy, division quartermaster;



S. S. Agamemnon bringing Home Victorious Members of Yankee Division, April, 1919



Getting Straw for Bed-sacks on Arrival at Camp Devens



General Edwards decorating Lieutenant Paul Hines with the D. S. C. on the Boston Common



Members of Twenty-sixth Division back Home at Camp Devens

Major Albert Greenlaw, assistant chief of staff, G-1; Captain John W. Mahoney, adjutant, 101st Ammunition Train; and Captain William C. Van Allstyne is the writer much indebted for their assistance in the compilation of this history.

NICHOLAS BIDDLE, Captain, Q. M. C., Division Remount Officer.

#### CHAPTER XXVII

#### "Homeward Bound"

On December 30 the division was delighted to receive a message from their former commander, General Edwards. This message appeared in General Orders No. 122, issued by General Hale, which read:—

1. The following cablegram from Major-General Clarence R. Edwards is published to the command:—

Major-General H. C. HALE, Twenty-sixth Division.

Delighted you have the division. My congratulations. Give my love to the stout-hearted lads and tell them to carry on. We are all waiting to welcome you.

EDWARDS.

In the same order General Hale published a commendation from the corps commander of the conduct of the men while on leave. This read:—

- 1. The corps commander desires to express his sincere commendation of the high standards of conduct and soldierly pride manifested by the members of the Twenty-sixth Division during their presence in the Auvergne leave area. Their behavior was such as to attract the favorable notice of the commanding officer of that area, and he was so highly impressed that he has communicated his sentiments in a complimentary letter with reference thereto. The members of this leave detachment reflected credit upon the division, the corps and the American Army, and have established a standard worthy of emulation by all who succeed them.
- 2. It is especially desired to commend Captain William Walker, 102d Infantry, in charge of the leave train, who displayed fine soldierly qualities, marked ability and earnest

loyalty in the performance of all his duties. His leadership in retaining full control of his men under all circumstances is a high tribute to his efficiency.

C. P. SUMMERALL, Major-General, Commanding.

By command of Major General Hale, Cassius M. Dowell, Acting Chief of Staff.

Following the inspection of the division, and the decoration of the battalion of the 102d by General Petain, previously described by Lieutenant-Colonel Horsey, the next event of importance to the New Englanders was the order to move to the Le Mans area of the American embarkation center. This order was received with the greatest joy, as every member of the division, New Englander or otherwise, was anxious to get back home as soon They were wearied of the inaction and as possible. longed for peaceful pursuits. They had come across willingly to do their share in the war, and had done it in a way that brought compliments and decorations from the greatest soldiers in the French Army. Now they wanted to get back to their homes and families and forget, if possible, what they had gone through. The personnel of the division was greatly changed. Of the National Guard officers who went over with the Twentysixth less than a handful remained. The following roster issued to the transportation officers at this time will show how many changes had taken place: -

Roster of Commanding Officers. — Major-General Harry C. Hale, commanding; Captain Paul L. White, A. D. C.; Captain Willis H. Hale, A. D. C.; Captain Lawrence B. Cummings, A. D. C.

Division Staff. — Colonel Duncan K. Major, Jr., chief of staff; Major Albert E. Greenlaw, assistant chief of staff, G-1;

Major Hamilton R. Horsey, assistant chief of staff, G-2; Lieutenant-Colonel Cassius M. Dowell, assistant chief of staff, G-3; Lieutenant-Colonel Charles A. Stevens, adjutant; Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred F. Foote, inspector; Lieutenant-Colonel Elon F. Tandy, quartermaster; Major Thomas L. Jenkins, surgeon; Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Dolan, ordnance officer; Lieutenant-Colonel Harry B. Anderson, judge advocate; Lieutenant-Colonel Charles N. Sawyer, signal officer; Lieutenant-Colonel John D. Murphy, machine gun officer; Colonel George W. Bunnell, engineer; Major Charles W. Lewis, dental surgeon; First Lieutenant Keith P. Ribble, gas officer; Captain William J. Henderson, motor transport officer; First Lieutenant Otto J. Conzelman, acting veterinarian; First Lieutenant Michael J. O'Connor, division chaplain.

Headquarters Troop. — First Lieutenant Thomas J. Byrne, commanding.

101st Machine Gun Battalion. — Major Laurence H. Waters, commanding. First Lieutenant Chester F. Comey, acting adjutant.

Fifty-first Infantry Brigade. — Brigadier-General George H. Shelton, commanding. Major Judson Hannigan, adjutant; First Lieutenant Silas S. Clark, A. D. C.

102d Machine Gun Battalion. — Major William P. Carpenter, D. S., at infantry school; Captain John R. Sanborn, commanding. First Lieutenant Gerald Courtney, adjutant.

101st Infantry. — Colonel Horace P. Hobbs, commanding. Lieutenant-Colonel Henry N. Coleman, Captain Robert J. Hammerslag, adjutant; Major Sidney G. Brown, commanding 1st Battalion; Major Thomas F. Foley, commanding 2d Battalion; Major Harry B. Gilstrap, commanding 3d Battalion; Major William J. McCarthy, unassigned.

102d Infantry. — Colonel Douglas Potts, commanding. Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas M. Hunter; Captain Cyrus C. Washburn, adjutant; Major Clarence M. Thompson, commanding 1st Battalion; Major Harry B. Bissell, commanding 2d Battalion; Major James D. Corbiere, commanding 3d Battalion; Major James F. Johnson, unassigned.

Fifty-second Infantry Brigade. — Brigadier-General Charles H. Cole, commanding. Major Robert H. Barrett, adjutant; First Lieutenant Francis V. Logan, A. D. C.; First Lieutenant John C. Leggat, A. D. C.; First Lieutenant H. G. Lund, A. D. C.

103d Machine Gun Battalion. — Major Herbert L. Bowen, commanding. Captain Earle W. Chandler, acting adjutant.

103d Infantry. — Colonel Percy W. Arnold, commanding. Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Beck; Captain William D. Martin, Jr., adjutant; Major Horace C. Bates, commanding 1st Battalion; Major Sherman M. Shumway, commanding 2d Battalion; Major William E. Southard, commanding 3d Battalion.

104th Infantry. — Colonel B. Frank Cheatham, commanding. Lieutenant Colonel Anton C. Cron; Captain William H. Stiles, adjutant; Major Edward J. Connelly, commanding 1st Battalion; Captain John Rachek, commanding 2d Battalion; Major James H. McDade, commanding 3d Battalion; Major Harry A. Mushan, unassigned.

101st Ammunition Train. — Lieutenant-Colonel William J. Keville, commanding. Captain Oliver Turner, adjutant.

101st Supply Train. — Major Henry H. Wheelock, commanding. Second Lieutenant Francis Wyman, adjutant.

101st Engineer Train. — First Lieutenant Schuyler R. Waller, commanding.

101st Sanitary Train. — Major Fred E. Jones, commanding. Major Owen H. Kenan, commanding field hospital section; Captain Herbert W. Taylor, commanding ambulance section.

Fifty-first Field Artillery Brigade. — Brigadier-General Pelham D. Glassford, commanding. Major Wayland M. Minot, adjutant; First Lieutenant Livingston Whitney, A. D. C.

101st Field Artillery. — Colonel Robert E. Goodwin, commanding. Lieutenant-Colonel Frank S. Perkins; Captain Benjamin H. Ticknor, adjutant; Major Erland F. Fish, commanding 1st Battalion; Major Ivar Hendricksen, commanding 2d Battalion.

102d Field Artillery. — Colonel Jacob A. Mack, commanding. Lieutenant-Colonel John F. J. Herbert; Captain Ray

Harrison, adjutant; Captain Lawrence B. Page, commanding 1st Battalion; Captain Roger C. Swaim, commanding 2d Battalion.

103d Field Artillery. — Colonel J. Alden Twachtman, commanding. Lieutenant-Colonel Eugene T. Spencer; Captain Stuart L. Bullivant, acting adjutant; Major Norman D. McLeod, commanding 1st Battalion; Major Harold R. Barker, commanding 2d Battalion; Major Stanley Bacon, commanding 3d Battalion.

101st Trench Mortar Battery (Detached). — Captain James A. Walsh, commanding.

101st Engineers. — Colonel George W. Bunnell, commanding. Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Bartlett; Captain Herbert C. Thomas, adjutant; Major Porter B. Chase, commanding 1st Battalion; Captain George E. Parsons, commanding 2d Battalion; Major John F. Osborn, unassigned (D. S. at Paris).

101st Field Battalion Signal Corps. — Captain Russell Hobbs, commanding. First Lieutenant Archie G. McPherson, adjutant.

101st Train Headquarters. — Colonel Warren E. Sweetser, commanding. Captain Charles E. Akeley, adjutant.

26th Military Police Company. — Captain Michael J. Dee, commanding.

101st Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop. — First Lieutenant James W. Armour, commanding.

Mobile Repair Shop No. 1. — Second Lieutenant Harry C. Davis, commanding.

Machine-shop Truck Unit No. 362. — First Lieutenant John C. Aikens, commanding.

Machine-shop Truck Unit No. 377. — First Lieutenant Clint O. Perrins, commanding.

Clothing Squad No. 11. — Second Lieutenant William E. Coffee, commanding.

Salvage Squad No. 20. — Second Lieutenant Harding E. Sponsellor, commanding.

Sales Commissary No. 10. — Second Lieutenant Sidney S. McKinley, commanding.

U. S. A. P. O. No. 709. — First Lieutenant Alexander Macdonald, commanding.

The entire division had arrived in the Le Mans area on February 4, and division headquarters was established at Écommoy (Sarthe).

It was on February 2 that General Pershing cabled to Director-General John Barrett of the Pan-American Union:—

Replying to your cablegram it gives me pleasure to send you a message about Vermont and New England troops. Briefly stated, they merit the warmest praise by the people they represent. They have maintained the best traditions of their New England ancestors, and the spirit of '76 has been theirs. They have played their full part in the splendid achievement of American arms on the battlefield and in the supporting services.

On the same date Secretary of War Baker wrote to Mr. Barrett complimenting the Twenty-sixth Division. In the course of his remarks he said:—

With the first and second Regular Army divisions, and the Forty-second or Rainbow Division, the Twenty-sixth is numbered, they being considered the first four veteran divisions of our great American Expeditionary Forces, and I would be glad to have the people of New England know that their division, the first of the National Guard troops to embark overseas, bore itself with distinction and gallantry, and that it contributed on every battlefield to America's real participation in the fighting and the unbroken success of our arms.

Things seemed to be coming the way of the division at this time, for on February 11 Colonels Logan and Hume, who had been relieved of their commands, were reinstated. The regiments of both officers turned out to

meet them, after the colonels had reported to General Hale. Never was there such a greeting. Marching at the head of their outfits the two colonels paraded to their billets, where each was greeted by his staff. Both officers found many strange faces.

Colonel Logan, who had been acting as counsel for other officers at Blois, had presented his case to General Pershing, and demanded a hearing. He was informed that the officers he intended to summon as witnesses could not be procured, whereupon he incorporated in his brief summaries of what they would say. A hearing was never granted to either Colonel Logan or Colonel Hume, but both were simply ordered reinstated.

The last act of Colonel Logan at Blois was to win the case of Major Allie Gray, also of the Yankee Division, who was removed for discussing orders. He was also ordered back to the division.

On February 19 the division was reviewed by General Pershing, who pronounced it as one of the finest which he had ever seen, and the equal of any in the American Expeditionary Forces. The truck drivers worked for two days getting the troops up to the reviewing field, some of them being carried 20 miles. General Hale was so pleased with this accomplishment that he wrote the following letter to Colonel Warren E. Sweetser:—

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION, FRANCE, February, 1919.

Colonel WARREN E. SWEETSER, Commanding Train Headquarters and Military Police, Écommoy, France.

The successful review of this division on February 19 by the Commander-in-Chief was made possible only by the extremely efficient co-operation of the personnel of the divisional trains in conveying a large part of the division to and from the review ground.

I am aware of the serious obstacles that beset the truck drivers in carrying out their work in this connection, and have learned with gratification of their loyal, untiring and effective efforts in surmounting these obstacles. It is at times like these, when such unusual, unselfish and arduous work is demanded to insure success, that the mettle of the soldier is tried, and in this case the prompt and loyal response to the demand shows that the test was met in every instance.

I take this occasion, also, to congratulate you and the officers and men belonging to the trains of this division upon their expert skill in so long maintaining the trains in a serviceable condition, and upon their labor and care in keeping them in a clean condition. And their discipline and efficiency in those respects are equaled by their careful observance of road regulations.

I congratulate and thank you all.

HARRY C. HALE,
Major-General,
United States Army, commanding.

General Pershing made an extremely thorough review, after which he was entertained at a division show. His opinion of the entire affair was expressed in an order issued by Major-General Hale two days later, which read:—

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION,
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
FRANCE, February 21, 1919.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 15.

- 1. The division commander congratulates the officers and men of this command upon the splendid example of soldierly appearance and efficiency presented by the division at the review by the Commander-in-Chief on the 19th instant.
- 2. The magnificent spectacle of the entire division massed as a unit; the remarkably alert, cleancut and healthy appearance of the men; the uniformity and neatness of the equipment;

the inspiring effect of the massed band; and finally the evidence of training manifested in the thrilling march past, — all were noted and repeatedly praised in warm terms by the Commander-in-Chief, who desired that his satisfaction and admiration be communicated to the command.

3. The division commander desires that this order be read to the command at the first formation after its receipt.

By command of Major-General Hale.

Duncan K. Major, Jr., Chief of Staff.

The attention of the members of the division, which flagged somewhat after the review, was spurred by the military and athletic tournament. After this was over, however, every one once more devoted his thoughts to home.

At last, toward the latter part of March, definite word came down that the division would begin to embark by the 1st of April. Great was the rejoicing. The day of days was at hand.

In the meantime Brigadier-General John H. Sherburne, who had been commanding a colored brigade, was returned to the 51st Field Artillery. A number of other former Twenty-sixth officers, including Colonel Thorn-dike Howe, who had been divisional postmaster, were also returned to the line.

The 101st Trench Mortar Battery, commanded by Captain James A. Walsh of No. 12 Mayfair street, Roxbury, was the first complete unit to get away. As a matter of fact, because they had turned in all their equipment early, they had been able to sail from St. Nazaire on March 30. This outfit, which was largely made up of the old 1st Maine Heavy Artillery, reached Hoboken, N. J., on April 12. The 3 officers and 184 men were immediately sent to Camp Merritt for a few days, and then were

shipped to Camp Devens, where they were demobilized. They immediately hurried to their homes for a while, pending the tremendous welcome which they were informed was being prepared for the division.

On April 4, the big transport "Mount Vernon," formerly a German liner, steamed proudly up Boston Harbor, bearing 5.824 men of the Yankee Division, the vanguard of the famous New England organization. Never was there such a welcome as was given these home-coming men. Official welcoming committee of the State and city, headed by Governor Coolidge and Mayor Peters, met the "Mount Vernon" at quarantine, while other officials, with friends and relatives of the returned heroes, almost swamped a flotilla of small craft. The soldiers were bombarded with cigarettes, candies and all kinds of goodies. while frenzied shouts of greeting and the tearful cries of mothers were drowned out by a perfect din of whistles from every boat in the harbor and factories on shore. It was an indescribable scene and one never to be forgotten. New England was welcoming her own, returned with glory from a righteous war. Castle Island, Commonwealth Pier and all the piers along the waterfront were black with hysterical humanity. For many, however, it was a sad occasion, for their loved ones slept under the sod in France.

The "Mount Vernon" carried Major-General Hale with his staff and division headquarters, Headquarters Troop, Military Police, Headquarters Fifty-second Infantry Brigade, 101st Engineers (less Company C), 104th Infantry and 101st Engineer Train. One of the first to meet them and seize the hand of General Hale and his officers was Brigadier-General Cole, who had been sent over in advance of the division to help in the arrangements for its reception.

The first cry of the men, when the press boat neared the side of the big transport, was, "Where is General Edwards?" As it happened the General, believing that the ship would not arrive so soon, was on a speaking tour in Maine. Immediately, upon learning of the arrival of the "Mount Vernon," he canceled his engagements and hurried to Boston. He boarded the ship at 6 the next morning and was warmly greeted.

The next day, April 5, with General Cole, he was on hand when the steamer "America," carrying Brigadier-General Shelton, Colonels Logan and Hume, and the Headquarters Fifty-first Infantry Brigade, 101st Infantry; 103d Infantry (less Companies L and M), and Company C, 101st Engineers.

The previous day's welcome was outdone, if that were possible, as Colonel Logan is a son of Boston and the commander of what was practically a Boston regiment. His parents, General and Mrs. Lawrence J. Logan, his brother Theodore, relatives and friends, including delegations from many associations, were on hand to greet him.

The boats from then on came into Boston in almost daily intervals. On Monday, April 7, the "Agamemnon" arrived, with the 102d Infantry complete, Companies L and M of the 103d Infantry; 101st Machine Gun Battalion; field and staff officers of the 101st Field Artillery; Headquarters Company, 101st Field Artillery; A and B Batteries, 101st Field Artillery; casual companies for New York and Ohio, and 213 casual officers.

A coincidence was the presence on board of Major-General Clement A. F. Flagler, commanding the Forty-second (Rainbow) Division, whose transports were secured by the Twenty-sixth in September, 1917, thus permitting the local troops to reach France first.

The remainder of the boats came in on alternate days, until finally, on April 21, the battleship "New Jersey" brought in the last units of the Twenty-sixth Division.

For the only time in its life Boston went crazy on April 25, when the reception and parade to the Twenty-sixth Division took place. Seats were at a premium, and men and women fought for places along the curb. Millions of people were in Boston at this time to see the parade of the Yankee Division, and a fitting reception was given to the men from New England who had made the world safe for democracy.

Two days after the parade the Division was mustered out, and so ended the fighting New England organization.

# **APPENDIX**

# APPENDIX

# Roster of Officers, Twenty-sixth Division, as Originally Organized

Abbott, Frank J., . 1st Lieut. (Bat. D), 103d F. A. Adams, Burton A., 1st Lieut. (Co. G), 104th Inf. Adams, Frederick J., Major, N. G. M. C. (comdg. San. Det.), 101st F. A. Adams, Lee. 2d Lieut., Inf., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. . 2d Lieut., O. R. C. (Co. D), 101st Mach. Gun Agnew. John A., Bn. . 1st Lieut. (Hdqrs. Train, Mil. Police). Akeley, Charles E., Alcorn, William F., . Major (comdg. 2d Bn.), 102d Inf. Alexander, Wilford S., Captain (comdg. Co. I), 103d Inf. Alfonte, William A., . Major (Div. Sig. Officer), 26th Div. Allen, Bernard H., . . 1st Lieut. (Dental Corps), 102d Inf. Allen, Franklin E., Captain, 103d F. A. Allen, Lew. . 2d Lieut., Inf., N. A., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6. p. 5, 26th Div. Allport, Floyd H., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d F. A., S. O. 6, p. 2, 26th Div. . 2d Lieut., Inf., O. R. C. (Co. D), 101st Mach. Ames, Charles E., . Gun Bn. 2d Lieut., Inf., O. R. C. (Co. B), 101st Mach. Amory, Harold, Gun Bn. . Captain (comdg. Co. E), 104th Inf. Anderson, Robert H., Andrews, Albert E., . Captain (comdg. Co. K), 103d Inf. Angell, Isaac H., . 1st Lieut. (Bat. C), 101st F. A. Appleton, Donald, . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st F. A., S. O. 6, p. 6, 26th Div. Apthorp, Robert E., . 2d Lieut., F. A., N. A., assigned 102d F. A., S. O. 6, p. 2, 26th Div. Arnold, Davis G., . Captain (R. I. Cav.), comdg. Sup. Train. Arnold, Howard C., 2d Lieut. (Co. A), 103d Mach. Gun Bn. Ashby, Bertrand W., . 1st Lieut. (Hdqrs. Troop), 26th Div. Ashley, J. M., . Major (Amm. Train, comdg. Horse Sec.). Ashworth, Arthur, . Captain (comdg. Mach. Gun Co.), 103d Inf. Atherton, Raymond M., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Mach. Gun Bn., S. O. 6, p. 10, 26th Div.

2d Lieut. (Bat. F), 103d F. A. Auer, Fred. Averill, Ernest L., . 1st Lieut. (comdg. Sup. Co.), 103d F. A. Avery, William J., . . 1st Lieut. (8th Mass.), Adjutant and Sup. Officer, Sup. Train. . Captain (comdg. Bat. C), 103d F. A. Babcock, Donald S., . 1st Lieut. (Bat. A), 103d F. A. Babcock, Harold P., Backarack, Sydney, . 2d Lieut., O. R. C. (Co. A), 101st Mach. Gun Bn. Badger, Phillip B., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. Bailey, Carl R., . 1st Lieut. (Co. A), 103d Inf. Bailey, Harry M., . . 2d Lieut. (Hdgrs. Co.), 102d Inf. Bailey, Karl R., . . Captain, N. G. M. C. (Asst. Surgeon), S. O., Hdqrs. 26th Div. . 1st Lieut., 101st Eng. Bailey, Thomas W., . 1st Lieut. (San. Troops, Dental Corps), 101st Baker, Douglas M., F. A. Baker, Norman D., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Mach. Gun Bn., S. O. 6, p. 6, 26th Div. . 2d Lieut. (Mass. Cav.) (Hdqrs. Troop). Baker, Theodore C., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st F. A., S. O. 6, Balch, C. B., . p. 6, 26th Div. Baldwin, Dwight D., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st F. A., Baldwin, Robert, . S. O. 6, p. 6, 26th Div. Ballou, Lande E., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 4, 26th Div. Barker, Harold R., . Captain (comdg. Bat. A), 103d F. A. Barnard, Charles T., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. . Captain (comdg. Co. F), 102d Inf. Barnes, Raymond B., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6, Barnett, William B., p. 5, 26th Div. Barr, William H., . . 1st Lieut. (Co. L), 104th Inf. Barrow, William H., . 1st Lieut., M. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 1st F. H. Barrows, Walter G., . 1st Lieut. (5th Mass.), trans., S. O. 3, p. 13, 26th Div. Barry, John J., . Major (comdg. 1st Bn.), 101st Inf. Bartlett, A. L., . Captain, 101st Eng. Bateman, Charles J., . 1st Lieut., 101st Eng. Beacham, Joseph W., Jr., . Lieut. Col., Inf., N. A. (Quartermaster). . 1st Lieut. (Co. A), 101st Eng. Beard, Cornelius, . Beaucer, Fred W., . . 1st Lieut. (Co. G), 102d Inf. . Major (comdg. 2d Bn.), 104th Inf. Beckman, Albert, . Major (comdg. 2d Bn.), 102d Inf.
1st Lieut. (Sup. Co.), 102d Inf. Beebe, Henry A., . Beers, Arthur C. T., Belcher, Alfred, . 1st Lieut. (Co. H), 104th Inf.

Bell, Edward C.,		2d Lieut. (Co. H), 102d Inf.
Benner, Fred W.,		2d Lieut. (Mach. Gun Bn.), 103d Inf.
Bennett, Charles A., .	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C. (Co. B), 101st Mach. Gun Bn.
Bennett, Roger W.,	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div.
Bernheimer, Clarence M.	., .	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6, p. 5, 26th Div.
Bernheisel, George H., .	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d F. A., S. O. 6, p. 2, 26th Div.
Berry, Bernard M., .		1st Lieut. (Co. F), 104th Inf.
Bertholet, George P., .	•	1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Amb. Co. No. 4), R. I. Amb. Corps.
Bevans, James F.,		Lieut. Col., Med. Dept. (Div. Surgeon).
Binghon, Charles,	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div.
Bird, Edward S.,		2d Lieut. (Co. A), 104th Inf.
Bisbee, Spaulding,		Captain (comdg. Co. B), 103d Inf.
Bishop, Ralph L.,		2d Lieut. (Co. F), 102d Inf.
Bishop, Wilton H., .		2d Lieut. (Co. B), 102d Inf.
Bissell, Clarence E., .		2d Lieut., N. A. Inf., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6,
		p. 5, 26th Div.
Bissell, Harry B.,		Captain (comdg. Co. G), 102d Inf.
Bissell, Herbert G., .		2d Lieut., Inf., N. A., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6,
	-	p. 4, 26th Div.
Blackman, Floyd H., .		2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6,
,,,,		p. 4, 26th Div.
Blair, Frederick G., .		1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (comdg. Amb. Co. No.
		4), R. I. Amb. Corps.
Blaisdell, Frank G., .		2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6,
	•	p. 5, 26th Div.
Blanchard, Hugh C., .		1st Lieut. (Co. B), 104th Inf.
Blease, Ernest,	_	1st Lieut. (Co. E), 104th Inf.
Bliss, Henry M.,		2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6,
		p. 4, 26th Div.
Blood, Robert O.,		1st Lieut., N. H. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 4th F. H.
Bobst, Frank T.,		2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6,
	-	p. 3, 26th Div.
Bogan, Frederick L., .	•	Major (comdg. Att. San. Troops), 101st Regt. Inf.
Boldt, Herman St. J., .		2d Lieut. (Co. I), 102d Inf.
Bonney, Timothy D., .	•	1st Lieut. (Co. H), 103d Inf.
Bowen, Charles W., Jr.,	:	1st Lieut. (Bat. B), 103d F. A.
Bowen, Herbert L.	•	2d Lieut. (Mach. Gun Bn.), 103d Inf.
Boyd, Walter E.,	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6,
	•	p. 3, 26th Div.
Boynton, William,	_	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6,
,,	•	p. 4, 26th Div.
Brassil, Thomas E		1st Lieut. (8th Mass.) (Hdgrs. Co.), 104th Inf.

Brearley, Harris J.,	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Mach. Gun Bn., S. O. 6, p. 10, 26th Div.
Breen, Vincent C.,	2d Lieut. (Co. D), 101st Inf.
Breslin, Robert H.,	1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Amb. Co. No. 4), R. I.
	Amb. Corps.
Brewer, Arnold,	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6,
	p. 1, 26th Div.
Brickley, T. J.,	2d Lieut. (Horse Sec.), Amm. Train.
Brigham, Arthur W.,	2d Lieut. (Co. E), 102d Inf.
Brigham, William W., Jr., .	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6,
	p. 5, 26th Div.
Bright, Horace D.,	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6,
	p. 3, 26th Div.
Brooks, John E.,	1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 103d Inf.
Brown, Arthur G.,	1st Lieut. (Co. H), 104th Inf.
Brown, Chester P.,	1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 1st F. H.
Brown, E. Lawrence,	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6,
	p. 2, 26th Div.
Brown, James,	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6,
	p. 5, 26th Div.
Brown, Joseph R.,	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6,
	p. 3, 26th Div.
Brown, Ray F.,	1st Lieut., N. H. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 2d F. H.
Brown, Thomas W.,	2d Lieut. (Co. G), 102d Inf.
Bruce, John S.,	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6,
	p. 3, 26th Div.
Brush, Edwin M.,	Captain (comdg. Co. E), 101st Eng.
Brushy, Willard E.,	1st Lieut. (Co. K), 102d Inf.
Bryant, Myron E.,	1st Lieut., N. G. D. C., Att. 101st F. A., wait-
	ing assignment.
Buckminster, William R., .	2d Lieut. (5th Mass.), trans. 101st Inf., S. O. 3,
	p. 13, 26th Div.
Buehler, Arthur G.,	1st Lieut., N. G. D. C. (San. Troops), 102d F. A.
Buehler, Harold A.,	1st Lieut., N. G. D. C. (San. Troops), 102d F. A.
Bulkeley, Morgan E., Jr., .	Captain (comdg. Co. B), 101st Mach. Gun Bn.
Bullivant, Stuart L.,	1st Lieut. (Bat. F), 103d F. A.
Burbanck, Frank J.,	2d Lieut. (Co. C), 103d Inf.
Burdick, Harry R.,	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Mach. Gun
	Bn., S. O. 6, p. 10, 26th Div.
Burger, Ernest R.,	Captain (comdg. Mach. Gun Co.), 104th Inf.
Burke, Daniel H., Jr.,	1st Lieut., N. H. M. C. (San. Troops), 101st Inf.
Burke, George E.,	1st Lieut. (Bat. E), 101st F. A.
Burnap, Arthur E.,	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6,
	p. 4, 26th Div.
Burnell, George W.,	Colonel (comdg. Regt.), 101st Eng.
Burnette, William H.,	1st Lieut. (Co. H), 103d Inf.
Burns, Clifford S. F.,	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Mach. Gun
	Bn., S. O. 6, p. 10, 26th Div.
Burr, Eugene F.,	Captain (comdg. Co. H), 104th Inf.
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Burton, A. W., Captain (comdg. Motor Sec.), Amm. Train. Buxton, Bertram H., . 1st Lieut. (comdg. San. Det.), 103d Mach. Gun Bn. Byrd, Benjamin C., . 2d Lieut. (Co. D), 102d Inf. Cabot, Charles H., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, . p. 4, 26th Div. Cady. Francis L. . . 1st Lieut. (Co. E), 104th Inf. Cahoon, Harry E., . . 2d Lieut. (Bat. E) (absent, sick), 101st F. A. Call. Edwin C.. . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 4, 26th Div. Campbell, Harry B., . Major (8th Mass.), trans. 104th Inf., S. O. 19. Cannon, Charles J., . 1st Lieut. (in hospital, struck by lightning), 101st Inf. Cannon, George B., . 1st Lieut. (Co. B), 102d Inf. . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6. Cannon, Peter L., . p. 3, 26th Div. . Lieut. (Asst. Topog. Officer), S. O. 91, N. E. D., Capelle, George C., 101st Eng. Carlson, Francis O. P., . . 2d Lieut. (Act. Sup. Officer), 102d Mach. Gun Bn. . 1st Lieut. (Co. M), 103d Inf. Carpenter, Hector J., . Carr, Andrew J., . . Captain (5th Mass.), trans. 101st Inf., S. O. 3, p. 13, 26th Div. . 1st Lieut. (Co. G), 103d Inf. Carroll, Edward E., Carroll, John C., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Mach. Gun Bn. Carter, Bernard S., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6. p. 4, 26th Div. Carter, Elliot A., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6. p. 4, 26th Div. Carter, George M., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6. p. 4, 26th Div. Cary, Melbert B., Jr., . . 1st Lieut. (comdg. Bat. F), 103d F. A. . Captain (comdg. Co. A), 103d Mach. Gun Bn. Case, Norman S., . Casey, William J., . . Major (comdg. 2d Bn.), 101st Inf. Cashin, Arthur H., . 2d Lieut. (Eng. Train), 26th Div. . Major, N. A. (Asst. Adjutant). Cass, Lewis W., Cavanaugh, Frank W., . . 2d Lieut. (Bat. B), 102d F. A. Chaffee, Everitte S., . . Captain, R. I. F. A. (Regt. Adjutant), 103d F. A. Chamberlain, Rodman W., . 2d Lieut. (Co. E), 102d Inf. Chambers, Marten, . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 3, 26th Div. Chandler, E. W., . . 1st Lieut. (Bn. Adjutant), 103d Mach. Gun Bn. Chandler, Theophilus P., . 2d Lieut. (Bat. C), 101st F. A. Chase, Errol C., . . . 2d Lieut. (Sup. Co.), 103d Inf. Chase, Harry G., . . . Major (comdg. Bn.), 101st Bn. Sig. Corps. Chase, Porter B., . . Major (comdg. 2d Bn.), 101st Eng.

Cheney, George W., . 1st Lieut. (Conn. Cav.) (Co. C), 101st Mach. Gun Bn. Chisolm, William F., . 2d Lieut. (Co. E), 101st Eng. Choate, Roland H., . Captain (Regt. S. O.), 102d F. A. Choquette, Wallace A., . 1st Lieut. (Co. D), 104th Inf. Christian, Daniel E., . . Captain (comdg. Co. M), 101st Inf. Christie. Daniel F.. . 1st Lieut. (Co. F), 103d Inf. . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st F. A., S. O. 6, Clapp. R. A., Jr., p. 6, 26th Div. Clark, Fletcher, Jr., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 4, 26th Div. . 2d Lieut. (Bat. F), 103d Inf. Clark. Philip G.. . Clarke, James F., . . 1st Lieut. (Bat. A), 101st F. A. Clifford, Charles C., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st F. A., S. O. 6, p>6, 26th Div. . Captain (comdg. Co. E), 104th Inf. Clogher, Ambrose, . Clunie, John T., Jr., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 4, 26th Div. Coar, Herbert C., . . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 4, 26th Div. Cobb, William L., . . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. . 1st Lieut. (Train Hdqrs. and Mil. Police). Coburn, James F., . Cochrane, James E., . Chaplain, 103d Inf. . . 1st Lieut. (Co. C), 103d Inf. Cochrane, Jerry, . Cohn, Ralph, . . . 1st Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. Colbran, Paul T., . . . 2d Lieut., N. A., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6, p. 5, 26th Div. Cole. Charles H., . . Brig. Gen. (comdg. 52d Brig.). Cole, George C., . . . Major, Q. M. C. (Asst. Quartermaster). . 2d Lieut. (Co. D), 101st Eng. Cole, Harry, . Coleman, Augustus P., . . . 1st Lieut. (5th Mass.), trans. 101st Inf., S. O. 3, p. 13, 26th Div. . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6, Colley, Dwight T., . . p. 5, 26th Div. . 1st Lieut. (Co. E), 101st Eng. Collins, George H., Comerais, Henry D., . Captain (5th Mass.), trans. 101st Inf., S. O. 3, p. 13, 26th Div. Comerford, John T., . 1st Lieut. (Mach. Gun. Co.), 101st Inf. Comey, Chester F., . 2d Lieut. (Conn. Cav.) (Co. B), 101st Mach. Gun Bn. . 1st Lieut. (Conn. Cav.) (Co. A), 101st Mach. Condren, George D., . Gun Bn. Connelly, Gregory L., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 3, 26th Div. . Captain (Co. K), 101st Inf. Connelly, Peter F., . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 102d F. A. Connor, Harold J., . Captain (comdg. Sup. Co.), 102d Inf. Connor, Michael A.,

Cook, Sydney A.,	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assign p. 4, 26th Div.	ned 103d Inf., S. O. 6,
Corbett, Edward F., .	2d Lieut. (Co. C), 101st I	nf.
Corbin, George A., .	1st Lieut. (Co. G), 101st	Inf.
Corey, R. T.,	Captain (comdg. Horse Se	e.), Amm. Train.
Corkurn, A. D.,	2d Lieut. (Co. A), 104th I	nf.
Coughlin, Wallace E., .	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assign p. 1, 26th Div.	ed 101st Inf., S. O. 6,
Coulter, Andrew F., .	1st Lieut. (Co. E), 103d I	
Courtney, Gerald,	2d Lieut., O. R. C. (Co. Bn.	C), 101st Mach. Gun
Cousins, John W.,	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assign p. 1, 26th Div.	ed 101st Inf., S. O. 6,
Cox, James H.,	2d Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Troop.	Veterinarian), Hdqrs.
Crafts, Addison F., .	Captain (comdg. Co. A),	
Craig, George L.,	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assign p. 3, 26th Div.	ned 102d Inf., S. O. 6,
Cramer, John S.,	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assign p. 1, 26th Div.	ied 101st Inf., S. O. 6,
Crampton, Earl W., .	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assign p. 5, 26th Div.	ed 104th Inf., S. O. 6,
Crawford, Douglas C., .	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assign p. 5, 26th Div.	ed 104th Inf., S. O. 6,
Crockett, Elbert M., .	2d Lieut. (comdg. 4th Co.	), Sup. Train.
Cronin, George J.,	Captain (comdg. Co. D),	101st Inf.
Crook, Roland D.,	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assign p. 4, 26th Div.	ned 103d Inf., S. O. 6,
Cross, George I.,	Captain (comdg. Co. F),	
Crossman, Charles T., .	1st Lieut. (5th Mass.), tra p. 13, 26th Div.	ns. 101st Inf., S. O. 3,
Crowley, Edward W., .	2d Lieut. (Bat. B), 102d I	₹ <b>. A.</b>
Cummings, Frank B., .	Lieut. Col., 103d Inf.	
Cunningham, Edward, .	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assign p. 5, 26th Div.	ed 104th Inf., S. O. 6,
Cunningham, Ralph D.,	1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. Troops), 103d F. A.	, Dental Corps (San.
Curran, Arthur M., .	1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (8e	in. Troops), 104th Inf.
Cushing, Henry Dwight,	Major (Instructor), 103d	Mach. Gun Bn.
Cushing, H. S.,	Captain (comdg. Motor S	ec.), Amm. Train.
Cutchin, Joseph H., .	1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Co.	Jr. M. O.), 2d Amb.
Cutler, David S.,	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assign p. 4, 26th Div.	ed 103d Inf., S. O. 6,
Dabney, George B.,	Captain (Adjutant, 1st Br	a.). 101st Eng.
Daley, J. T.,	2d Lieut. (Detached Servi	
Daly, Thomas V.,	1st Lieut., N. G. M. C.	
	4th Amb. Co.	

Dame, Ralph L., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 3. 26th Div. Dana, William B., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d F. A., S. O. 6, p. 2, 26th Div. Daniels, Roy A.. . Captain (comdg. Bat. C), 102d F. A. . Captain (Chaplain), 104th Inf. Danker, Walter S., Davis, Charles E., . . 1st Lieut. (Co. I), 103d Inf. Davis, Frank W., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 3, 26th Div. Davis, Frederick K., . 2d Lieut. (Co. I), 102d Inf. Davis, George F., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. Davis, Joseph C., . . 1st Lieut. (Bat. A), 101st F. A. Davison, Harold K., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. Day, George T., . . 2d Lieut. (6th Co.), Sup. Train. Day, Wallace A., . . 2d Lieut. (Mach. Gun Co.), 104th Inf. Dean, Thompson, . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d F. A., S. O. 6, p. 2, 26th Div. Decker, Ray E., . . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1. 26th Div. Dee, Michael J., . Captain (Hdqrs. Train, Mil. Police). Demelman, Walter W., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. . 1st Lieut. (Co. K), 101st Inf. Densmore, Edgar R., Desmond, Arthur W., . . 1st Lieut. (2d Bn. Adjutant), 101st Inf. Dewart, Murray W., . . Chaplain, 101st F. A. . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6, Dexter, Allan L., . p. 5, 26th Div. . 2d Lieut. (Co. B), 101st Eng. Dickson, Robert B., Dinsmore, D. S., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st F. A., S. O. 6, p. 6, 26th Div. Doane, Harry L., . . Major (comdg. 1st Bn.), 104th Inf. Doane, Erwin E., . . 1st Lieut. (Co. L), 103d Inf. Doherty, James A., . 1st Lieut., 103d F. A. Doherty, Walter G., . 1st Lieut., Dental Corps (San. Troops), 101st Inf. . Major (Train Hdqrs., Mil. Police). Dolan, William H., Donahue, Louis A., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. Donavan, Frank L., . Major (comdg. 3d Bn.), 101st Inf. Donavan, John J., . . 2d Lieut. (Sup. Train). . 2d Lieut. (Veterinarian), 101st F. A. Dowd, Eugene, . Lieut. Col., N. A. (Div. Judge Adv.), 26th Div. Dowell, C., . Drake, Frank E., . . Captain (comdg. Hdqrs. Co.), 103d Inf. . 2d Lieut. (Bat. E), 103d F. A. Driscoll, Joseph H., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, Driver, Robert M., p. 1. 26th Div. Drohan, William L., . . 2d Lieut. (Sup. Co.), 101st Inf.

Drown, Henry C., . 2d Lieut. (Co. F), 101st Eng. Drury, Forrest H., . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), F. H. No. 4. Dudley, Oscar C., . . Captain, N. G. M. C. (comdg. 2d Amb. Co.). Dume, Ralph L., . . 2d Lieut. (Co. D), 102d Inf. Dunbar, Donald E., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. Dunn. Charles E... . 1st Lieut. (Co. M). 104th Inf. Dunn. John A.. . Captain (Co. H), 101st Inf. Dunn, John H., . Lieut. Col., 101st Inf. Dunn, Leo F., . 2d Lieut. (Co. M), 103d Inf. Dwight, Philip J., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6. p. 4, 26th Div. Dwyer, William J., . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 101st Inf. Eadie, Harold F., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 4. 26th Div. . 2d Lieut. (Veterinarian), 103d F. A. Eames, Harold M., Eaton, Ralph M., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 4, 26th Div. Eaton. William S., . . 2d Lieut. (Conn. Cav.) (Co. C), 101st Mach. Gun Bn. Echfeldt. Roger W., . 1st Lieut. (Bat. D), 102d F. A. Eckert, John J., . 1st Lieut. (Co. B), 101st Bn., Sig. Corps. Eckle, John M., . 2d Lieut. (Co. F), 102d Inf. . Captain, 103d Inf. Edes. Samuel H., . Edgerley, Arnault B., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6, p. 5, 26th Div. Edmands. Horton. . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6. p. 1, 26th Div. Edmonds, Edward, Jr., . . 2d Lieut. (5th Mass.), trans. 101st Inf., S. O. 3, p. 13, 26th Div. Edwards, Clarence R., . . Maj. Gen. (comdg. 26th Div.). Edwards, Frank P., . 1st Lieut. (Sup. Officer, Bn. Adjutant), 101st Bn., Sig. Corps. Edwards, H. Boyd, . 1st Lieut., Chaplain, 101st Engineers. Elish, Carl M., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6, p. 4, 26th Div. Elliott. George R... . 2d Lieut. (Co. C), 104th Inf. Ellis, Alexander, . . 1st Lieut. (Co. C), 101st Eng. Ellis. Walter C.. . Captain, 103d Inf. Ely, Theodore W., . . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 1st Amb. Co. . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st F. A., S. O. 6, Emerson, Bisphane H., . p. 6, 26th Div. . 2d Lieut. (Co. I), 103d Inf. Emerson, Harry D., Emsley, George, . . 2d Lieut. (Bat. F), 102d F. A. English, Philip H., . 2d Lieut. (Co. M), 102d Inf. Enright, Thomas J., . Captain (comdg. Co. M), 103d Inf. Erickson, Edgar E., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st F. A., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div.

Erlenbach, James H., .		1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 1st F. H.
Erskins, Leroy G.,		2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st F. A., S. O. 6,
, ,		p. 6, 26th Div.
Estey, Harold W.,		Major (comdg 1st Bn.), 101st Eng.
Evans, Charles H., .		2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6,
		p. 4, 26th Div.
Evans, James A.,	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6,
		p. 1, 26th Div.
Evarts, Joseph A.,	•	1st Lieut. (Vt. Inf.) (Co. D), 101st Mach. Gun
		Bn.
Ewing, Arthur W., .	•	1st Lieut., N. G. D. C. (San. Troops), Train
		Hdqrs., Mil. Police.
Ewing, John A.,	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6,
		p. 5, 26th Div.
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Fair, Harold I.,	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6,
_		p. 1, 26th Div.
Farris, Harry R.,	•	Major (comdg. San. Troops), 103d Inf.
Fay, Henry A.,	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st F. A., S. O. 6,
		p. 6, 26th Div.
Fay, William J.,	•	1st Lieut., M. C. (San. Det.), 102d Inf.
Felsted, Joseph E.,	•	Captain (comdg. Co. E), 102d Inf.
Feltham, John H., Jr., .	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6,
		p. 4, 26th Div.
Fenton, Roland T., .	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Mach. Gun
		Bn., S. O. 6, p. 7, 26th Div.
Field, Charles W. W., .	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Mach. Gun
		Bn., S. O. 6, p. 7, 26th Div.
Field, Elias,	•	Captain (comdg. Co. A), 101st Eng.
Findlay, Roland G., .	•	Captain (comdg. Co. C), 103d Inf.
Finney, Lawrence,	•	2d Lieut. (Amm. Train).
Fish, Erland W.,	•	Captain (comdg. Bat. B), 101st F. A.
Fisher, Neal H.,	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6,
T. 11 TT'III T		p. 1, 26th Div.
Fitsgerald, William P., .	•	2d Lieut. (Co. G), 101st Inf.
Fitzgibbons, John,	•	1st Lieut. (Co. A), 102d Inf.
Flaherty, Lawrence J., .	•	1st Lieut. (Co. G), 101st Inf.
Flanagan, James J., .	•	1st Lieut. (Co. I), 101st Inf.
Flanders, Frank R.,	•	1st Lieut. (Co. M), 104th Inf.
Fleming, John A.,	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6,
Floring Nicholas A		p. 3, 26th Div.
Fleming, Nicholas A., .	•	1st Lieut. (Co. D), 101st Inf.
Flenniken, John,	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6,
Flotobox Edward C		p. 1, 26th Div.
Fletcher, Edward G., . Flood, Martin J.,	•	2d Lieut. (Co. I), 103d Mach. Gun Bn.
Flood, Martin J.,	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Mach. Gun
Foegel, John R.,		Bn., S. O. 6, p. 7, 26th Div.
T3 . 1 T . 1 T3	•	1st Lieut., 102d Inf.
roley, John F.,	•	2d Lieut., 101st Eng.

Foley, Thomas F., . Captain (comdg. Co. G), 101st Inf. Major (comdg. 3d Bn.), 104th Inf. Foote, Alfred F.. Captain, O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, Ford. Alfred J. L., . p. 11, 26th Div. 1st Lieut., M. G. M. C. (comdg. San. Troops), Ford. Leonard G.. . 102d Mach. Gun Bn. 1st Lieut. (Co. B), 104th Inf. Forsberg, Oscar W., Forsythe, Edward C., 2d Lieut., 103d F. A. Foss, Reginald E., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 4, 26th Div. Foster, Chester C., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6, p. 5, 26th Div. . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d F. A., S. O. 6, Foster. Dwight. p. 2, 26th Div. Foster, George W., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. Fowler, Milburn M., . 1st Lieut., N. G. D. C. (San. Troops), 103d Inf. . 1st Lieut., N. G. D. C. (San. Troops), 103d F. A. Fox. M. K.. Frances, Donald S., 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1. 26th Div. Francis, Walter L., 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Mach. Gun Franks, Jerome A. O., Bn., S. O. 6, p. 7, 26th Div. Captain (comdg. Co. C), 102d Inf. Freeland, George C., French, Prentiss, 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d F. A., S. O. 6, p. 2, 26th Div. Frost. Rufus S.. 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d F. A., S. O. 6, p. 2, 26th Div. Frothingham, Huntington W., 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 4, 26th Div. Fuessenich, L. C., 2d Lieut. (Co. M), 102d Inf. Fuller, William A., 2d Lieut. (absent, sick since call), 101st Inf. Fullerton, James R., 1st Lieut. (Co. F), 102d Inf. Furber, Charles L., 2d Lieut. (Bat. C), 101st F. A. Gallulo, Michael J., 2d Lieut. (Mach. Gun Co.), 102d Inf. Gallup, Dana T.. . Captain (comdg. Co. C), 102d Mach. Gun Bn. Galpin, Perrin C., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d F. A., S. O. 6, p. 2, 26th Div. Galvin, John J., . 2d Lieut. (Co. L), 104th Inf. . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Mach. Gun Gardiner, Edward H., Bn., S. O. 6, p. 7, 26th Div. . 1st Lieut. (Co. F), 101st Eng. Garland, Kimball R., . 1st Lieut. (Co. A), 103d Mach. Gun Bn. Garlick, William J., Gatchell, Walter G., . Major (comdg.), 103d Mach. Gun Bn. Gates, Ernest A., . . Major (comdg. San. Troops), 104th Inf. . 2d Lieut., 101st Eng. Gay, Grant E., Geer, Clarence W., . 1st Lieut. (Co. H), 102d Inf.

Genard, Aimes D., 1st Lieut. (Co. A). 103d Inf. Geoffrion, Alfred J., 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 3, 26th Div. . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops). 102d Inf. Gettings, James A., Gibbs, Frank. . . . 2d Lieut. (5th Mass.), trans. 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 13, 26th Div. Giblin, John F. A., . 1st Lieut., 101st Eng. Gifford, Charles C., . 2d Lieut. (Hdqrs.), 101st F. A. Gilbert, W. J., . 1st Lieut. (Staff, Motor Sec.), Amm. Train. Giles, Charles B., . . 2d Lieut. (Bat. F), 101st F. A. Gillis, Fred K. J., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 4, 26th Div. . Captain (Asst. Surgeon). Glass, James, . Gleason, Marten H., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned Amm. Train, S. O. 6, p. 12, 26th Div. . 1st Lieut. (Co. C), 101st Bn. Sig. Corps. Glynn, Edward J., . Golver, Joseph A., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 4, 26th Div. Goodhue, Charles D., . . 2d Lieut. (Sup. Co.), 104th Inf. Goodnough, Henry E., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. Goodrich, George L., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. Goodwin, Robert E., . Major (comdg. 1st Bn.), 102d F. A. Gordon, Douglas, . . 2d Lieut. (Co. I), 104th Inf. Gordon, Sumner S., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned Amm. Train, 8. O. 6, p. 12, 26th Div. Gorfinkle, Bernard L., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned Amm. Train, S. O. 6, p. 12, 26th Div. Gould, Daniel I., . Captain (comdg. Co. G), 103d Inf. Guile, Edward M., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. Guinman, Clarence J., . Captain (comdg. Hdqrs. Co.), 102d Inf. Gully, Edward J., . 1st Lieut. (Bat. B), 102d F. A. Gunter, Fred G., . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 102d F. A. Grabfield, Gustav A., . . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 1st Amb. Co. Captain, O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, Grandgent, L., p. 11, 26th Div. Gravel, Romeo A., . 1st Lieut. (Bat. E), 102d F. A. . 1st Lieut. (5th Mass.) (Aide-de-Camp, Brig. Gray, Albert C., . Gen. Traub). . Lieut. Col., 104th Inf. Gray, Edwin R., Gray, John L., Jr., . Captain (comdg. Co. H), 102d Inf. Green, Walter, . 2d Lieut. (Bat. E), 103d F. A. . Captain (comdg. Tr. Mor. Bat.). Greene, Roger A., . Greenlaw, Albert, . . Captain (Regt. Sup. Officer), 103d Inf. Griffin, Ashley J., . . 1st Lieut. (Co. L), 102d Inf. Griffin, Philip J., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 4, 26th Div.

Grigas, Raymond B., 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6. p. 1, 26th Div. Grimwood, Earl F., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned Amm. Train, S. O. 6, p. 12, 26th Div. Grindle, Wade L., . . 2d Lieut. (Co. A), 103d Inf. Griswold, Alfred H., . Captain (comdg. Co. C), 102d Inf. Hadley, Harold E., . 1st Lieut. (Co. E), 101st Eng. . Major, 103d Inf. Hadley, John A., . . 1st Lieut. (Co. G), 102d Inf. Haggerty, James A., Hale, Richard A., . . Lieut. Col., 101st F. A. Hall, Harry G., . 2d Lieut., 103d F. A. Hall, John W., . 1st Lieut. (Bn. Adjutant), 102d Mach. Gun Bn. Hall, Murray T., . 2d Lieut. O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 4, 26th Div. . 1st Lieut. (Co. A). 102d Inf. Hall, Ray W., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned Amm. Train. Hall, Roswell E., . S. O. 6, p. 12, 26th Div. . Captain (Hdqrs. Co.), 103d F. A. Hall, Samuel A., Hallett, Ralph H., . . Captain (Regt. Adjutant), 101st Eng. Hamilton, Ralph S., Jr., . Major (comdg. 1st Bn.), 103d F. A. Hammann, George L., . . 1st Lieut. (Co. M), 102d Inf. Hammond, Ernest K., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6. p. 1, 26th Div. Hammond, Oliver W., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6. p. 1. 26th Div. . Captain (comdg. Co. I), 104th Inf. Hammond, Thomas J., . Hanley, Gerald T., . Captain (Bat. B), 103d F. A. . 1st Lieut., 104th Inf. Hannigan, Judson, . Hansen, Arthur B., . 2d Lieut. (5th Mass.), trans. 101st Inf., S. O. 3, p. 13, 26th Div. . Captain (comdg. Co. D), 103d Inf. Hanson, Roy L., Harbane, William C., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. Harbold, Robert P., . Major, N. A. (Asst. Instructor), 26th Div. . 2d Lieut. (Bat. E), 101st F. A. Harding, Henry A., Hardwick, Sydney C., . . Captain, N. G. M. C. (comdg. San. Troops), Hdqrs. Train, Mil. Police. . Captain, 104th Inf. Hardy, John A., Harriman, Lynn H., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1. 26th Div. . 2d Lieut. (Co. F), 102d Inf. Harris, Robert V. K., Harrop, Daniel S., . . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C., Amb. Co. No. 4. . 1st Lieut. (Aide-de-Camp, Brig. Gen. Traub). Hart, Charles E., Jr., Hart, Esra D., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. . 2d Lieut. (Bat. A), 103d F. A. Hartwell, Everett S., Hartwell, Herbert F., . Captain (Regt. Sup. Officer), 104th Inf. Hartwell, P. B., . 1st Lieut. (Staff, Horse Sec.), Amm. Train.

Harwood, Benjamin P., 1st Lieut. (Act. 2d Bn. Adjutant), 102d F. A. Hascall, Theodore C., . 1st Lieut. (San. Troops), 103d F. A. Hassett, Leonard W., Captain, N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 101st Inf. Hasty, Percy A., Captain (comdg. Co. A), 103d Inf. . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, Hause, Robert E., . p. 4. 26th Div. . 2d Lieut. (Train Hdgrs. and Mil. Police). Hawkes, Edgar B., . 2d Lieut. (Co. I). 101st Inf. Hayes, Robert, Hayes, William C., . Colonel, comdg. 104th Inf. Hazeltine, Frank G., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6. p. 1, 26th Div. Healey, Thomas F., . Captain, N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 102d Inf. . 1st Lieut. (Co. L), 101st Inf. Healy, Jeremiah J., Healy, John E., . 1st Lieut. (Co. E), 103d Inf. Heiser, Jerome M., . 2d Lieut. (Co. B), 104th Inf. Helff, Joseph R., . . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 2d F. H. Hemingway, Harold, . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6, p. 5, 26th Div. Hepburn, William. . . 1st Lieut. (Co. E), 102d Inf. Herbert, John F., Jr., . Major (comdg. 2d Bn.), 102d F. A. Herrick, Harold W., 1st Lieut. (Conn. Cav.) (Co. D), 101st Mach. Gun Bn. Hickey, James F., . . Captain (Co. L), 101st Inf. Higgins, Royal F., Jr., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 3, 26th Div. Higgins, William, . . 1st Lieut. (Bat. C), 102d F. A. Hill, Lucius E., . 1st Lieut. (Bat. D), 103d F. A. Hill, Mahlon T., 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 4, 26th Div. Hiller, John A., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. Hills, Orlando G., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 3, 26th Div. Hinds, Charles S., . . 2d Lieut. (Mach. Gun Co.), 103d Inf. Hines, Paul H., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 3, 26th Div. Hobbs, Henry C., . . 1st Lieut. (Hdgrs. Co.), 104th Inf. Hobbs, Horace B., . . Lieut. Col. (Inspector). Hobbs, Marland C., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6, p. 5, 26th Div. Hobbs, Russell, . 1st Lieut. (Co. B), 101st Bn., Sig. Corps. Hoegan, Joseph A., . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 102d Inf. Holmes, John J., . . 1st Lieut., 102d Inf. Holmes, Robert P., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. Homeister, Henry J., . . 1st Lieut. (Co. C), 103d Mach. Gun Bn. Hopkins, Ralph P., . 1st Lieut. (5th Mass.), trans. 101st Inf., S. O. 3, p. 13, 26th Div.

Horner, Albert A., . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Ft. Oglethorpe, Ga.). 101st F. A. Hosford, Elson A., . . Captain (comdg. Co. L), 103d Inf. Hosmer, George W., . 1st Lieut. (Co. E). 104th Inf. Houley, Joseph P., . 2d Lieut. (Co. D), 102d Inf. Howard, James L., . Major (Conn. Cav.) comdg. 101st Mach. Gun Bn. Howard, Ralph W., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 3, 26th Div. Howe, H. M., . . Captain (comdg. Motor Sec.), Amm. Train. Howe, Harry R., . 2d Lieut. (Co. C), 101st Eng. Howe, Thorndike D., . . Lieut. Col., 102d F. A. Howe, William F., . . 1st Lieut. (Bat. C), 102d F. A. Hoyle, Henry R., . . 2d Lieut. (Mach. Gun Co.), 104th Inf. Hudson, W. N., . . Captain (comdg. Horse Sec.), Amm. Train. . Major, N. G. M. C. (Surgeon), 102d Inf. Hugo, John G., Hume, Frank M., . . Colonel, comdg. 103d Inf. Huntington, Frederic D., . Captain (comdg. Bat. A), 101st F. A. Hurley, James S., . . . 2d Lieut. (Co. G), 102d Inf. Hutchins, Edward, . . 1st Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d F. A., S. O. 6, p. 8, 26th Div. Hyatt, John W., . . Captain (Infantry) (Aide-de-Camp, Maj. Gen. Edwards). . 1st Lieut. (comdg. Bat. D), 102d F. A. Inches, Henderson, . 2d Lieut. (Co. A), 102d Inf. Ingersoll, Colin M., . . 2d Lieut. (Mach. Gun Co.), 103d Inf. Ireland, William D., . 2d Lieut. (5th Mass.), trans. 101st Regt. Inf., Irving, George E., . 8. O. 3, p. 13, 26th Div. . Colonel, comdg. 102d Inf. Isbell, Ernest L., . . Captain (Topog. Officer), 101st Eng. Jacobs, Carlton D., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, Jenkins, Lawrence D.. . p. 1, 26th Div. Jenkins, Thomas L., . Major, N. G. M. C. (comdg. San. Troops), 103d F. A. . 2d Lieut. (Co. C), 102d Inf. Johnson, Albert E., Johnson, Edward A., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 3, 26th Div. . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, Johnson, Norman P., p. 1, 26th Div. . 2d Lieut. (Hdqrs. Co.), 104th Inf. Johnson, Orville P., Johnston, Clyde C., . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 104th Inf. Jones, Fred H., . 1st Lieut. (Div. Staff), 101st Bn., Sig. Corps. Jones, Frederick E.. . Major (Asst. Surgeon). Jones, John A., . 2d Lieut. (Co. C), 104th Inf.

Jutras. William A.. . . 2d Lieut. (Co. A), 103d Inf.

Kane, Robert,	•	2d Lieut., N. A., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6, p. 5, 26th Div.
Kavanagh, Arthur J., .		1st Lieut. (Co. C), 102d Inf.
Kearney, James R., .	:	2d Lieut. (5th Mass.), trans. 101st Inf., S. O. 3,
real news, various res,	•	p. 13, 26th Div.
Keenan, Barry,		2d Lieut. (Co. B), 102d Mach. Gun Bn.
Kelleher, S. B.,	:	1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), Amm.
		Train.
Kelley, Herbert N., .		Captain (comdg. Co. L), 104th Inf.
Kellog, Francis F.,	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6, p. 4, 26th Div.
Kells, Walter D.,		1st Lieut. (San. Troops), 101st Eng.
Kelly, James V.,		2d Lieut. (Mach. Gun Co.), 101st Inf.
Kenealy, Martin A., .		Captain (Regt. Sup. Officer), 101st Inf.
Kennon, Blaisdell C., .	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div.
Kenny, John,		Captain (comdg. Co. A), 102d Mach. Gun Bn.
Kerr, James,		2d Lieut, Co. M, 104th Inf.
Keville, W. J.,		Lieut. Col. (comdg.), Amm. Train.
Kilpatrick, Charles J., .		2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 103d Inf., S. O. 6,
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King, Frederick A., .		Major, comdg. 2d F. H.
King, George M.,	•	Major (comdg. Motor Sec.), Amm. Train.
King, John P.,		1st Lieut. (Officer Interp.).
King, Malcolm L.,		2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6,
		p. 1, 26th Div.
Kingston, James M., .	•	2d Lieut. (Veterinarian), 101st F. A.
Kirby, Edward J.,		2d Lieut. (Co. K), 102d Inf.
Kirkpatrick, A. H., .	•	1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 104th Inf.
Kirwan, Thomas A., .	•	2d Lieut. (Bat. A), 101st F. A.
Kittredge, Paul E., .		2d Lieut. (Co. M), 101st Inf.
Kivenaar, William J., .	•	1st Lieut. (Co. C), 101st Inf.
Kluge, Ernest J.,	•	2d Lieut., 101st Eng.
Knauth, Felix W.,		1st Lieut. (Bat. A), 101st F. A.
Knight, Henry P.,	•	2d Lieut. (Co. H), 104th Inf.
Knowlton, John G. W.,		Major, N. G. M. C., comdg. F. H. No. 4.
Kroll, Nolan,	•	2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 102d Inf., S. O. 6,
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LaDue, Charles P., .		2d Lieut. (Co. H), 102d Inf.
Lahey, James D.,		2d Lieut. (Co. B), 102d Inf.
Lamb, Edwin E.,		Lieut. Col., 102d Inf.
Lamkin, Howard W., .		1st Lieut. (Co. C), 101st Bn., Sig. Corps.
Landon, Horace Z., .		1st Lieut. (Co. B), 101st Eng.
Lane, Albert S.,		2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6,
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Lane, Ralph W.,		2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6,
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Lang, E. H.,	•	2d Lieut. (Horse Sec.), Amm. Train.

Langdon, Duncan, . 2d Lieut. (Bat. B), 103d F. A. Langdon, George, . 2d Lieut. (Bat. A), 102d F. A. Langill, Morton H., . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 103d Inf. Larkin, George W., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6. p. 5, 26th Div. Lawler, Daniel H., . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 3d Amb. Co. Lawrence, William D., . . 2d Lieut. (Co. D), 103d Inf. . 1st Lieut. (Co. F), 101st Inf. Leahy, Francis H., Leavenworth, Dana T., . 2d Lieut. (Co. K), 102d Inf. Lee, Christopher H., . Captain (comdg. Co. I), 101st Inf. Lee, Joe, . . 2d Lieut. (Sup. Co.), 103d Inf. . 1st Lieut. (D. S. Hdqrs., 52d Brig.), 6th Mass. Leggat, John C., Lentine, G. E., . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Surgeon), 101st Mach. Gun Bn. Leslie, Howard C., . . 1st Lieut. (Co. C). 102d Mach. Gun Bn. Lewis, Lester T., . . 2d Lieut. (Bat. D), 102d F. A. . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6, Lewis, S. Alger M., p. 5, 26th Div. Lincoln, Clark R., . 2d Lieut. (Co. A), 102d Mach. Gun Bn. Lincoln. Winslow S., . 2d Lieut. (Bat. A), 102d F. A. Linton, Frederick M., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6. p. 1, 26th Div. . 2d Lieut. (comdg. 3d Co.), Sup. Train. Livingstone, Thomas F., Lockart, Charles E., . 1st Lieut. (Co. E), 102d Inf. Locke, Arthur F., . . Captain (comdg. Co. M), 102d Inf. . 2d Lieut. (Co. D), 104th Inf. Logan, Donald B., . Logan, Edward L., . Colonel, comdg. 101st Inf. Loomis, James L., . . Captain (comdg. Co. B), 104th Inf. Lothrop, Everett W., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6, p. 5, 26th Div. Love, Robert W., . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6, p. 1, 26th Div. . 1st Lieut. (Jr. M. O.), F. H. No. 4. Lovely, Bernard H., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6. Lovett. Robert N.. p. 1. 26th Div. . 2d Lieut. (Co. G), 103d Inf. Lowell, Eugene P., . 1st Lieut. (Mach. Gun Co.), 104th Inf. Lowell, Harry L., . Lucke, Frederick H., . Captain (comdg. Co. A), 104th Inf. Lund, H. Gardner, . 2d Lieut. (Co. H), 104th Inf. Luscombe, Walter S., . . 2d Lieut. (Bat. B), 101st F. A. Luther, Earl F., . 2d Lieut. (Sup. Co.), 103d F. A. Luther, Willard B., . 1st Lieut. (Bat. E), 101st F. A. . 2d Lieut. (D. S., N. E. D., S. O. 85), 101st Inf. Lydon, John J., . 1st Lieut. (Co. A), 101st Bn., Sig. Corps. Lynch, James H., . Lynch, W. H., . 2d Lieut. (Veterinarian), 103d F. A. Lyon, James A., 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 101st Inf. McDade, William A., . . . Captain, 104th Inf. . 1st Lieut. (3d Bn. Adjutant), 104th Inf.

MacDonald, Alexander,

MacDonald, Herman A., 1st Lieut. (Bat. F), 101st F. A. MacLeod, Colin G., 1st Lieut. (Bat. C), 103d F. A. MacLeod, Norman D., . 1st Lieut. (Bat. B), 103d F. A. 2d Lieut. (Co. I), 104th Inf. Mackenzie, John A., MacMillan, Robert W., 2d Lieut. (Co. D), 101st Eng. Maddocks, L. E., . 2d Lieut. (Veterinarian), 103d F. A. Madison, Burdette R., . 1st Lieut. (Mach. Gun Co.), 104th Inf. Mahoney, Daniel P., 1st Lieut. (Co. B), 103d Mach. Gun Bn. Mahoney, John W., 1st Lieut. (3d Bn. Adjutant), 101st Inf. Main, Mathew W., 1st Lieut. (Co. F), 103d Inf. Mains, Charles F., . Captain, N. G. M. C., comdg. 1st Amb. Co. Malanev, C. E., 1st Lieut. (Horse Sec.), Amm. Train. Malcahyt, Raymond F., 1st Lieut., N. G. D. C. (San. Troops), 104th Inf. Maloney, Leonard J., 2d Lieut. (Co. G), 102d Inf. Malonson, James H., 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 2d Amb. Co. Maloon, Robert I., 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st Inf., S. O. 6. p. 1, 26th Div. Mansfield, Lawrence K., . 2d Lieut. (Bat. D). 101st F. A. Mansfield, Thomas H., . 1st Lieut. (Co. M), 104th Inf. Manson, William B., 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6. p. 5. 26th Div. 1st Lieut. (Co. C), 101st Bn., Sig. Corps. Marion, John F., Marley, Thomas, Jr., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 5, р. 5. Marston, Roy L., . . Captain (comdg. Co. E), 103d Inf. Martin, Harry G., . . Captain, N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 104th Inf. Mason, Edward H., . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 103d F. A. Master, Mellville E., . 1st Lieut. (Co. K), 104th Inf. Mattson, William R., . 1st Lieut. (Co. E), 101st Eng. Mau, Clarence R., . . 1st Lieut. (Adjutant, 1st Bn.), 102d Inf. Maubach, A. A., . Major, N. A. (Asst. Chief St.). Maynard, Oscar J., 2d Lieut. (R. I. Cav.) (comdg. 2d Co.), Sup. Train. Major, 103d Inf. Mayo, Walter J., . McBrayne, Winfred, 1st Lieut. (Bat. F), 102d F. A. McCarthy, Eugene J., 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 2d Amb. Co. McCarthy, George E., . 2d Lieut. (Tr. Mor. Bat.). McCarthy, William J., . Captain (Co. B), 101st Inf. McConnell, Joseph W., 1st Lieut. (Co. A), 101st Inf. McDowell, Jeremiah J., Captain (comdg. Co. D), 6th Mass. McGar, Frank H., . . Captain (comdg. Co. L), 102d Inf. McGrew, Donald R., . 1st Lieut. (Hdqrs. Co.), 103d Inf. McKenna, Peter G., 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 1st Amb. Co. McKenney, Henry J., 2d Lieut. (Co. L), 103d Inf. McLeod, Stuart. . Captain (Regt. Adjutant), 102d F. A. McMath, D. E., . Captain (comdg. Horse Sec.), Amm. Train. McMillan, R. F., Lieut. Col. (Asst. Quartermaster). McNair, Morris L., 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6, p. 5, 26th Div.

1st Lieut. (Bat. B), 101st F. A. McNamee, Frank A., 2d Lieut., 104th Inf. Merriam, Dana S., Merrill, Harold H., . 1st Lieut., 103d F. A. . 1st Lieut. (Co. C), 103d Inf. Metcalf, Donald C., . 2d Lieut., 103d F. A. Metcalf, Ernest T. H., Mevers. Richard F., . Captain (comdg. Co. B), 102d Inf. Miller, Edgar F., . 2d Lieut. (Hdgrs. Co.), 102d Inf. . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 101st Miller, Richard H., F. A. Mills, Hiram W., . 1st Lieut. (Bn. Adjutant), 101st Mach. Gun Bn. 1st Lieut. (Horse Sec.), Amm. Train. Miner, R. B., . . Captain (Bn. Adjutant), 102d F. A. Minot, Wayland M., Mitton, Harry D., . . Captain (comdg. Bat. D), 101st F. A. Montooth, Charles, . 1st Lieut. (comdg. 1st Co.), Sup. Train. Moore, E. Judson, . . 2d Lieut. (Co. E), 102d Inf. . 1st Lieut. (Co. D), 102d Inf. Moore, Russell V., . . Captain (comdg. Bat. F), 101st F. A. Morgan, William B., Morrill, William H., . 2d Lieut. (Co. A), 102d Mach. Gun Bn. . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6, Morrison, Dana S., p. 5, 26th Div. Captain (comdg. Bat. A), 102d F. A. Morse, Charles H., . 1st Lieut. (5th Mass.), trans. 101st Inf., S. O. 3. Moyse, George G., p. 13, 26th Div. . Captain (comdg. Co. G), 104th inf. Munyon, Benson G., Murphy, Edward R., 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 101st . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6. Murphy, Gardner, . p. 5, 26th Div. . Captain (comdg. Mach. Gun Co.), 101st Inf. Murphy, John D., . Murphy, Thomas F., . Captain (Regt. Adjutant), 101st Inf. Murphy, William A., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 104th Inf., S. O. 6. p. 5, 26th Div. . 1st Lieutenant (Co. A), 104th Inf. Murray, Archie F., Murray, William H., . Captain (comdg. Co. H), 103d Inf. Murtaugh, Joseph E., . 1st Lieut. (Co. H), 102d Inf. Myers, Rawdon W., . Captain (comdg. Co. C), 101st Mach. Gun Bn. Nagle. William T., . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 3d Amb. Co. Nash, Arthur N., . . Major (R. I. R. A.), 103d F. A. Needham, Daniel, . . 1st Lieut. (Hdgrs. Co.), 101st F. A. Needham, Sumner H., . Captain (comdg. Bat. F), 102d F. A. Nelson, Gustav A., . 2d Lieut. (Co. A), 101st Mach. Gun Bn. Nelson, Hendrick C., . 1st Lieut. (Bat. C), 103d F. A. Newcomb, Erwin B., . 1st Lieut. (Bn. Adjutant), 103d Inf. Newell, Harold G., . 1st Lieut. (Co. K), 103d Inf. Newman, William E., . 2d Lieut. (Co. A), 102d Inf. Newton, E. H., . 2d Lieut. (Horse Sec.), Amm. Train. Newton, J. Willard, . 2d Lieut. (Bat. E), 101st F. A.

Neval, Henry, 2d Lieut. (5th Mass.), trans. 101st Inf., S. O. 3, p. 13, 26th Div. Nevers, Harry H., . Major, N. G. M. C. (comdg. San. Troops), 101st F. A. Nielsen, Edwin B., . Major, N. G. M. C. (comdg. San. Troops), 101st Eng. Norris, Robert B., . . 1st Lieut. (Co. C), 101st Eng. Northrop, George A., . 2d Lieut. (Co. I), 102d Inf. Norton, Charles N., . Captain (comdg. Co. F), 103d Inf. Norton, Paul J., . . Captain (Regt. Adjutant), 104th Inf. Nye, George I., . 2d Lieut. (Co. F), 103d Inf. Oates, William H., . 1st Lieut. (5th Mass.), trans. 101st Inf., S. O. 3, p. 13, 26th Div. . 2d Lieut. (Co. B), 102d Inf. Oberlin, Frederick, O'Brien, James J., . . Captain (comdg. Co. E), 101st Inf. O'Brien, Patrick, . . 1st Lieut. (5th Mass.), trans. 101st Inf., S. O. 3, p. 13, 26th Div. O'Connell, Daniel, . 2d Lieut. (Co. C), 102d Inf. O'Connor, Michael J., . . 1st Lieut. (Chaplain), 101st Inf. O'Donnell, Timothy J., . 2d Lieut. (Co. H), 103d Inf. O'Keefe, John A., Jr., . . 1st Lieut. (Bn. Adjutant), 101st F. A. Osborn, John F., . Captain (comdg. Co. B), 101st Eng. Owen, Albert S.. . . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 101st Bn., Sig. Corps. . Captain (comdg. Bat. B), 102d F. A. Page, Lawrence B., Palmer, Osborne, . . 1st Lieut. (Co. B), 101st Eng. Park, Joseph M., . . 1st Lieut. (Co. K), 102d Inf. Parker, George A., . Captain (comdg. Bat. C), 101st F. A. Parker, George O., . 2d Lieut. (Train Hdqrs., Mil. Police). Parker, Harold E., . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 2d F. H. Parsons, George E., . Captain (Regt. Sup. Officer), 101st Eng. Paton, John A., . 2d Lieut. (Co. A), 102d Mach. Gun Bn. . Captain (Train Hdqrs., Mil. Police). Payne, Arthur N., . Peaslee, John D., . . 2d Lieut. (Co. F), 104th Inf. Pell. Charles E.. . Captain (Staff, Amm. Train). Pellett. Charles A., . 2d Lieut. (Co. B), 101st Mach. Gun Bn. Pendleton, Andrew L. J., . Captain (Aide-de-Camp, Maj. Gen. Edwards). Penney, George S., . Captain (comdg. Hdgrs. Co.), 104th Inf. Perkins, Frank S., . . Major (comdg. 2d Bn.), 101st F. A. Perkins, Holton B., . Lieut. Col., 101st Eng. Perrins, John, Jr., . . Major, comdg. 102d Mach. Gun Bn. Petrofsky, Joseph J., . 2d Lieut. (Co. B), 102d Inf. Petty, Orville A., . . 1st Lieut. (Chaplain), 102d Inf. Phillips, Edward H., . 2d Lieut. (Co. E), 104th Inf. Pickett, Samuel C., . 1st Lieut. (Co. F), 102d Inf. Pierce, Roull A., . . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O), 1st F. H. Pinches, Francis W., . 1st Lieut. (Hdqrs. Co.), 102d Inf.

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Piper, Frank, . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 2d Amb. Co. Plummer, Charles W., 2d Lieut. (Bat. A), 101st F. A. Pond, William G., . Captain (comdg. Hdqrs. Co.), 6th Mass. Inf. Potter, James F., . Captain (comdg. Co. M), 104th Inf. Powell, Lester L., . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 101st Inf. Power, John D., 1st Lieut. (Bat. E), 102d F. A. Powers, James J., . Captain (comdg. Co. C), 6th Mass. Inf. Powers, Theodore H., 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 3d Amb. Co. Pratt. Bronsdon A.. 1st Lieut. (Sup. Co.), 102d F. A. Pratt. George L.. . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 103d Inf. Quirk, Thomas J., . 1st Lieut. (Co. K), 103d Inf. Rancourt, Mark P., 2d Lieut. (Hdgrs. Co.), 103d F. A. Rancourt, Thomas J., 1st Lieut. (Hdqrs. Co.), 103d F. A. Rand, Raymond R., 1st Lieut. (Co. C), 103d F. A. Rapport, David L., 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 1st F. H. Rau, George A., Major (comdg. 1st Bn.), 102d Inf. Reardon, Frank J., 1st Lieut. (Co. I). 104th Inf. Redmond, Ernest R., Captain (comdg. Bat. E), 101st F. A. Renth, Clifford, 1st Lieut., N. G. D. C. (San. Troops), 104th Inf. Reynolds, Charles P., 2d Lieut. (Bat. B), 101st F. A. Richardson, Edward B., Major (comdg. 1st Bn.), 101st F. A. Rieke, Henry A., . 2d Lieut. (Co. L), 102d Inf. Rivers, James G., 2d Lieut. (Co. B), 104th Inf. Robart, Ralph W., 2d Lieut. (Co. A), 104th Inf. Robbins, Howard W., 1st Lieut. (Bn. Adjutant), 104th Inf. Roberts, George A., Captain (comdg. Co. K), 104th Inf. 1st Lieut. (Co. B), 102d Inf. Robinson, George K., Robinson, Warren E., 2d Lieut. (Co. C), 102d Mach. Gun Bn. Rodger, James V., . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 2d F. H. Rogers, Albert R., . 1st Lieut. (Bn. Adjutant), 103d Inf. Rogers, Fred H., . 1st Lieut. (D. S. Hdqrs., 52d Brig.), 6th Mass. Inf. 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), F. H. No. 4. Rogers. John A.. Root, William H., . 1st Lieut. (Bat. A), 102d F. A. Rosoff, Abraham, 1st Lieut., N. G. D. C. (San. Troops), 102d Inf. Rotch, Charles M., Captain (comdg. Co. C), 101st Eng. Rushford, Edward A., Major (comdg. San. Troops), 102d F. A. Safford, Ralph K., . 1st Lieut. (Co. B), 104th Inf. Saltmarsh, Charles H., . 2d Lieut. (Co. B), 103d Mach. Gun Bn. Sanborn, John R., . 1st Lieut. (Co. A), 102d Mach. Gun Bn. Sanders, Thomas, . 1st Lieut. (Bat. D), 101st F. A. Sargent. Lester F... Captain (2d Bn. Adjutant), 101st Eng. Sayrers, William J., 2d Lieut. (Co. B), 103d Inf. Scanlon, Harry W., 2d Lieut. (Co. D), 6th Mass. Inf. Scarborough, Clarence G., 2d Lieut. (Mach. Gun Co.), 102d Inf. Scarles, Herbert C., 1st Lieut. (Co. C), 104th Inf.

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Sohley, William S.,	1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 2d F. H.
Schuyler, Philip L.,	Captain (Train Hdqrs., Mil. Police).
Scorer, Charles E.,	Captain (Asst. Quartermaster), 26th Div.
Scott, Harley J.,	1st Lieut. (Co. B), 102d Mach. Gun Bn.
Searle, Chester A.,	2d Lieut., 103d F. A.
Shanahan, William J.,	Captain (comdg. Co. A), 102d Inf.
Shanley, J. L.,	Captain (comdg. Motor Sec.), Amm. Train.
Shannon, William H.,	2d Lieut. (Veterinarian), 102d F. A.
Sheldon, Harold P.,	1st Lieut. (Co. C), 102d Mach. Gun Bn.
Sheldon, Harry G.,	1st Lieut. (Train Hdqrs., Mil. Police).
Shelton, George H.,	Lieut. Col. (Chief of Staff).
Sherburne, John H.,	Colonel (comdg.), 101st F. A.
Sherman, Roger,	1st Lieut. (Sup. Co.), 101st F. A.
Shipke, John,	Captain (comdg. Mach. Gun Co.), 102d Inf.
Shumway, Sherman N.,	2d Lieut. (Co. E), 103d Inf.
Shunney, William P.,	Captain, 103d F. A.
Silbees, Henry O.,	Captain (comdg. Sup. Co.), 101st F. A.
Simkins, William G.,	1st Lieut. (Co. C), 101st Bn., Sig. Corps.
Simonds, George S.,	Lieut. Col. (Adjutant), 26th Div.
Simons, Aiken,	Captain (Asst. Ord. Officer), 26th Div.
Simpkens, Willard,	2d Lieut. (Bat. E), 102d F. A.
Simpkins, John R.,	Captain (comdg. Hdqrs. Co.), 102d F. A.
Simpkins, N. S., Jr.,	1st Lieut. (Aide-de-Camp, Gen. Edwards),
	101st F. A.
Slate, Demund J.,	Captain (comdg. Co. D), 104th Inf.
Small, Deane B.,	Captain (comdg. Co. C), 101st Bn., Sig. Corps.
Smith, Arthur,	1st Lieut. (Co. G), 103d Inf.
Smith, Charles W. H.,	2d Lieut. (5th Mass.), trans. 101st Inf., S. O. 3.
	p. 13, 26th Div.
Smith, Corburn,	Captain (comdg. Hdqrs. Co.), 101st F. A.
Smith, Emery T.,	Colonel, 103d F. A.
Smith, Frank L.,	1st Lieut. (Bat. F), 101st F. A.
Smith, Harold W.,	1st Lieut. (Co. M), 102d Inf.
Smith, Harry F.,	Captain (comdg. Co. B), 103d Mach. Gun Bn.
Smith, R. E.,	1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 101st Inf.
Smith, S. Stewart,	Captain (comdg. Co. B), 101st Bn., Sig. Corps.
Smith, Walter B.,	2d Lieut. (Bat. D), 103d F. A.
Southard, William E.,	Major, 103d Inf.
Spencer, Harry E.,	1st Lieut. (Co. D), 101st Eng.
Sprague, Charles H.,	1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 3d Amb. Co.
Spratt, Charles W.,	Captain (comdg. Co. C), 103d Mach. Gun Bn.
Stackpole, Markam W., .	1st Lieut. (Chaplain), 102d F. A.
Stanchfield, Charles C., .	Captain (comdg. Co. B), 102d Mach. Gun Bn.
Staten, Chester E.,	Captain, 104th Inf.
Stevens, Frank W.,	Captain, N. G. M. C. (comdg.), 3d Amb. Co.
Stevenson, William,	Captain (Co. C), 104th Inf.
Stewart, Duncan M.,	Major, 6th Mass. Inf.
Stiles, William H.,	1st Lieut. (Co. F), 104th Inf.
Stillwell, Thomas K. P.,	Major, 104th Inf.

Stoddard, Malcolm L., . 2d Lieut. (Co. I), 103d Inf. Stowe, Roy E., . 2d Lieut. (Bat. E). 103d F. A. Strickland, Daniel W., . 1st Lieut. (Co. D), 102d Inf. . 2d Lieut. (Co. G), 104th Inf. Stromwell, Edgar A., Strong, Joseph W., . 2d Lieut., 101st Eng. . Captain (comdg. Co. E), 6th Mass. Inf. Sullivan, George W., Surls, Joseph K., . . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 101st Swaim, Roger D., . . Captain (D. S., Ft. Sill, Okla.), 102d F. A. . Captain (comdg. Co. D), 101st Eng. Swan, Carroll J., Sweetser, Warren E., . Colonel, comdg. Train Hdgrs., Mil. Police. Swett. Guy I.. . . 1st Lieut. (Co. D), 103d Inf. . Captain, N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 103d Inf. Talbot, Bertell L., . Tarbell, George G., . 2d Lieut. (Co. A), 101st Eng. . Captain (Regt. Adjutant), 102d Inf. Taylor, Emerson G., Taylor, H. W., . Captain, N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 104th Inf. Taylor, John C., . 1st Lieut. (Co. M), 103d Inf. Tenney, Walter N., . 2d Lieut. (Co. B), 102d Mach. Gun Bn. . Major, N. G. M. C., comdg. 1st F. H. Tenney, William N., Thomas, Chester C., . 1st Lieut. (Co. C), 101st Mach. Gun Bn. Thomas, Harold C., . 2d Lieut. (Co. C), 103d Mach. Gun Bn. Thompson, Clarence M., . Captain (comdg. Co. K), 102d Inf. Thompson, Frederick J., . 2d Lieut. (Co. D), 102d Inf. Thompson, Harold W., . . 2d Lieut. (Bat. C), 102d F. A. . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 101st Inf. Tibbetts, George A., Tickner, Benjamin H., . . Captain (Regt. Adjutant), 101st F. A. Tidd. John H.. . . . 1st Lieut. (5th Mass.), trans. 101st Inf., S. O. 3, p. 13, 26th Div. . Captain (Hdgrs. Co.), 103d Inf. Tobey, ----, . Tobey, Walter P., . . 1st Lieut. (Bat. C), 101st F. A. Toelken, Julius W., . 2d Lieut. (Co. K), 104th Inf. Toppan, William J., . 1st Lieut. (Co. F), 101st Eng. Towne, John G., . . Major, N. G. M. C. (Asst. Surgeon), 26th Div. . Brig. Gen., comdg. 51st Inf. Brig. Traub, Peter S.. . Captain (comdg. Bat. E), 102d F. A. Trombly, Arthur P., . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned Amm. Train, Turner, Oliver, 8. O. 6, p. 12, 26th Div. Twachtman, J. Alden, . . Captain (D. S., Ft. Sill, Okla.), 103d F. A. . 2d Lieut. (Co. L), 103d Inf. Twitchell, Clarence C., . . 1st Lieut. (Co. L), 102d Inf. Tyler, Samuel A., . . 2d Lieut. (Bat. B), 102d F. A. Vail, Robert, . Valle, Paul B., . 2d Lieut. (Mach. Gun Bn.), 102d Inf. Vitalis, Mario M. de, . . 2d Lieut., O. R. C., assigned 101st F. A., S. O. 6, p. 6, 26th Div. Wade, William W., . Captain (Brig. Adjutant), 51st Brig. Walcott, William W., . . 1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), 101st Eng.

	2d Lieut. (Co. L), 102d Inf.
Wallace, George M., .	
Wallace, John B.,	1st Lieut. (Adjutant, 3d Bn.), 102d Inf.
Wallbridge, Robert E.,	2d Lieut. (Co. B), 103d Mach. Gun Bn.
Waller, S. R.,	1st Lieut., Eng. Train.
Walsh, James A.,	1st Lieut. (Tr. Mor. Bat.).
Walsh, James F.,	2d Lieut. (Co. L), 101st Inf.
Walsh, James J.,	1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (Jr. M. O.), 101st F. A.
Ward, Stanley A.,	2d Lieut. (Bat. C), 103d F. A.
Ware, George H.,	OLTIMA (Co. D) 1044 Tut
Ware, John,	tot Times (Clark) total Them
Warner, Frederick L.,	THE TRUM (CL. D) TOTAL THE
Warren, Walter E.,	And Thomas (The Additional Colonial States Total
Washburne, Cyrus C.,	0.3 T
Waterman, Paul,	And an area of the control of the co
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Watson Golden G	
Watson, Selden S.,	
Watts, Edward R.,	
Webster, Earle,	
Weeks, Charles S.,	
Weisel, Admund T.,	
Welbourn, Marshall A., .	
Welch, William H.,	
Wendell, Percy,	2d Lieut., 102d F. A.
Wesselhoeft, Conrad,	1st Lieut., N. G. M. C. (San. Troops), Train
	Hdqrs., Mil. Police.
Westbrook, Stillman F., .	1st Lieut. (Co. B), 101st Mach. Gun. Bn.
Wheeler, Carroll N.,	2d Lieut. (Bat. D), 101st F. A.
Wheelock, H. H.,	Captain, Q. M. C. (Asst. A. M.).
White, Ralph F.,	0.4 T ! 4 /Cl - TZ
White, Ralph G.,	2d Lieut. (Co. F), 103d Inf.
Whitney, William H.,	Q ! . ( Q D . 100 l T . /
Wigglesworth, Norton,	* 4 T to 14 / 2 4 Tho
Wilcox, Leroy S.,	0171 4 (26-1 (0-1 (0-1 104) 1-6
Wilkerson, Charles P.,	017: 4 (C. A) 40017.4
Williams, Frank P.,	Time Cal (And Common)
Williams, Howard S.,	1st Lieut. (Mach. Gun Co.), 102d Inf.
33721 T-1 TO	0.1 T (Cl. TX) 109.1 T(
W: D W	1-4 Time (To M O) TO H Ma 4
Window Broads	Od Time (Det E) 100d E A
Wolcott Oliver	
Wolcott, Oliver,	
Wood, Howard C.,	
Wood, Jack B.,	
Woods, John C.,	* *
Woods, John F.,	
Woods, Wesley H.,	2d Lieut. (Co. B), 103d Inf.
Young, William H.,	2d Lieut. (Bat. E), 101st F. A.

# INDIVIDUAL SERVICE RECORD

# INDIVIDUAL SERVICE RECORD

Name	
Address	
Volunteered at	
Drafted at	
Draft number	
Called for service	
Age on entering service	
Trained at	
Length of training period in the United States	
Length of training period in the United States	
First Assignment	
Date19.	
at	

# Sailing and Arrival in France

Entrained at
Detrained at
Embarked, port of
On S. S
Arrived, port of
Disembarked at
Entrained for
Incidents of trip
Beginning of Life "Over There"
Billeted in19to19
Training Period Abroad
days atfrom19to19
days atfrom19to19

# Departure for the Front

Entrained at	.19
Detrained at	_19
Off for the front19Arrived	.19
Name of battle frontLocation	
Entered trenches first time	_19
Number of days in trenches	
Longest period in trenchesdays at	
From	_19

# **Battles**

Battle of	19	to	19
Battle of	19	to	19
Battle of	19	to	19
Battle of	19	to	19
Battle of	19	to	19_,
Battle of	19	to	19

# **Furloughs**

# PLACES VISITED

***************************************			
•-•			
			•••••
Casu	alties		
Injured at			19
Nature of injury			
Injured at	~~~~	•••••	19
Nature of injury			
In hospital	19	.to	19
In hospital	19	.to	19
Convalesced at	19	to	19
Gassed at			19
"Over the top"times, from	19	9to	.19

# Transfers and Promotions

Transferred from	19
Toat	
Promoted from	19
Toat	
Commanding Officers	
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	
•	•
Honorable Mention	
Honorable discharge at close of war	19
At	
Cited for honorable mention for	

# Decorations received In Memoriam Name.....Age.... Killed in action Died of accident at 19 Buried at \_\_\_\_\_\_\_19\_\_\_\_\_\_ Mustered Out - Arrival Home At.... Arrived, port of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_19\_\_\_\_\_ Disembarked 19

# Incidents of Special Interest

Signatu <del>res</del>		ding Officers Division	and Me	n of My
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Signatures	of	Commanding Officers a Division	and	Men	of	Му
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